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Abstract
Why did they make birds so delicate and fine as those sea swallows when the ocean can 
be so cruel? She is kind and very beautiful. But she can be so cruel and it comes so 
suddenly and such birds that fly, dipping and hunting, with their small sad voices are 
made too delicately for the sea" - Ernest Hemingway, “The old man and the sea”.  
The background of this research, given the central condition that the world is 
completely dependent on maritime transportation systems, is to understand how these 
systems are vulnerable towards disruptions, what the consequences are if the 
transportation systems should break down, and how one may give the systems the 
ability to restore their ability to move goods after a disruption has occurred.  
The mission of the system is to move goods, hence the focus on protecting the mission 
rather than the infrastructure itself. The prevalence of low-frequency high-impact 
scenarios; events that have a low probability but may cause great harm to the system, 
give the ground for why not all efforts should be directed towards preventing 
disruptions from occurring. Disruptions are bound to occur, how may the systems be 
prepared to cope with these events? 
Cases within transportation of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) and humanitarian logistics 
are used to illustrate the problem and the approach to coping with such problems.  
The research part of the doctoral thesis  can be divided into five thematic areas:  
TA1: Energy security, in particular for natural gas and global LNG transportation 
systems  
TA2: Understanding of maritime transportation system failures, in particular for low-
frequency high-impact scenarios  
TA3: Methods for systematically addressing how systems fail and how these may be 
made less vulnerable 
TA4: The relevance of maritime transportation systems in humanitarian relief 
operations, and how to strengthen these 
TA5: The interaction between supply chain risk assessment and LNG transportation 
system optimization 
Contributions from the research can be summed up as:  
C1: An overview of the critical functions necessary for a maritime transportation 
system’s ability to move goods. 
C2: A framework for systematically addressing vulnerabilities in maritime 
transportation systems, treating both operational and low-frequency high-impact risks, 
as well as incorporating cost/efficiency criteria in the assessment. 
C3: The insight and understanding of failure and restoration of maritime transportation 
systems is applicable to humanitarian relief logistics, where the application of principles 
from commercial supply chain management is immature.
C4: Combining supply chain risk assessment with optimization tools for an LNG supply 
chain increases the robustness and resilience of the system and thereby the energy 
security of the recipients, while ensuring efficient resource usage of the supply chain. 
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1. Introduction* 
“God must have been a ship-owner. He placed the raw materials far from where they 
were needed and covered two thirds of the earth with water.” – Erling Næss 
Global maritime transportation systems are essential for the world economy, providing 
access to energy, raw materials and finished goods to places where these are scarce, 
needed and wanted. At a glance, one may assume that maritime commerce is a modern 
phenomenon. Bernstein [1] shows that trade has been essential throughout history, and 
how maritime transportation has helped form the world we live in. 
The title of this thesis, “Risk and resilience in global maritime supply chains”, has a 
modern touch to it, using current concepts such as “resilience” and “global supply 
chains”. However, the essential concepts are not at all new: how societies depend on 
maritime transportation systems and maritime commerce; how these systems may break 
down; what can be done to prevent such breakdowns from occurring; what 
consequences will happen if indeed these transportation systems do break down; and 
how systems should be designed?  
My own story, having grown up in the old Hanseatic trade town Bergen, gave me 
perspectives on trade throughout history. The medieval wharfs are visible signs of a 
long maritime tradition, where in particular dried and salted cod was shipped in from 
the north, and traded onwards to continental Europe. Due to the geography of Norway 
and lack of roads, as well as the threat of piracy, international trade was more prevalent 
than trade between East and West Norway. This was visible also in the Viking age, of 
which remnants still exist; mastering the ocean was possible with supreme vessel 
technology – great journeys as far as across the Atlantic were made possible. Maritime 
commerce has impacted the growth of civilizations, and still plays a great, though 
almost invisible, part in the lives we live.
The following sections (1.1 and 1.2) discuss general characteristics of the shipping 
industry and the historical development of maritime commerce. Readers should be 
advised that these sections may be skipped, though they provide an overview and a 
historical perspective of the domain.  
*Sections 1.1 and 1.2 of this introductory chapter has primarily been based on two books; Bernstein’s “A splendid 
exchange” [1], and Stopford’s “Maritime Economics” [2]. The thesis format is based on a template by Conradi and 
Bjørnson [3].  
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1.1 Characteristics of maritime commerce and the shipping industry 
Why is merchant shipping wanted and necessary? I would argue this is due to three 
reasons: 1) Raw materials are located somewhere else than where these are sought for, 
and in between there is water. 2) Ships offer the potential to move large amounts of 
cargo over long distances with little use of labor. 3) Scale advantages allow for more 
cost-efficient production; to utilize such effects, produced goods needs transportation to 
markets.  
The demand side for maritime transportation can be described through studying the 
flow of goods. The largest volumes of commodities currently traded by sea can be 
organized into four categories [2], page 58]:
1) Energy trades, by weight accounting for 44 %, comprising crude oil, oil products, 
liquefied gas and thermal coal for electricity generation.  
2) Metal industry trades, accounting for 18 %, including the raw materials and products 
of steel, such as iron ore, metallurgic coal, various non-iron ores, steel products and 
scrap metal.  
3) Agricultural and forestry trades, in total 9% of volumes, consisting of the raw 
materials and the products from the agricultural industry. Commodities include cereals 
such as wheat or barley, soy beans, sugar, agribulks (dry bulks are e.g. seeds, wet bulks 
are typically oils such as soy or palm), fertilizers and forest products.
4) Other cargos, ranging from industrial materials such as cement to semi-manufactures 
and manufactures such as machinery and vehicles. While only constituting 29 % of 
volumes, in value the share of this latter category is closer to 50 %.
The supply side for sea transportation can be classified into three segments [2], page 
62]: Bulk cargos, Specialized parcels and General cargo parcels. Bulk cargos can be 
defined as “Unpacked homogeneous cargo poured loose in a certain space of a vessel 
or container” [4], which are split into dry buck such as coal and wet bulk, such as crude 
oil. Specialized cargos consist of large parcels with non-homogenous cargos, such as 
motor cars, refrigerated cargo and liquefied gas. These are transported on dedicated 
vessels. Finally, general cargo parcels are defined as “any individual parcel too small to 
fill a ship or hold”[2]. These cargos are transported as containerized goods, palletized 
goods, or stowed goods in cargo holds. Examples of vessels can be found in figure 1. 
The market for ships, ship building et cetera is not a central theme in this thesis, and 
will not be discussed further. 
Adam Smith gave examples of scale effects in “The Wealth of Nations”. For instance, 
in six weeks sometime in the 18th century, two men and six to eight horses pulling a 
wagon could carry about 4 tons between London and Edinburgh. In the same time, six 
to eight men manning a ship could move 200 tons – a labor productivity benefit of 15 
times [2]. Such effects are relevant today; the larger containerships currently in 
operation can carry about 15000 twenty-foot containers [TEU]. This would require 
7500 trucks, assuming a 40ft container per truck. More so, assuming a vessel crew of 
20, the labor productivity is 375 times higher by sea (naturally, disregarding the support 
staff needed to dock, produce, maintain and load the vessel, as well as the availability of 
fossil fuel to power engines).
State of the art 
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Figure 1. Example photos. Clockwise from top left: Container vessel with harbor cranes “Eugen Maersk” 
[5], LNG tanker “Arctic Voyager” [6], Crude oil tanker “Front Ardenne” [7], Car carrier “Alliance New 
York” [8]. 
Adam Smith stated that shipping was relevant for the production side too [2]: his 
example was that ten craftsmen could each make less than 100 pins a day. Combining 
efforts and specializing, combined they could make 48 000 pins. As this would be too 
much for a home market, access to transportation and thereby customers was 
fundamental to utilizing these scale effects. A current example is the usage of 300 000 
DWT bulk carriers. Significant infrastructure is required to handle, store and process 
parcels of a tenth of a million tons of iron ore. However, Chinese shipping companies 
are considering ever larger bulker designs, at present 600 000 DWT [9], showing that 
scale effects are indeed relevant.  
1.2 History of maritime trade and its development 
Growing up in a modern Western country, it is hard to grasp the access to goods from 
across the world. My local supermarket present perfectly ripe apples from New-Zealand 
next to Peruvian avocados, pineapples from the Maldives, Spanish oranges and Algerian 
dates as the most trivial thing. Given the access to such vast amounts of goods in this 
variety, it is overwhelming to grasp the importance of trade throughout history.  
Almost two thousand years ago, a roman laborer would have to pay a year’s wage for a 
hundred grams of silk [1], barely enough for a scarf – only the wealthiest could afford a 
toga. Exotic commodities such as silk could be worth its weight in gold, and only these 
were worthy of being transported around the world. The silk trade followed two main 
routes: the land route through Asia or the sea route across the South China Sea, the Bay 
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of Bengal, cross the Arabian Sea and the Red Sea, overland through Egypt and finally 
across the Mediterranean, a journey that would take at least 18 months, see figure 3.  
Normally, goods would change hands a number of times throughout the journey as 
traders followed their goods only for limited stretches, there was little oversight 
throughout the chain. As a result, little was known about the origins of trade goods such 
as spices, neither the origin nor exactly how it would be produced. It is safe to assume 
that the lack of such knowledge increased both the exclusivity of the good, as well as in 
some instances its healing power used as a medicine. This phenomenon is still visible in 
current organic health food stores.
Before the arrival of the European Caravel in the 15th century, valuable sea-borne cargo 
would be rowed; sailing was reserved for low-value cargo. A 150 feet trade galley could 
carry up to 500 oarsmen, not including other crew, officers and passengers. Late 
Venetian galleys would carry up to 300 tons of cargo.
Maritime commerce has been relevant all through the development of civilizations. In 
the following sections, maritime commerce is illustrated, in particular in the light of the 
vulnerability and struggle for control of these trade routes.
1.2.1 15 000 - 10 000 BC 
The time when man started creating watercrafts is unclear. Cave paintings and some 
maritime remains indicate that simple boats created for hunting emerged in Northern 
Europe about fifteen thousand years ago [1], page 22]; a major weakness of the reindeer 
was that it had poor abilities for swimming, requiring it to hold its head high for 
breathing – this made them easy targets for humans. Simple boats made from animal 
hides sewn over antler horns were used for hunting. The advantage of moving the 
carcasses by boat compared to by land must have pushed for using boats for other types 
of cargos.
One of the earliest traded commodities must have been obsidian, a volcanic rocklike 
glass that could be chipped razor sharp cutting tools and weapons [1], page 23]. For 
archaeologists, obsidian is relevant for two reasons: It is only to be found in a limited 
number of volcanic sites, and that samples can be traced back to its source. Obsidian 
flakes dating twelve thousand years back found in the Franchti Caves on the Greek 
mainland originated from Melos, an island some 160 kilometers offshore. This indicates 
that there has been maritime movement of goods, although no historical evidence exists 
to give more insight in this trade. 
1.2.2 4000 BC – 1450 AD 
Herodotus described the earliest of large cargo ships used for trade down the Euphrates 
to Babylon [1], page 24]; wooden frames supporting a skin of sewn hides could carry up 
to fourteen tons. For the reason of strong currents, the boats could not be paddled 
upstream, so upon arrival to Babylon, the wood frames would be scrapped and the hides 
packed on donkeys for the return upriver. Then, a new vessel could be constructed from 
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the same hides. The origins of this trade is about six thousand years ago, where copper 
was shipped from the Ergani mines in Turkish Anatolia to Uruk (160 km west of Basra) 
in what is now Southern Iraq.
With the arrival of written records about 3000 BC, we may get a better perspective on 
the extent of maritime commerce [1], page 26]. Dilmun, the land of milk and honey in 
the Sumerian creation myth, not far from current Qalat al-Bahrain, was a major trading 
center for copper from current Oman. What is relevant is that the settlement had about 
5000 inhabitants, which is far more than what could be sustained from the agricultural 
hinterland. Hence, the town was reliant on grain imports from upriver Euphrates. 
Around year 2000 BC, it is expected that the shiploads were in the range of several 
hundred tons, being the lifeline of the town. In effect, already 4000 years ago societies 
were entirely dependent on maritime transportation. 
While the cradle of civilization in Mesopotamia, including the Sumerians, Akkadians, 
Assyrians and later the Babylonians, had access to enormous grain resources allowing 
them to settle down and free labor for other tasks than hunting and gathering, they had 
little other strategic materials such as metals, timbers and even stone [1], page 28]. As 
much of the modern world depends on oil imports, the trade of these goods was vital for 
these empires – the large volumes despite doubtless enormous transportation costs 
illustrate the significance of these goods.  
The reliance on food imports can explain the pattern of growth of the Greek empires. 
While the first human civilizations settled in some of the world’s best farm land 
between the rivers of Euphrat and Tigris (current Iraq), and on the banks of the Nile 
(Egypt), this was not the fact in Greece. A traditional Greek farm could not even grow 
grain for its own needs [1], page 46]. All the while, the production of wine and olive oil 
for trade allowed for both food to feed the populace, as well as time and resources for 
farmers to participate in military service as Hoplites.  
Grain imports to Greece came from three sources, as illustrated in figure 2. Before 600 
BC, Egypt was the main source. From around 800 BC, however, Greek colonists started 
settling the eastern coast of Sicily - the colony of Syracuse, as well as the north shores 
of the Black Sea, what is now Southern Ukraine. Due to geography, the Spartans and 
their allies got their provisions from Syracuse, while Athens and its allies sourced grain 
from Ukraine – these two cities were the main adversaries of the Greek cities.  
State of the art 
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Figure 2: Athenian Grain Routes (based on [1] and [10]) 
It is relevant to observe how vulnerable these sea routes were, both passing through 
narrow seaways with ubiquitous risks of attacks from pirates and rivaling cities: Ships 
following the eastern route also had to pass the straits of the Dardanelles and Bosporus, 
which were settled and fortified from around 660 BC to respectively protect and prevent 
the trade [1], page 48]. Before the magnetic compass, the navigation season in the 
Mediterranean only lasted between May and September, as rough sea and cloud covers 
prevented open-sea transit for the remainder of the year.  
The Greek import dependency and the struggle for control of these sea routes and food 
sources led to a number of large battles. By 450 BC the Athenian navy patrolled the 
black sea more or less continuously, a move at the time unheard of in history [1], page 
49]. As neighboring city-states were just as dependent on these supply lines, requiring 
protection from “barbarians” and pirates, they soon joined forces with the Athenian, 
leading to the Athenian Empire. However, the Peloponnesian War started, like World 
War I, with a minor conflict in 431 BC, growing into a major Greek war. Between 415 
BC and 413 BC, Athens decided to cut off the supply routes to Sparta by breaking the 
supply lines from Sicily. A surprising defeat led to the destruction of the majority of the 
attacking fleet, leaving Athens vulnerable against attack. In late summer 405 BC, the 
counterattack came, taking or sinking the majority of grain ships. An invasion of Athens 
was no longer necessary, leaving the city to starve: Athens would never again regain its 
former position.  
Athens, as the cradle of Western civilization, illustrates the example of Western naval 
strategy [1], page 51]. Venice followed suit in the 1200s, then Holland of the 1600s and 
England of the 1800s: All nations had outgrown their domestic supplies, and depended 
on trade and imports for both survival and wealth. Comparing this with the current case 
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of oil import dependency of the Western world gives perspectives on the battle for 
control of oil resources in the latest century, and the US reliance on its navy.
The growing relevance of the Chinese can also be observed as the battle for resources 
increases. Chinese companies take increasing control of resources in the Middle East 
and in Africa. As for the other empires, to protect vulnerable sea routes of 
transportation, China is growing its navy fast, leading to worry among existing powers 
[11].
The history of the Roman Empire, from about 500 BC to 500 AD can explain swaths of 
the growth of global trade. Not unlike the luxury trades, the more exotic the goods, the 
more attractive it was. The importance of silk as a global merchandise has been 
illustrated earlier. Its main trade routes from China were the Silk Road and the sea 
routes around India [1], page 3]. The overland route based itself on camels (the 
preferred pack animal from around 1500 BC), where one driver would lead three to six 
camels, carrying in total between one and two tons of goods [1], page 56]. Given the 
camels’ capacity to go three days without water and an average day’s journey of around 
50 kilometers, trading posts (Caravanserais) were located about 150 kilometers apart 
throughout the Asian steppes.
Figure 3: The spice routes from China to Rome, the silk road and the Monsoon routes (based on [1] and 
[10]) 
Until pepper and silk arrived in the West, incense was the most important commodity. 
Already in 3500 BC, it was consumed in Babylon and Egypt [1], page 59]. The primary 
sources were current Yemen and Somalia, the supply chain went either by ship through 
the Red Sea or overland on camel through the Arabian Peninsula – the latter route 
considered safer due to frequent piracy and weather challenges. At the peak of Roman 
incense imports around 200 AD, ten thousand camel loads of incense was shipped to 
Rome every year [1], page 66] together with silk significantly draining the coffers of the 
empire.  
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Naturally, walking overland throughout Asia with camels was a perilous journey. In 
particular, tribes controlled the Arabian Peninsula, lacking a central authority. In this, a 
major source of income is raiding the trade of neighboring tribes. Academically, this 
may be described as a typical case of sub-optimization, where parties had a large 
incentive in gaining a larger share of the trade revenues, rather than actually performing 
trade. This was to change with the rise of Islam.  
Mohammed was born in 571 AD, and raised by his uncle, a trader. Trade and Islam was 
strongly connected, as illustrated by the Koran, Sura 4:29: “O you who believe! Do not 
devour your property among yourself falsely, except that it be trading by your mutual 
consent” [1], page 71]. In this, the growth of Islam can be understood as a bubble of 
unity against the unbelievers, where Islamic traders were protected and “infidels” 
preyed upon. Through a combination of conquest and by providing strong incentives to 
convert, by 750 AD, the Muslim empire recreated a Pax Romana throughout large parts 
of Asia, effectively controlling trade. In addition, Muslim navies took control of the 
East Mediterranean in 655 AD and later the remainder of it, effectively shutting down 
sea trade between East and West until Vasco da Gama’s arrival in the late 1400s.  
However, the eastern sea trade was blossoming, led by the Arabs, Persians, Indians and 
in particular the Chinese. The gradual collapse of the Abbasid Empire in the 800s and 
900s made the overland trade routes more dangerous. However, the trade winds in the 
Indian Ocean allowed for easy trade by sea. In the AD 1000s, the Chinese Song 
Dynasty shifted their focus towards the sea, resulting in the establishment of a 
permanent navy in 1132 [1], page 98]. The Chinese vessels carried innovations such as 
iron-nailed vessels with several decks, the magnetic compass and sails that allowed for 
tack courses.  
The most famous Chinese sea voyages were the seven voyages of the treasure fleets, 
commanded by the eunuch Zheng He between 1405 and 1433. Most of the voyages 
consisted of about three hundred vessels ranging from 100 feet “support ships” to nine-
masted 3-400 feet “treasure ships”, as well as a crew of about thirty thousand [1], page 
100]. Objectives of the mission were diplomatic, military and symbolic, rather than 
commercial. The primary achievement of these voyages was the stabilization of the 
Strait of Malacca, connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans and separating Peninsular 
Malaysia from Indonesian Sumatra. This is still considered one of the vital chokepoints 
of maritime commerce. The vessels reached as far as much of the East African coasts.  
Due to a power struggle between the Confucian bureaucracy that loathed trade, and the 
eunuchs, controlling most of it, no more trading missions would follow. Neither the 
commercial nor naval Chinese fleet was given any priority. In 1500, the emperor made 
building vessels with more than two masts a capital offense, followed by a 1525 decree 
making any oceangoing vessel illegal, effectively ending Chinese maritime presence. 
However, seeing how the goals of the expeditions never were commercial profit, who 
can blame the emperor for setting down the foot to excursions costing half the industrial 
output of the country? 
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Figure 4: Ming treasure ship and Columbus’ Santa Maria [12] 
As for Central Asia after the decline of the Umayyad and later Abbasid empires, the 
Asian waters without patrolling navies soon was full of pirates. Fortunately for the 
Portuguese explorer Vasco da Gama’s ego, he arrived in the Indian Ocean 65 years after 
Zheng He’s voyages ended. Da Gama’s largest caravel São Gabriel at 27 meters was on 
par with the smallest vessels in the Chinese fleet.   
As incense had been the most sought-after commodity in antiquity, spices such as black 
pepper, cinnamon, nutmeg, mace and cloves took this role between the 1300s and the 
1600s [1], page 110]. Venetian and Genoese merchants could buy spices in the markets 
in Alexandria and sell them in their home markets for three to five times the sum, giving 
them net returns in excess of 100% after shipping, insurance and customs. Europe, 
having little goods of interest for the Eastern partners, resorted to slave trade for the 
Muslim armies. Their main sources of slaves were in the eastern parts of the Black Sea 
and selling them in Egypt and the Levant (east coast of the Mediterranean). As for the 
Greek grain supply chains two thousand years earlier, this trade was absolutely 
dependent on the waterways through the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, then controlled 
by the declining Byzantine Empire. The conflict between Venice and Genoa led to a 
number of battles, whereof these straits were one. (Venice took Constantinople in 1202, 
Genoa toppled the Venetian rule in 1261, the slave trade was greatly reduced in 1292 
with the fall of Tyre and Acra, re-establishing land based trade of slaves from Caucasus. 
1, p127) 
An observation here is: What do Chinese eunuchs, Muslim slave armies and catholic 
priests have in common? This could either be the start of a really promising joke or an 
interesting academic debate. We will focus on the latter. Francis Fukuyama [13] argues 
that three elements are needed for successful state building; a strong state, a working 
legal system and mechanisms for holding the rulers responsible. To control large 
empires, it was critical that nepotism were controlled, as favoring family is indeed 
human nature. Hence, the eunuchs could not procreate, so their offspring could not be 
favorites. Slave armies served to free themselves, not for their families. Catholic priests 
were forced into sexual abstinence, hence removing their possibility for having 
offspring that could challenge the existing power structures.
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Trade in Northern Europe expanded throughout the middle age. Bruges in Belgium 
became one of the new trading centers in the years after 1227, taking over the position 
as a leading trading power within Europe [2], page 11]. Europe’s need for raw materials 
such as wool, timber, corn and fish led to the establishment of a precursor to the 
Hanseatic League in Lübeck in 1241 – the first official meeting of the League was held 
in 1356. The Hanseatic League can be seen as a precursor to the European Union, with 
its common commercial practices, currencies and institutions. Its final collapse in 1669 
can be explained to be due to its clumsy structure, the rise of new rivals, and the impact 
of the Reformation [14].  
1.2.3 1450 - 1833 
The Ottoman capture of Constantinople in 1453 shut down the remainder of Muslim -
Christian spice trade [1, page 129]. However, the battle for the spice trade had started 
earlier, Venetian and Genoese merchants had strong commercial interests in the 
crusades; the battle for control of the enormous cash flow of the Spice trades provided 
strong incentives for continued efforts in the crusades. The Muslim control of this trade 
led to several efforts by other powers to find a sea route to India. Portuguese King 
Henry the Navigator greatly supported map making and maritime development, leading 
to the discovery of the Caravel and later its larger sister the Carrack (“Nau” in 
Portuguese). These weatherly ships were sturdy enough to handle the strong winds of 
the ocean, as well as that their rigging allowed for tack courses. (See illustrations of 
Columbus ships in figure 5).  
Much can be said about Christopher Columbus’ estimates of the distances between 
Lisbon and India, the goal for the European spice expeditions. Already 1700 years 
earlier, in 205 BC, Greek Erastothenes of Alexandria calculated the circumference of 
the Earth [1, page 164]. Funded by the Spanish Queen Isabella and the Spanish finance 
minister Luis de Santangel, Columbus departed west in 1492, where the discovery of 
the Americas is history. As the scholars of the Spanish court were more enlightened 
about sailing distances than Columbus, the discovery of a world only briefly described 
by the Vikings, came as a great surprise. The pillaging of which in the following 
centuries led to unimaginable wealth in Spain and immense suffering in the New World.  
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Figure 5: Columbus ships; Caravel “Pinta”, Carracks “Santa Maria” and “Niña” [15] 
Vasco da Gama’s expedition to India between 1497 and 1499 had a more solid 
scientific foundation than that of Columbus [2]1, page 170] and was based on two 
“innovations”.  First, a recent discovery of the last decade, northbound trade winds led 
him to do a great circle sailing almost to Brazil after the Cape Verde islands, before 
circling south towards the Cape of Good Hope – a ninety-five day sea journey, where 
measured latitudes never were more than two degrees off. The second was the use of 
(kidnapped) Indian pilots to navigate the Indian Ocean. His commercial planning was 
however limited: they had not brought trading goods for acquiring spices, and local 
traders were unimpressed with the Europeans. Likewise, cultural sensitivity was not a 
strong feature, creating numerous enemies for him. Due to scurvy on the return leg, less 
than half of the 170 men he set out with got to return to Portugal. However, due to 
favorable prices of the limited textiles they had brought and cheap spices, the returns 
was sixty times the cost of the expedition, starting a new era in Portuguese seafaring 
and brutal conquests in the Indian Ocean.   
The reliance on maritime chokepoints made the Portuguese attempt to control Aden and 
later Bab-el Mandeb (the entrance to the Red Sea), which finally failed in 1538 as the 
Ottoman Empire took control of Aden. However, in 1511, the Portuguese took control 
of the Malacca Strait, which was critical to the Spice trade, originating from the Maluku 
(Spice) Islands in Indonesia [2]1, page 184] In spite of this, due to limited manpower, 
Portugal never managed to fully monopolize the spice trade; Ottoman trade with 
Venice, then France and the German countries took part in watering out their 
dominance. As Portugal (in what Bernstein refers to as “in a proud Iberian tradition”) 
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focused on military control rather than trade, it was continuously broke and gradually 
lost relevance from the mid 1500s. A relevant academic question is whether the same is 
happening for the Chinese and Americans in current global trade, where the former 
bases itself on commerce, the latter of military domination.  
Bernstein [2]1, page 199] points out four factors that led to “globalization” as we know 
it today: 
1) Within a few decades of Columbus voyage to the Americas, the exchange of 
agricultural crops such as corn, wheat, sugar and coffee had revolutionized the 
world trade and labor markets. 
2) By the early 1600s, Spanish and Dutch sailors had revealed the Earth’s wind 
patterns, allowing for crossing the oceans.  
3) Vast silver deposits discovered in Peru and Mexico allowed for a global 
monetary system, the Spanish eight-real coin (named dollar after 1690), in effect 
from the 1500s to the 1800s. 
4) The rise of the joint-stock corporation, with a number of advantages compared 
to royal monopolies or single families.  
Between 1577 and 1580, Francis Drake, in command of “The Golden Hind” repeated 
Magellan’s 1519-1522 circumnavigation of the globe. Returning to Plymouth harbor, he 
carried pirated Spanish silver and gold (supposedly so much that it replaced the ballast 
of his vessel) and Dutch trade goods, as well as cloves and nutmeg from the Spice 
Islands. After the plundered Spanish riches were handed over to the crown, the voyage 
paid returns fifty times the cost. More important, he carried the Portuguese pilot Nuño 
da Silva, maps and the knowledge of celestial navigation in the southern hemisphere 
[2]1, page 215]. Cavendish repeated the feat in 1588, returning with Spanish loot, crew 
clad entirely in silk, gold lined sails and the main sail made entirely from damask. Such 
riches provided strong incentives for further expeditions, leading to the establishment of 
the English East India Company (EIC) in 1600.  
The Dutch East India Company (VOC) was incorporated in 1602 with a 21-year 
monopoly on Dutch Asian trade. Nine years later, in 1611, Captain Brouwer of the 
VOC took a southeast turn after passing the Cape of Good Hope, rather than the usual 
turn northeast towards India [2]1, page 210]. In this, he became the first captain to ride 
the Roaring Forties, the strong westerly winds normally found between 40 and 50 
degrees south, all the way to Southeast Asia. This became the trucking road for 
European navigators for the next three centuries. After the north turn for the Sunda 
Strait, Bouwer reached current Jakarta in five months and twenty-four days after his 
departure from Holland, achieving two goals: The route was over twice as fast as the 
contemporary route, and he completely avoided the Portuguese at Malacca.
State of the art 
14
Figure 6: The sailing patterns between Europe, Asia and the Americas (based on [1] and [10]) 
Both the VOC and the EIC were allowed to conduct military operations (on certain 
terms of loyalty) – and were dependent on doing so to protect the trade routes. Between 
1602 and 1663, The VOC with its sister company the West India Company (WIC) 
effectively ran a world war, fighting for sugar in Brazil, spices in Asia and slaves and 
gold in Africa. The largest success of the VOC was though as a commercial enterprise. 
Dutch financial systems were the most advanced in the world in the 1600s [2]1, page 
223], offering an effective capital markets, bonds and futures, maritime insurance and 
fractional ownership of ships and companies – all of which stimulating commerce. In 
the 1620s, the interest rate in Holland was 4%, in England 10%, allowing the Dutch to 
borrow 2.5 times as much money. This allowed both merchants to invest in commerce 
and the state to fund its military.  
To control the spice flows; in 1605 the VOC decided that it needed not a monopoly of 
trade to Holland but to the world. As a consequence, they decided to take control over 
the Spice Islands, the origins of the spices located in the Maluku archipelago in present 
Indonesia. After a number of bloody battles, the VOC finally signed a peace treaty with 
the Spanish in Münster in 1648. The result of which was that the VOC could 
significantly increase the scope of its commercial operations [2]1, page 222]. The most 
profitable routes of the VOC was in fact the intra-Asian trades; Spices from Indonesia; 
Gold, copper and silver from Japan; tea, porcelain and silk from China, and Indian 
Cotton all went trough Batavia (current Jakarta), the main trading post of the Dutch. 
Only the most valuable cargos actually crossed the Cape. The Dutch Golden age ended 
with shifting tastes of the Western consumers, combined with new focus areas of the 
English. The new major commodities included cotton from India, tea from China, sugar 
from the Caribbean, Coffee from Yemen and Indonesia, and slaves from Africa [2]1, 
page 240]. The cynical nature of the latter trade in part led to the US civil war. 
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The triangular trade of the 1800s Atlantic basin is taught to any school child in the 
West; Commodities such as sugar, rum, cotton and tobacco from the Americas to 
Europe; manufactured goods such as textiles from Europe to Africa; Slaves from Africa 
to the Americas. This is an oversimplification that neglects the short haul trades – 
however it does illustrate the flow of goods [2]1, page 278]. The Eastern trades were not 
as simple, in particular as no obvious trade goods could be found to match the demand 
for goods such as tea. Until about 1820, tea was traded with Indian cotton in China, the 
cotton for manufactured goods from England, and tea to England [2]1, page 287]. Due 
to increased domestic production of Cotton in China, this trade broke down; the EIC 
had to pay for the tea with prized silver.
To understand where Adam Smith got the inspiration for his free-trade manifesto ”An 
Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations” [16], one must understand 
the context of English trade and mercantilism. The EIC gained from its monopoly on 
trades to the East, while suffering from domestic protectionism in textile manufacturing 
[2]1, page 283]. Smith’s theory about the “invisible hand of the market” was directly 
opposed to the state monopolies; he argued that the government should facilitate a 
multitude of parties competing. This also became a case with parallel trade.  
Opium sourced from India became the sought-after trade good for the British to China. 
Its use had first been made unlawful in China in 1729, so the EIC could not directly sell 
it in China – it had to go through local smugglers for fear of the wrath of the Chinese 
Emperor. Bernstein argues that the myth of the “entire Chinese population” being 
opium addicts is a gross overstatement. While half the men and a quarter of the women 
were occasional users, by 1879, less than one percent inhaled enough to be at risk for 
addiction [2]1, page 290]. Arguably, silver and the trade balance was as important a 
cause for moral outrage as the consumption of opium. Like now, the illegality of the 
trade forced prices up – the high prices paid for drugs in Western countries now 
finances one of the world’s largest industries, the “war on drugs” is a seemingly futile 
game only benefiting drug lords. Around 1800, the trade balance was heavily favoring 
China. According to EIC records, the tides turned in 1806, and by 1820, a fifth of the 
value of Chinese exports was silver. In 1834, the EIC finally lost its monopoly of trade 
to China [2]1, page 295]. Several confrontations between opium traders and the Chinese 
authorities finally led to the first of two Opium Wars, lasting from 1839 - 1842 and 
again 1856 - 1860.
1.2.4 1834 - 1950 
Four inventions changed international commerce in the 1800s [2], page 23]:  
1) Steam engines allowed vessels to move without wind, significantly decreasing 
transit times.  
2) Iron and later steel hulls allowed for building larger ships which protected cargo 
better.
3) Screw propellers made merchant ships more seaworthy and more efficient 
(compared to the earlier paddle-wheels). 
4) Deep sea cable networks allowed traders and ship owners to communicate 
across the world in a matter of hours rather than months.
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The speed of international trade growth illustrates the massive changes in global 
commerce. Volumes went from 20 million tons in 1840 to 140 million tons in 1887, 
averaging 4.2 % annually. Average sailing distances went up similarly, as trade routes 
within the Mediterranean were replaced with long haul routes to the Americas and 
Australia. The passenger trades went up similarly, in particular as a function of 
emigration from Europe to USA and Australia: On average, 32 000 passengers left 
Europe yearly between 1825 and 1835, 71 000 per year between 1836 and 1845, and a 
staggering 250 000 per year between 1845 and 1854. Monuments such as the Statue of 
Liberty in the seaward approach to New York have been closely associated with this 
migrant movement, and large Italian and Irish communities in cities such as Boston and 
New York bear witness to this migration.  
Shipping regulation became an issue in the 1800s. Lloyds Register had been started in 
the 1760s as a ships registry, assumed the role of setting standards and classing ships 
[2], page 34]. Lloyds originally started as the first modern maritime insurer in 1688 in 
Edward Lloyd’s coffee house [17]. Several other countries launched their own classing 
societies in the 1800s, including Det Norske Veritas (DNV) and The American Bureau 
of Shipping [2]. Great Britain controlled about half the world fleet in the 1800s. As a 
result, the majority of maritime legislation in other countries was based on the British 
standard, leading to a relatively consistent maritime legal system worldwide. 
Both liner routes and tramp shipping was well developed by the end of the 1800s. Liner 
services spread throughout the world as of 1870, accommodating a mix of passengers, 
mail, general cargo, oils and refrigerated cargo. By the 1950s, there were 360 liner 
conferences (in effect, legal price fixing meetings) for the deep-sea trades, each with 
between 2 and 40 members [2]. Tramp shipping in the 1800s consisted of ships moving 
from port to port, depending on where the best rates could be obtained. This was 
coordinated via overseas cables from the London ship broking companies through the 
Baltic Exchange – in 1869, Clarksons spent more on telegram fees than on wages. 
Compared to the liner services, tramp shipping was dominated by smaller players; a 
third of British companies in 1912 had less than three ships. Beside the British, Greek 
and Norwegians were the largest players. 
Trade wars, tariffs and duties drove several large changes throughout the between the 
1600s and 1800s. In Britain alone, no less than 127 Corn Laws were introduced to 
micromanage the trade of grains (referred to as corn) – mainly to protect the income of 
the landowners (who, coincidentally also controlled the parliament) to the disadvantage 
of the people [2]1, page 301]. The most draconian law, completely forbidding grain 
imports was implemented in 1815, causing hunger and economic stagnation. These laws 
have become examples of mercantilism, the debate between Thomas Malthus and David 
Ricardo has also become a text-book example in international economy on competitive 
advantages. High food prices forced people to spend a bulk of their earnings on food 
rather than manufactured goods, thereby costing jobs in manufacturing and more 
economic loss [18]. The laws were finally repealed in 1846.
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Import tariffs were also an important seed for conflict between the Northern and 
Southern states in the US; before the introduction of income taxes in the 1900s, import 
duties financed 90 % of the US government [2]1, page 320]. The North demanded 
protection from British manufacturing; the South did not want their farming exports 
touched. In 1833, the “Compromise Tariff” passed the US Congress, thereby delaying 
the civil war for a generation. The 1861 - 1865 US Civil War was about tariffs, but also 
about slavery and states’ right: the Northern (Union) side won over the separatist 
Southern (Confederate) states.  
The transition from wooden sail ships to metal steam ships took almost a century, due to 
several reasons. One was the cost and cargo capacity needed for fuel; ships using more 
than 25% of its cargo capacity for fuel would not be competitive. By 1850 sail ships 
were more economical beyond 4 800 kilometers, by 1890 beyond 16 000 km [2]1, page 
328]. In the early 1900s, only low-value long-haul cargos such as guano and dried cod 
were transported by sail ships. Other problems were the fouling of iron hulls, and that 
steam ships cost 50% more to build and needed 50% more crew. Also, the availability 
of cheap American timber and the precise meteorological charting of the earth’s wind 
patterns kept the sail ships competitive. However, the opening of the Suez Canal in 
1869 cut the sailing distance between Europe and Asia from 18 000 kilometers to 10 
500 km, thereby removing one of the most important routes for sailing ships. China’s 
main export to Europe was tea, of so high value that shippers were willing to pay extra 
charges to ensure fast delivery.
As shown, not everyone benefits from trade. European farmers were hurt by the 
enormous farming capacity developed in the Americas and Oceania. Technological 
innovations led to lower shipping costs, refrigeration technology allowed for a wider 
scope of goods to be transported. The Swedish economists Heckscher and Ohlin, the 
last of which won the Nobel Prize for this theory, that trade and decreasing shipping 
costs led to global convergence of commodity prices, as well as the input factors; wages 
rents and interest rates [2]1, page 340], which has been proved as a robust result [19]. 
The Stolper-Samuelson theorem explains who wins and who loses from international 
trade (the owner of the most intensively used input wins), and the implications of this 
on international trade. In sum, this led to a backlash; the European free-trade movement 
was set back, according to Bernstein [2]1, page 337], contributing to two world 
conflicts and present globalization battles.
1.2.5 1950 – 
Tramp and liner services had seemed a robust mechanism for a century; few had 
expected anything but these trades to continue. However flexible, the systems were too 
labor-intensive; rising labor cost after World War II forced companies to increase the 
scale of operations, to integrate maritime transportation into larger logistics systems and 
to invest in labor-saving technology, such as more efficient cargo handling (compared 
to stowing the goods manually) [2]. Bulk goods were moved by dedicated carriers 
between terminals designed to handle the goods, general cargo by container ships. 
Passenger liner routes were eradicated and ships broken up or converted into cruise 
liners.  
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The world commerce markets changed with new trade strategies of Western nations 
after World War II. Increasing protectionism, culminating in the US Smoot-Hawley 
legislation and retaliation by US partners led the world into autarky [2]1, page 353].
The Bretton Woods conference in 1944, and later the 1947 General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) meant opening of economies, including former colonies, and 
increased trade world wide [2]. The US had also learnt that trade wars in part could 
contribute to real war [2]1, page 356], as seen in part with the case of Germany, where 
trade wars offered “an excellent opportunity to arouse popular resentment”. 
Analogously, within Europe, the Coal and Steel Community was established in 1951, 
which was expanded into the European Economic Community in 1957 [20] (The 
current European Union). The motivation was that “tying countries together politically 
and economically is a way to consolidate democracy and resolve the traditional causes 
of conflict”
Worldwide sea trade grew from 500 million tons in 1950 to 7 billion tons in 2005 in 
what Stopford calls “Shipping’s industrial revolution” [2]. In the last half of the 1900s, 
vessel sizes grew massively, and a number of new ship types were developed, including 
roll-on roll-off carriers, container ships, liquefied gas-carriers and chemical tankers.   
The growth of the bulk shipping industry was driven by multinational corporations. 
Until the 1950s, international oil trades were limited; oil was normally transported as 
products in smaller tankers. Strategies changed into moving crude near the markets to 
refine it close to customers, creating a market opportunity for larger vessels [2]. Steel 
mills similarly moved closer to shore, while iron ore and coal mines were developed 
overseas to supply them. Hence, commodities like oil, iron ore and coal were used in 
such large quantities that parcel sizes well above 100 000 tons were practical. Until the 
1950s, normal vessel sizes were not above 10-12 000 tons. For dry trades, by the 1970s, 
vessels over 200 000 tons could be used for high-volume routes, similarly over 300 000 
by the 1980s. The average crude tankers correspondingly moved up to being around 
80 000 dead weight tons (dwt) by the 1980s, the average size stabilizing there. Very 
large crude carriers (VLCCs) are now around 300 000 dwt, where the extremes built in 
the late 1970s were around 550 000 dwt.
Container shipping technologies turned the liner shipping industry completely around. 
Developed in 1956 by Malcolm Mc Lean [2]1, page 361], over the next centuries it 
made general cargo trade virtually free. By the 1960s, port congestion and labor 
difficulties were significant bottlenecks; cargo from Europe to the US could take 
months to arrive [2]. In comparison, a container could arrive in the US only days after 
being sent; ready to be transferred to rail services going inland. Containerization 
covered a wider perspective than just moving general cargo: by investing heavily in 
infrastructure, an end-to-end responsibility of cargo was made possible within a closed 
conference system.  
Current shipping markets are characterized by ever lower shipping costs [21]. The cost 
of a transatlantic shipment of a 20 foot container, which can carry up to 15 tons of 
goods, is comparable to an economy class plane ticket. Transportation of a crude oil 
from the Middle East to the US cost less that 1 US Cent per liter. A ton of iron ore from 
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Australia to Europe runs less than USD 10. Sending consumer electronics from Asia to 
Europe would cost USD 10 for a TV set and USD 1 for a vacuum cleaner. In other 
words, the transport cost is marginal compared to the product price – which is quite the 
development since the origin of international trade.  
The present focus of ever reducing cost on transportation, combined with increasing 
societal dependence on maritime transportation, makes this an interesting subject. The 
relevance of the subject is shown in the next section.
1.3 Current relevance of sea trade systems 
Maritime supply chains are exposed to many disruption sources, leading to a number of 
system breakdowns every year. There seems to be a growing realization in research 
communities that the maritime transportation system cannot be seen as yet another set 
of nodes in the supply chain, but rather as integrated components, where failures do 
have severe consequences. De Martino and Morvillo [22] argue that ports until recently 
have not been seen as integrated components in the supply chain, although their focus is 
value creation. Carbone and De Martino contend that existing research on ports in a 
business perspective is modest [23]. Robinson similarly suggests that ports should be 
included as elements in value-driven chain systems [24].  
The current dependence on maritime supply chains can best be illustrated by when these 
fail. Extreme examples are the 1995 Kobe earthquake [25], and the 2002 Los Angeles 
dock workers’ lockout [26], both with massive consequences to business and 
infrastructure. It is relevant to observe that these events hurt the port element of the 
supply chain. The Port of Kobe suffered severe damage, 0 of 35 container berths and 
only 9 of 186 berths total were operable.  It took over two years to restore full capacity 
[25]. Consequently, the port dropped from being the 6th to the 17th largest container port 
in the world. Long-term traffic loss endured beyond the restoration of port facilities due 
to the competitive situation in the area, increasing the economic loss endured by 
stakeholders and dependents of the port.
The 2002 11-day shutdown of US West Coast ports resulting from the lockout of 
potentially striking dockworkers, as reported by Park et al. [27]. They show that the 
total losses to the US economy from the incident were about $3 billion, which is severe, 
although smaller than earlier estimates of 2 to 6 times this number. Stakeholders of the 
industry thereby have strong economic incentives in avoiding the consequences of 
supply chain disruptions. 
As for the ancient Greek and onwards throughout history, trade has been relying on a 
limited set of routes. While ships can, in theory, travel anywhere on the oceans, major 
trade routes follows the shortest sailing paths, referred to as sea lines of communication. 
Narrow points in these, due to land, islands or shallow water, can be described as 
chokepoints. While numerous of these exist, only a few are of major importance to 
world trade, as may be seen in table 1. Sea lane security was an important research topic 
in the 1970s and 1980s, particularly within a military context [28]. While concern has 
abated since the end of the Cold war, the subject is as critical as ever with the growth of 
and dependency on global maritime trade. Maritime transportation is a prerequisite for 
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global trade, as over 80% of global trade in goods are transported by ships [29]. A 
general trend is that world merchandise trade grows two to three times faster than the 
world economy, represented by the global gross domestic product. In 2005, over 7 
billion tons of cargo was moved by sea between 160 countries [2], constituting a great 
share of international volumes. The 2004 value of world import trade was $7.2 trillion 
dollars, where maritime transportation has been vital as an enabler.  
While chokepoints of sea lanes in theory are a resource of fixed supply, the effective 
supply is variable. For some trades, like crude oil, pipelines, either origin to destination 
or parallel to chokepoint, may offer additional transport capacity. Supply may be 
threatened in two dimensions: physical constraints that restrict transit and actions by 
states or non-state actors that threaten or restrict free passage [28]. Current threats are 
not so much direct threats, in the form of military power, as indirect, such as piracy, 
terrorism, collisions blocking waterways and regional instability. Examples of 
disruptions include the laying of sea-mines in the Strait of Hormuz in the 1980s, piracy 
and terrorist attacks in the Malacca Strait, the closure of the Suez Canal between 1967 
and 1975, and the terrorist attack on USS Cole near Bab-el-Mandab in 2000.
For my thesis, the initial approach focused on the sea transit element of maritime supply 
chains. As a part of this, initial discussions were held with the Royal Norwegian Navy 
and the Norwegian Naval Academy. However, an insight that emerged was that 
stakeholders assessing their supply chains should focus on factors which they may 
control and influence. Securing ocean transit is typically the task of national states and 
supranational organs such as the UN. Also, the ocean transit is only a part of the supply 
chain, the interaction between sea and land supply chains became a focus for the 
remainder of the research.  
General trends in maritime transportation are consolidation and privatization; terminals 
are increasingly operated by large transnational terminal operators replacing local 
partners, and shipping companies increase their scope of control in the value chain [30]. 
An increased security focus in maritime transportation, introducing initiatives and 
regulations such as Authorized Economic Operator [AEO], Partners in Protection [PIP], 
Container Security Initiative [CSI],  Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism [C-
TPAT] and 100 % container scanning are introducing new complexities for the flow of 
goods [31, 32]. The combination of industry consolidation and increased regulation 
results in tighter coupling and more complex interactions between the components of 
the maritime transportation systems, thereby increasing the vulnerability of the system 
[33].
Global energy dependence is an illustrating example of the world’s dependence of long 
and complex supply chains. While this study only outlines the problem, it is clear that 
research is needed to determine possible disruption sources, as well as how participants 
and dependents of the value chain may adapt and prepare themselves to handle such 
low-probability high-impact scenarios. 
The World Economic Forum (WEF) in their 2008 Global Risk Report identified four 
emerging global risks: Hyper-optimization and supply chain vulnerability, and energy 
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supply security were two of them [34]. Integration of regional economies has come as a 
result of reduction in trade barriers and improvement in global logistics and technology. 
A result is that international and intra-regional trade growth rate has surpassed the 
global economy growth rate over the last twenty years. The above mentioned report 
asserts that effective preparation and management of supply chains may prevent 
contagion of a localized risk event: lack of sufficient preparation may amplify the 
disruptive impacts of events beyond the industrial sector into the societal domain. In 
particular, this is relevant in energy supply. Nevertheless, risks in long and complex 
supply chains are obscured by the sheer degree of coupling and interaction between 
sources, stakeholders and processes within and outside of the system; disruptions are 
inevitable, management and preparation are therefore difficult – in accordance with the 
Normal Accident Theory [33]. The WEF 2009 report upholds the warning: “Risk 
management must also account for interlinkages and remote possibilities. Low-
probability, high-severity events, such as the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the Asia tsunami 
of 2004 and the global credit crisis do happen“ [35].
Systemic risk in global infrastructure is emphasized in the 2010 report [36], page 23: “a 
major terrorist attack that closed a port such as Rotterdam, Hong Kong or Los Angeles 
for weeks would have severe economic consequences on world trade because it would 
inflict major disruptions in complex just-in-time supply chains that comprise the global 
economy”. The conclusion from WEF is: “there is a need to balance the additional 
private costs to operate more safely that might negatively affect the firm’s bottom line 
with the benefits of reduced global risks; that is the trade-off between private efficiency 
and public vulnerability.”  
Global supply chains are highly dependent on maritime transportation. Through 
reviews, little research has been found on the disruption vulnerability of Maritime 
Transportation Systems [MTS]. This hole in research is relevant to pursue further. The 
understanding of maritime supply chain disruption vulnerability may be better 
understood through using methods from fields where the understanding of such 
problems are more progressed – namely reliability and safety engineering. A core 
concept in my PhD work is to adapt the maritime safety-method Formal Safety 
Assessment [FSA] [37] into the domain of understanding maritime supply chain 
vulnerability.
A key question in this is whether to prevent a disruptive event from occurring or to 
prepare to respond to a disruptive event after it has occurred. At a glance, the question 
may seem trivial; it is better to not have anything happen rather than to deal with the 
consequences afterwards. However, given that there are almost endless possibilities for 
something going wrong; knowing which scenarios to prevent from is not a trivial task.
Secondly, not all risks can be foreseen or quantified; “unknown unknowns”, or events 
one did not know one was vulnerable to, still may cause harm. Therefore, one should 
prepare to restore the ability of the system to perform its mission.  
Thirdly, money is an issue: the cost-efficiency or “lean” trend of the latest 30 years [38], 
where organizations have minimized excess inventory and capabilities to cut cost, has 
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made systems more vulnerable – one may fear that some cost cuts have reduced the 
damage tolerance of systems, such as illustrated by the World Economic Forum [34]. 
A two-tiered approach to addressing maritime supply chain vulnerabilities is suggested. 
Frequent and well-known risks, typically operational issues and recurring events from 
the past, can be foreseen. For these, the existing Formal Safety Assessment framework 
is adaptable with some adjustments. However, for low-frequency high-impact [LFHI] 
disruption scenarios, such as the Kobe earthquake, a consequence focused approach 
termed failure mode assessment is suggested.  
Failure modes are about disregarding what hazards caused a disruptive event, and rather 
to understand the consequences such events have on the system. By looking at the 
maritime transportation system from a functional perspective, seeking what capabilities 
and functions are necessary for the system to be able to perform its mission, one may 
protect these functions without focusing on particular hazards and threats. Recognizing 
that there are endless numbers of hazards and threats, attempting to prepare the 
organization for all of these is fruitless. But there may be great value in preparing for 
the few ways that your system would fail. Through the grounded theory work of Rice 
[39, 40], and expansions to these by Berle et al [41], the authors argue to have captured 
the high level ways maritime transportation systems may fail. The essential question is 
then; which functions do you need to back up to make your supply chain work? 
The basis for the six failure modes used in the failure mode research is the MIT Center 
for Transportation and Logistics Supply Chain Response project, for which several 
hundred disruption scenarios were assessed and grouped through grounded theory [42]. 
The concept of failure modes is well known and used within safety and reliability 
application [43, 44]. 
The U.S. Department of Transportation [45] defines the Maritime Transportation 
System [MTS] as composed of ports, intermodal connections, navigable waterways, 
vessels and users. We do not treat the user explicitly, as the interest of the user is 
covered by the definition of the mission of the transportation system, but the four others 
are the elements used in this paper. A distinction between ports and terminals is made 
through ownership and their tasks.
Ports, as opposed to terminals, are to a large degree owned and operated by the public. 
Ports are considered to be the business support functions around the terminals, such as 
providing internal infrastructure like port road and rails, safety and security functions 
such as customs, investments, development and marketing. While some ports authorities 
operate the terminals themselves, a tendency is that terminal facilities are private 
facilities, where the port authority serves as a landlord. The terminal function, as 
defined here, refers to the superstructure involved in the commercial operation of the 
port, i.e. the movement and processing of cargo. Intermodal connections are the links 
between the loading processes of goods in the terminal and the surface transportation 
system through road, rail, and pipelines. Vessels are referring to ships that carry goods 
over sea. Barges are a special case that can be considered as vessels, although mainly 
operated on inland waterways.
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System borders for the maritime transportation system, as defined in papers one and 
two, are where the goods exit the port domain. In this, navigable waters such as turning 
basins, canals and waters leading into open sea is included, open water transit is not. 
Similarly, on the land side, when goods exit the port infrastructure into the main 
logistics systems such as the public highway or main rail system (the hinterland 
transportation system), it is no longer within a port domain. In addition, vessels are key 
components in the maritime transportation system, and are therefore included. 
The interaction between the elements of the maritime transportation system may be 
illustrated as in figure 7; this is a receiving end port. Sending the goods the other way 
would make this an export port, loading and unloading from vessels to vessels would be 
a transhipment port. The model thereby covers the maritime transportation system. 
System borders illustrate where the scope of the assessment ends. In short, goods are 
unloaded from the vessel to the terminal, before goods are loaded through the 
intermodal connections and are sent to the public infrastructure through the port 
infrastructure.  The port environment encompasses the navigable waterways, terminal 
and intermodal connections. There are some variations affecting what constitutes 
terminal operation and what constitutes intermodal connections, illustrated by the gray 
area. Intermodal connections are dependent on port infrastructure, so elements of the 
port infrastructure are included in the scope of the intermodal connections.
Figure 7: Process of the maritime transportation system 
When disruption occurs, reducing the consequences is the only possible action. In 
which ways can planning allow for restoring the ability to perform the mission of the 
system? The critical functions can be found in paper 1 in the attachments. 
To ensure a comprehensive approach to understanding supply chain vulnerability, a 
framework for assessment of supply chains was deemed necessary. Instead of 
developing one from scratch, a concept was to adapt existing frameworks to the 
problem. Reliability engineering was found to be suitable, from which the 
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methodologies had been used for numerous cases within risk management, offshore 
safety et cetera. The advantage of using tested methods includes that benefits and 
disadvantages are known.  
Given that not all threats can be foreseen, nor can all threats be prevented from causing 
a disruption, supply chain disruptions are bound to occur. Reasons for this include that 
many disruptive events have a very low probability, although consequences can be 
large. The risk for each and every one of these is so low, and the number of potential 
threats so large, that preventing all events from occurring neither is feasible nor rational.  
The concept of barriers may explain how to prevent hazards from leading to full blown 
disruptive events, as well as to reduce the consequences in case a disruptive event 
occurs. Hollnagel [46]. Barriers can be modelled as part of fault and event trees, which 
are discussed later in this dissertation.
The infrastructure needed to liquefy natural gas is very costly, the vessels likewise. To 
reduce capital and operational expenses, LNG supply chains are optimized to a high 
degree, leading to lean and tightly integrated systems with little slack. Societal 
dependence on natural gas is high, given that the most important usage area for natural 
gas is electricity generation. These properties; societal dependency and vulnerable 
maritime transportation networks where redundancy and buffers are expensive makes 
LNG transportation a relevant and timely subject for this research.  
Humanitarian Logistics operations have been studied, to investigate if the insights from 
this research could be applied in this operational domain. Given time, cost and capacity 
constraints, maritime transportation may contribute in moving goods into a relief area 
and distributing goods to end users. Through using the developed frameworks to 
increasing the understanding of humanitarian relief logistics, this case also offers an 
example of possible implementation of the research.
1.4 Research context 
This research project was funded by the Norwegian Research Council through the 
MARRISK research project. MARRISK was formed to answer the following research 
question [47]: “How should we able to engineer resilience into the maritime logistics chain 
that meets the vulnerability and risk taxonomies of the context, and finally be able to 
analyse and manage the vulnerability and risk scenarios in a proactive manner?”. The 
question of the author’s task in this project was to describe “in which ways the global 
shipping systems are vulnerable, and with our ability to analyse the consequences for global 
trading patterns and the shipping industry of these vulnerabilities, as well as the resilient 
measures within the shipping systems that are intended to cope with the vulnerabilities.”
In addition, for the author’s one-year research exchange at Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, he was generously funded through the Fulbright Foundation, The Jansons’ 
fellowship and the DNV fellowship.
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1.5 Research questions 
Two research questions have been formulated for each of the four journal papers from 
which this dissertation is composed. The relation between the papers, supporting 
research and the contributions of this project can be seen in figure 8. Much of the 
insights on energy security and dependence on maritime transportation systems came 
from the initial research on LNG transportation, as described in TA1.
Paper 1: Failure modes in the maritime transportation system – a functional approach 
to throughput vulnerability 
RQ1: How may one identify potential low-frequency high-risk disruption scenarios in 
maritime transportation systems?  
RQ2: How do one reduce systemic vulnerability towards low-frequency high-risk 
disruption scenarios in maritime transportation systems? 
Paper 2: Formal Vulnerability Assessment: A methodology for assessing and mitigating 
strategic vulnerabilities in maritime supply chains  
RQ3: What would be a suitable framework for addressing maritime transportation 
system vulnerability to disruption risks? 
RQ4: Which tools and methods are needed for increasing the ability of operators and 
dependents of maritime transportation to understand disruption risks, to withstand such 
risk, and to prepare to restore the functionality of the transportation system after a 
disruption has occurred?
Paper 3: The role of the maritime transportation system in relief supply chains  
RQ5: How may maritime transportation systems contribute in humanitarian relief 
operations? 
RQ6: What are the essential factors (critical capabilities) necessary for a maritime 
logistics operation within a humanitarian relief context?  
Paper 4: Optimization, risk assessment and resilience in LNG transportation systems 
RQ7: Can risk assessment methods combined with results from fleet planning provide 
more insight in creating resilience in maritime supply chains? 
RQ8: Does the combination of risk assessment methods and deterministic optimization 
software provide adequate results for a supply chain planning problem under 
uncertainty? 
1.6 Research design 
The research part of the doctoral fellowship period can be divided into five thematic 
areas:  
TA1: Energy security, in particular for natural gas and global LNG transportation 
systems  
TA2: Understanding of maritime transportation system failures, in particular for low-
frequency high-impact scenarios,  
State of the art 
26
TA3: Methods for systematically addressing how systems fail and how these may be 
made less vulnerable,  
TA4: The relevance of maritime transportation systems in humanitarian relief 
operations, and how to strengthen these 
TA5: The interaction between supply chain risk assessment and LNG transportation 
system optimization.  
Figure 8: Studies, contributions and papers
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As can be seen in figure 8, one study is associated to each thematic area. Three industry 
case studies were performed from the MARRISK project to understand practical aspects 
of supply chain vulnerability, insights from these were used in creating own frameworks 
and approaches in TA2 and TA3. A set of 20 interviews were performed, 16 of which as 
a part or the MIT CTL Port resilience project. In addition, support from three other 
studies not managed by the author was included, namely the MIT CTL port capacity 
study, the MIT CTL Port Resilience Survey and the MIT CTL Global Risk survey, the 
latter of which was only affiliated to the Port Resilience project.  
1.7 Papers 
1.7.1 Paper 1  
BERLE, Ø., RICE JR, J.B., and ASBJØRNSLETT, B.E., Failure modes in the maritime 
transportation system – a functional approach to throughput vulnerability. Maritime 
Policy and Management, 2011. 38(6): p. 605-632. [48] 
Abstract:
Maritime transportation systems are essential for world trade; it is crucial to understand 
how these systems may fail, to be able to maintain their capacity. In this paper, the 
maritime transportation system is seen as a throughput mechanism; a technical system 
which serves its purpose by moving goods for its dependents. Understanding which key 
functions and capabilities are prerequisite for the ability to move goods, the loss of 
which are the failure modes, allows for the creation of a ‘business continuity plan’ for 
the maritime transportation system 
Through two surveys and interviews with maritime transportation industry stakeholders, 
it was observed that while stakeholders in the industry have a solid focus on frequent 
operational risks, there is a lack of awareness of vulnerabilities, as well as methods for 
addressing and planning for low-frequency high-impact disruption scenarios. The 
presented approach provides a structured set of matrices of the key functions of the 
maritime transportation system, allowing stakeholders to increase the system’s 
resilience through preparing to restore this limited number of critical functions. 
Relevance to the thesis:  
This paper presents our findings in study 3, and serves as a continuation and expansion 
of the work done for SP4. It describes which key functions a maritime transportation 
systems is reliant on to provide its mission, and how one may create a more resilient 
transportation system through preparing to restore these functions. This paper belongs 
to TA1, corresponds to RQ1 and RQ2, presents C1 and lays the basis for C2, C3, RQ3 
and RQ4, as well as to some extent RQ5 and RQ6. In short, this approach towards 
understanding low-frequency high-impact risk is one of the critical contributions from
this thesis. 
The independent contribution of the candidate: 
I wrote this paper in its entirety, based on secondary paper 4. The approach was based 
on previous research at MIT, although the expansion into the maritime domain was a 
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novel approach. The concept was refined through discussions with Rice and 
Asbjørnslett. I took part in all interviews, except from four due to US Security rules and 
regulations. The questions for the 16 interviews done at MIT were developed in 
collaboration with Rice, the remainder by the author alone. The surveys were not my 
work, although I took part in the last stages of formulating questions for the MIT CTL 
Port Resilience Survey. 
The contribution on James B Rice:
Rice managed the MIT CTL Port Resilience Survey, took initiative to and led the 16 
interviews with terminal operators, port authorities and coast guard in the US and 
Panama. Further, he discussed the concepts and arguments with the author.  
The contribution of Bjørn Egil Asbjørnslett:  
Asbjørnslett supervised the paper, discussed the concepts and arguments with the 
author, and introduced the candidate to the problem. 
1.7.2 Paper 2  
BERLE, Ø., ASBJØRNSLETT, B.E., and RICE, J.B.J., Formal Vulnerability 
Assessment: A methodology for assessing and mitigating strategic vulnerabilities in 
maritime supply chains. Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 2011. 96(6): p. 696-
705. [49] 
Abstract
World trade increasingly relies on longer, larger and more complex supply chains, 
where maritime transportation is a vital backbone of such operations. Long and complex 
supply chain systems are more prone to being vulnerable, though through reviews, no 
specific methods have been found to assess vulnerabilities of maritime transportation 
system. Most existing supply chain risk assessment frameworks require risks to be 
foreseen to be mitigated, rather than giving transportation systems the ability to cope 
with unforeseen threats and hazards. In assessing cost-efficiency, societal vulnerability 
versus industrial cost of measures should be included. 
This conceptual paper presents a structured Formal Vulnerability Assessment [FVA] 
methodology, seeking to transfer the safety-oriented Formal Safety Assessment [FSA] 
framework into the domain of maritime supply chain vulnerability. To do so, two 
alterations are made: 1) The focus of the assessment is defined to be ensuring the ability 
of the transportation to serve as a throughput mechanism of goods, and to survive and 
recover from disruptive events. 2) To cope with low-frequency high-impact disruptive 
scenarios that were not necessarily foreseen, two parallel tracks of risk assessments 
need to be pursued: the cause-focused risk assessment as in the FSA, and a 
consequence-focused failure mode approach.  
Relevance to the thesis:  
This paper belongs within thematic areas TA1 and TA3, corresponds to RQ3 and RQ4, 
and results in contribution C2. It serves as a continuation of the work presented in SP3, 
and lays the foundation for the insights in TA5 in paper four. With the failure modes in 
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paper 1, this formalized approach provides a structured guideline in how to address 
maritime supply chain vulnerability. 
The independent contribution of the candidate: 
I wrote the entire paper, while concepts and arguments were developed together with 
and discussed with Asbjørnslett and Rice throughout the process. As for paper 1, I took 
part in all interviews, except from four due to US Security concerns. The questions for 
the 16 interviews done at MIT were developed in collaboration with Rice, the remainder 
by the author alone, under supervision by Asbjørnslett. The surveys were not my work, 
although I took part in the last stages of formulating questions for the MIT CTL Port 
Resilience Survey. 
The contribution of Bjørn Egil Asbjørnslett: 
Asbjørnslett proposed the concept to the first author, supervised the paper, developed 
and discussed the concepts and arguments with the first author. Further, he introduced 
the candidate to approaches for vulnerability assessments in a structured manner. 
The contribution of James B. Rice: 
Rice managed the MIT CTL Port Resilience Survey, took initiative to and led the 16 
interviews with terminal operators, port authorities and coast guard in the US and 
Panama. Further, he discussed the concepts and arguments with the author.  
1.7.3 Paper 3  
BERLE, Ø., SPENS, K., and ASBJØRNSLETT, B.E., The role of maritime 
transportation in humanitarian logistics. Submitted to the International Journal of 
Ocean Systems Management, in review. [50] 
Abstract
Humanitarian relief operations are characterized by limited transportation capacity at a 
high cost, in part due to high reliance on air freight, especially in the first days after a 
disaster has struck. This paper investigates critical supply chain capabilities needed to 
facilitate a transportation mode shift in humanitarian relief operations. Sea-
transportation can both improve the capacity characteristics, as well as the agile 
characteristics of humanitarian relief logistics, the latter in particular through short sea 
distribution of goods to local areas of need. Sea-based transportation can increase 
capacity into a disaster area at lower cost, but requires an adequate sea-land interface. 
Also, with such capacities in place, short sea transportation can relieve road-
transportation networks for moving goods to distribution centres, save from the final 
movement from distribution centers to end users. The approach provided is based on 
previous research using reliability engineering methods on supply chain risk 
management problems. An illustrative example is provided by means of data from the 
2010 Haiti earthquake.  
Key words: Humanitarian logistics, Supply chain capabilities, Haiti earthquake, 
Maritime transportation system 
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Relevance to the thesis: 
This paper is particularly relevant for TA4 and corresponds to RQ5 and RQ6, and 
results in contribution C3. It serves as an illustration of the concepts in paper 1, applied 
to a practical case, as well as to illustrate the potential gains that are possible when 
maritime transportation is included in planning.  
The independent contribution of the candidate: 
This paper is the result of collaboration with Spens, with whom the author started to 
develop the idea at MIT. The introduction and background is a result of several 
iterations, where the writing has been shared about equal. The approach and conclusions 
(sections 3-5) were developed in collaboration with Asbjørnslett and written by the 
author under supervision by Asbjørnslett.
Karen Spens’ contribution: 
Spens initiated the paper, discussed the concepts and arguments with the author. She 
wrote about half of the introduction and background parts, focusing on the humanitarian 
logistics segments.  
Bjørn Egil Asbjøprnslett’s contribution:  
Supervised the paper, with substantial input to concept development, and discussed the 
approaches and arguments with the author.  
1.7.4 Paper 4 
BERLE, Ø., NORSTAD, I., and ASBJØRNSLETT, B.E., Optimization, risk assessment 
and resilience in LNG transportation systems. Supply Chain Management: An 
International Journal, Submitted. [51] 
Abstract
Purpose: This paper addresses how to systematically address vulnerability in a maritime 
transportation system using a Formal Vulnerability Assessment approach, create 
quantitative measures of disruption risk and test the effect of mitigating measures. 
These quantitative data are prerequisites for cost efficiency calculations, and may be 
obtained without requiring excessive resources.
Design/methodology/approach:  
Supply chain simulation using heuristics-based planning tools offers an approach to 
quantify the impact of disruption scenarios and mitigating measures. This is used to 
enrich a risk-based approach to maritime supply chain vulnerability assessment. Monte 
Carlo simulation is used to simulate a stochastic nature of disruptions.
Findings:
The exemplary assessment of a maritime liquefied natural gas (LNG) transportation 
system illustrates the potential for providing quantitative data about the cost of 
disruptions and the effects of mitigating measures, which are foundations for more 
precise cost-efficiency estimates.  
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Research limitations/implications: 
This simulation was done on a simplified version of a real transportation system. For 
resource reasons, several simplifications were made, both with regards to modeling the 
transportation system and with the implementation of the Formal Vulnerability 
Assessment framework. Nevertheless, we believe the paper serves to illustrate the 
approach and potential outcome.  
Practical implications:  
Practitioners are provided with an approach to get more precise quantitative data on 
disruption costs and cost/efficiency of mitigating measures, providing background data 
for decisions on investing in reduction of supply chain vulnerability.
Originality/value:  
The combination of risk assessment methods and inventory routing simulation of 
maritime supply chain problems is a novelty. Quantifying vulnerability, effects of 
disruptions and effects of mitigating measures in maritime transportation systems 
contributes to a little-researched area.  
Key words: Supply chain risk, maritime transportation, LNG, fleet routing and 
scheduling, Monte Carlo simulation.  
Relevance to the thesis: 
This paper is a continuation of the work done in previous papers, in particular P2 and 
SP1, and is relevant for TA5. The research questions which were investigated were RQ7 
and RQ8, leading to contribution C4. The paper includes simulation and quantitative 
measures, which are lacking in the other papers, and provides a possible continuation to 
create a ready-to-use approach.  
The independent contribution of the candidate: 
The paper was written in its entirety by the author (except from the part about 
optimization tools). The concept was developed in collaboration with Asbjørnslett, the 
risk assessment and simulation approach by the author alone. Simulation model 
development was performed in collaboration with Norstad, who made the interface 
between the risk assessment and simulation tool. The author did all simulations, 
including setups, and performed data analysis on the results.  
Inge Norstad’s contribution: 
Norstad developed the simulation model, programmed the risk assessment approach 
into the simulation model. He reviewed and discussed the results, and the presentation 
of the results.
Bjørn Egil Asbjørnslett’s contribution: 
Asbjørnslett supervised the paper, developed the concept in collaboration with the first 
author, and discussed the approach and arguments with the author.  
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1.8 Supporting papers:
SP1 BERLE, Ø. and ASBJØRNSLETT, B.E., Vulnerability in global natural gas 
supply chains: A qualitative assessment of disruption risks in LNG maritime 
logistics, in Logistics Research Network Annual Conference 2008. 2008: 
Liverpool, UK. 
Relevance to the thesis: This paper served to give me an understanding of the 
world markets for liquefied natural gas, the major trade routes, and to lay the 
groundwork for later papers. Also, it involved a qualitative assessment on how 
trade routes are vulnerable in the ocean transportation leg.
My role: I wrote the paper in its entirety under supervision of Asbjørnslett, and 
presented it at the Logistics Research Network Annual Conference. 
SP2 BERLE, Ø. and ASBJØRNSLETT, B.E., Vulnerability in European natural gas 
supply chains, in SAMRISK. 2008: Oslo. 
Relevance to the thesis: This paper revolved around EU Europe’s dependency 
on imported natural gas, both piped and in the form of LNG. It also served as an 
example of a sector characterized by high degrees of optimization and little 
buffers in the form of natural gas storage.  
My role: I wrote the paper in its entirety under supervision of Asbjørnslett, and 
presented it at the Samrisk conference. 
SP3 BERLE, Ø. and ASBJØRNSLETT, B.E., Formal Vulnerability Assessment: A 
methodology for assessing and mitigating strategic vulnerabilities in maritime 
supply chains, in Proceedings of the European Safety and Reliability 
Conference. 2009: Prague, Czech. 
Relevance to the thesis: This paper was a preliminary version of the framework 
presented in paper two. It did not include the failure modes, and the LFHI risks 
were not clearly defined as a part of the problem. However, it did allow for 
presenting the adaptation of the Formal Safety Assessment framework to a wider 
audience of academics and practitioners.  
My role: I wrote the entire paper under supervision by Asbjørnslett, and 
presented it at the ESREL 2009 conference.
SP4 BERLE, Ø., RICE JR, J.B., and ASBJØRNSLETT, B.E., Failure modes in ports 
– a functional approach to throughput vulnerability, in ESREL. 2010, 
Taylor&Francis: Rhodes, Greece. p. 190-197. 
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Relevance to the thesis: This paper represented the ongoing research on failure 
modes, which resulted in paper one. It allowed for the concepts to be presented 
to a wider audience, and to get feedback from academics and practitioners.  
My role: I wrote the paper in its entirety under supervision of Asbjørnslett and 
Rice, and presented it at the ESREL 2010 conference. 
1.9 Contributions 
The scientific contributions of my thesis can be summed up in the four points below. 
These are discussed more thoroughly in section four.
C1: An overview of the critical functions necessary for a maritime transportation 
system’s ability to move goods. 
C2: A framework for systematically addressing vulnerabilities in maritime 
transportation systems, treating both operational and low-frequency high-impact risks, 
as well as incorporating cost/efficiency criteria in the assessment. 
C3: The insight and understanding of failure and restoration of maritime transportation 
systems is applicable to humanitarian relief logistics, where the application of principles 
from commercial supply chain management is immature.
C4: Combining supply chain risk assessment with optimization tools for an LNG supply 
chain increases the robustness and resilience of the system and thereby the energy 
security of the recipients, while ensuring efficiency resource usage of the supply chain. 
1.10 Thesis structure 
Chapter 2: State of the Art 
Within this chapter, state the art of current research within supply chain risk 
management, maritime supply chain management, risk management, humanitarian relief 
logistics and fleet scheduling is presented.
Chapter 3: Context and Research Design
The context, research design and progress of the research are discussed in this section.
Chapter 4: Results 
This chapter contains the results from the empirical work and the contributions of the 
thesis.
Chapter 5: Evaluation and Discussion of Results 
Results and methods are discussed in this section, included validity questions, 
limitations of the thesis and how the thesis relates to its context.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
Conclusions of the dissertation and suggestions for future work can be found here.  
Appendix A: Four papers have been selected as essential in this research, and are 
enclosed in full. 
Appendix B: Four papers are not included in the thesis as they do not contribute 
significantly to the value of the thesis beyond what is done by the papers in Appendix 
A.
Appendix C: The interview guide / questions for port & maritime transportation 
stakeholder interviews is enclosed.
Appendix D: The questions and text of the MIT CTL Port resilience survey is enclosed. 
Appendix E: The survey used for the MIT CTL Global Risk survey is enclosed.
Appendix F: Co-author declaration 
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2. State of the art 
"As if it were too great, too mighty for common virtues, the ocean has no compassion, 
no faith, no law, no memory." - Joseph Conrad, The Mirror of the Sea 
In the following, state of the art of relevant literature will be presented. The literature is 
divided into supply chain risk management literature, maritime supply chains, 
humanitarian logistics and fleet scheduling. General supply management literature is 
only referred to through reviews in section 2.2.1.
The general topic of this thesis is risk and resilience in global maritime supply chains. 
Supply chain risk management is a fairly recent research subject, stemming back from 
around year 2000, see e.g. Asbjørnslett and Rausand [52], Svensson [53] and Norrmann 
[54]. Maritime supply chain risk management is similarly even newer, no 
comprehensive framework or discussion on the subject was found in reviews. However, 
literature exists for components of the maritime supply chain, such as liability in 
shipping, port operation et cetera, this is presented in section 2.2.2. 
Humanitarian logistics set the context for paper three; a literature review of the field is 
therefore presented in section 2.2.3. Operations research methods are combined with 
risk assessment methods in paper four, a brief literature review of the relevant methods 
are therefore presented in section 2.2.4.
2.1 Definitions 
Some essential definitions are provided below; readers are advised to consult the 
glossary in chapter 8 for more thorough definitions.  
Risk may be defined according to industry standards, as: a triplet of scenario, frequency 
and consequence of events that may contribute negatively [55]. A hazard is a source of 
potential damage; Kaplan and Garrick describe risk as hazards divided by safeguards.
In this, risks cannot be completely removed, only reduced. Numerous definitions exist 
for supply chains, see e.g. Mentzer et al. [56]. In this article, the following definition is 
used: A supply chain or logistics system exists to move a product or service from 
suppliers to customers. The network can be seen both as a single system and a 
collection of interacting systems, involving people, technology, activities, information 
and resources.
The mission of the supply chain is to serve as a throughput mechanism of goods, and in 
hardship, protect the dependents from the consequences of disruptive events. Continued, 
in the context of maritime supply chain risk management, maintaining a supply chain 
mission focus, vulnerability is defined as: the properties of a transportation system that 
may weaken or limit its ability to endure, handle and survive threats and disruptive 
events that originate both within and outside the system boundaries, inspired by 
Asbjørnslett and Rausand [52].
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Supply chain resilience has become a field of research the latest 10 years, numbers of 
definitions have been made, see e.g. Jüttner et al. [57]. Resilience is the ability of the 
supply chain to handle a disruption without significant impact on the ability to serve the 
supply chain mission. Resilience is about handling the consequences of a disruption, not 
about preventing a disruption from occurring. However, the effort to create a resilient 
system is made before a disruption occurs. 
Failure modes are defined as the key functions and capabilities of the supply chain, loss 
of any such would reduce or remove the ability of the system to perform its mission, see 
Berle et al [41] for a comprehensive discussion. 
2.2 Literature 
2.2.1 Supply chain risk management 
Recent comprenensive reviews of academic supply chain risk management papers  
include Rao and Goldsby [58], who present a typology of risks based on reviewed 
papers; Vanany et al [59], who sort papers based on types of risk and industry sector, 
and Tang, [60] who develops a framework to classify supply chain risk management 
literature into supply, demand, product, and information management. He also offers a 
review on quantitative methods in supply chain risk management. Kleindorfer and Saad 
[61] develop a conceptual framework for managing supply chain disruption risk, 
drawing out 10 steps in the process. Their key frame is that sources of risks need to be 
specified, assessed and mitigated. [62] Zsidisin et al. structures supply chain risk 
assessment techniques, in particular with an agency theory perspective: The key 
message is that business continuity planning methods may be used to manage supply 
risk.
Giunipero et al [63] present a review of 405 published journal papers on supply chain 
management (SCM) published until 2006 from nine journals, and structure these into 13 
subject areas: 95 are about supply chain strategy; 74 on SCM frameworks, trends and 
challenges; 66 on alliances and relationships. Of five identified gaps in research, they 
identified the lack of research on global supply chains as one. The research of this thesis 
is related to the latter, as global maritime transportation systems is an enabler of global 
supply chains.
Greening and Rutherford [64] discuss disruptions in supply chain networks. Following a 
review, they state that there is a lack of literature on responding to supply chain 
disruptions, to which this research becomes relevant. Similar to what is argued in this 
thesis; the authors state that “much of the extant literature is focused on the mitigation 
of risk, implicitly assuming that sources of risk can be identified”. 11 propositions are 
presented to illustrate how disruptions affect supply networks.  
Tang and Musa [65] provides the most recent review of supply chain risk, structuring 
directions of research within the area between 1995 and 2009 through 138 journal 
papers. Their general perspective is that the research community has moved from vague 
descriptions of disruptions to managing supply chain risk in a structured system 
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dynamics perspective. They provide six methods to advance the research in supply 
chain risk management.  
Manuj and Mentzer [66] bring together concepts from logistics, supply chain 
management, strategy, operations and international management to propose a five step 
framework for comprehensive risk management and mitigation in global supply chains. 
This is comparable to the FSA method, except the fourth step, where Manuj and 
Mentzer do not solely consider cost/efficiency. Rather, they include factors such as 
complexity management and organizational learning in addition to performance metrics. 
The foundation for their risk assessment is identification of risk sources, similar to most 
reviewed frameworks. Manuj and Mentzer present seven risk management strategy 
categories: avoidance, postponement, speculation, hedging, control, sharing/ 
transferring, and security, although they stress that these are closely related. The paper 
presents a thorough review of current literature on the matter. Risk assessment 
paradigms are presented as probabilistic choice versus risk assessment; namely reducing 
the average, allowing good to weigh up for bad, versus reducing the consequences for 
catastrophic events through minimizing regrets.  
Craighead et al.[67] argue that supply chain disruptions are unavoidable. The severity of 
such disruptions depend on the number of entities (nodes) affected. To give a measure, 
they suggest that supply chain density, supply chain complexity, and node criticality 
may serve as explanatory variables for severity of a disruption to the supply network. 
Mitigation variables identified are recovery and warning capabilities. This is in line with 
Rice and Caniato [40] and Asbjørnslett [52]. 
Peck [68, 69] presents supply chain vulnerability through dividing the system into four 
layers: value stream and product, assets and infrastructure dependencies, organizations 
and inter-organizational networks, and the environment. She argues that given the inter-
organizational nature of supply chains with many uncontrollable factors, we must accept 
complexity and limited managerial control. Furthermore, she argues that supply chain 
vulnerability is an organizational matter, not only related to functional supply chain 
management.  
Juttner [70] gives evidence that supply chain stakeholders are worried about disruptions 
spreading across networks, what she terms “ripple effects”. Juttner, like many others, 
promote visibility in the supply chain, and report that a majority of surveyed industrial 
companies make efforts to increase visibility. However, they claim it is a problem 
beyond tier-one stakeholders. Juttners’ surveyed companies do make internal 
contingency plans in case of disruptions, but do not do so across the supply chain.
Hendricks and Singhal [71] investigated the stock price and equity risk effects of supply 
chain disruptions, and found that the abnormal stock return in the two years following 
disruption announcements were -40 %, the equity risk was 13.50 % higher in the year 
following the disruption than the year before. The reasons they point out are;
1) Increased complexity due to global sourcing, coordination needs between many 
parties, and long lead times; 2) Increased reliance on outsourcing and partnering, 
making ripple effects more likely; 3) Single sourcing strategies have increased the 
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vulnerability in case this supplier fails; 4) Focusing on reducing inventory, excess 
capacity and slack has coupled the various links, leaving little room for errors.  
Wagner and Bode [72] support the results of Henricks and Singhal through a survey 
among executives of German companies, showing that supply chain characteristics such 
as a firm’s dependence on certain customers and suppliers, the degree of single 
sourcing, or reliance on global supply sources are relevant for a firm’s exposure to 
supply chain risk. 
Risk assessment methods, such as Kleindorfer and Saad’s, are in general focused in 
identifying sources. This is comparable to Manuj and Mentzers two risk assessment 
paradigms; whether to look at operational risks or to minimize the consequences of 
disruptive events. Pecks theory of supply chains being inherently vulnerable and prone 
for disruptions is an insight the author agrees with. The risk assessment paradigm, as 
presented by Manuj and Mentzer, combined with insight from business continuity 
planning, as suggested by Zsidisin et al., is in line with the message of this thesis: Risk 
assessments cannot prepare to mitigate all risks, and must therefore prepare to restore 
functions after disruptions occur.
Tang and Tomlin [73] sum up previous research on why risk reduction efforts are not 
widespread, although there is a wide acceptance of the existence of supply chain risk:
1) Firms do not know how to manage supply chain risks, and 2) Firms lack credible 
estimates of the cost of a disruption, obstructing a formal cost/benefit analysis to justify 
risk reduction benefits.
2.2.2 Maritime supply chains 
A general overview and structuring of risk is presented by Drewry Shipping Consultants 
[74], where risk is structured into eight categories: Strategic, market, credit, financial, 
operational, legal, organizational and sovereign risk. This is the most comprehensive 
overview found by the author. Another notable Drewry report present issues and best 
practices of risk management in international transport and logistics [75].
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) reviewed 
maritime supply chain security efforts in a report focusing on developing a structured 
framework of risk and vulnerability in maritime supply chains [76]. The focus of this 
research is security efforts; given the insights of this thesis regarding the mission centric 
approach, insights span wider. This report bring out many of the same efforts that have 
been pursued in this thesis, including using technical risk assessment methods on 
maritime supply chains and making cost/benefit assessments explicit.  
UNCTAD brings forth a number of challenges with security risk assessments [76]: 
x Insufficient knowledge of the complex processes that determine the probability 
and impact of the risk.  
x Combination of low subjective probability, high uncertainty, and lack of 
consensus.
x Rarity of the occurrence of events, and thus little actuarial or historical figures.
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x Unclear pattern regarding the value, allocation, transfer and distribution of costs 
and benefits among both participating and non-participating parties. 
Supply chain risk assessments also have some significant problems, according to 
UNCTAD [76]:  
x Different approaches to the scope, nature and flow configurations of maritime 
supply chain linkages.
x Limited understanding of the impact of a terrorist incident on a system’s supply 
chain disruption and resilience capabilities.  
x Inadequacy of the traditional approaches (probabilistic, actuarial, historical, etc.) 
to modeling security-risk threats and vulnerabilities, due mainly to the lack of 
historical data and the irrationality of the terrorist human behavior.  
x Difficulty in quantifying and assigning costs/benefits across supply chain 
members with different exposure to risk. 
Finally, UNCTAD present three “sources of risk” relevant for assessments of maritime 
supply chains [76]:
x Environmental: uncertainties arising from external sources such as terrorist or 
environmental risks 
x Organizational: internal uncertainties arising within the supply chain such as 
strikes or production failures
x Network-related: referring to the uncertainties arising from the interactions 
between organizations in the supply chain 
While the focus of the above mentioned UNCTAD report is coordination between 
nations and regulatory affairs, it has been seminal in laying the foundations for this 
research project. In the following, general literature on commercial supply chains is 
presented.
Panayides [77] discusses the relation between maritime transport, logistics and supply 
chains, in particular within the containerized cargo industry, and defines maritime 
transport as “transportation of goods between two sea-ports by sea”. Logistics is “the 
function responsible for the flow of materials from suppliers into an organization, 
through operations within the organization and then out to customers”, while supply 
chain management “involves the integration of all key business operations across the 
supply chain”. In this he argues that logistics management is only a part of supply chain 
management.  
Notteboom and Winkelmans [78] claim that the market environment in which ports 
operate has changed dramatically, and that the port (authority) must adopt new roles to 
cope with this change. Structural changes in markets include that organizations move 
from “economies of scale” to “economies of scope”, relying on advanced production 
factors (know-how) and offering products with large variety and shorter life-cycles 
(hence, needing shorter time-to-market). This environment is offering new markets but 
with higher insecurity and risk. Supply chains increasingly are operated by flexible 
multi-firm networks that out-source large tasks, primarily in three forms: 1) Out-
sourcing of the production of components, 2) Value-added logistics, where finalization 
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of products is done near the customer, 3) Out-sourcing of transportation, warehousing 
and distribution through third-party logistics providers. Notteboom and Winkelmans 
suggest that port authorities take the lead in the development of port-related value added 
logistics activities, information systems and intermodality.  
An example of ports and terminals adapting to this environment was found at a car-
import terminal in the US, as a part of the interviews which are described (in part 4): 
The import terminal for cars consisted of a mass-customization plant for cars, having 
100 car servicing stations with mechanics, able to perform modifications ranging from 
adding spoilers and sunroofs to changing faulty gear-boxes. One such operation had 
been to change over 20 000 gear-boxes for a manufacturer over a short time period, 
which is a complex and critical task.  
Robinson [24] similarly argues that ports are elements in value-chain driven systems, 
and must be viewed as more than just a place performing complex functions in the 
chain. He argues the understanding of ports followed an evolution, moving from being 
understood as 1) places, 2) operating systems, 3) economic units, and 4) administrative 
units, into being 5) key elements “embedded in value-driven chain systems, in value 
chain constellations; they deliver value to shippers and other third party service 
providers in the value-driven chain; they will segment their customers in terms of a 
value proposition; and will capture value for themselves and for the chain in which they 
are embedded in so doing. Chain systems compete with chain systems.” In other words, 
the ports deliver value as a critical component of maritime transportation systems in 
which they take part, and for the supply chains dependent on these.
Song and Panayides [79] offers measures for port and terminal integration in the supply 
chain, and tests these measures empirically. Six parameters are identified as key for 
integration: 1) Use of technology for data sharing, 2) Relationship with shipping lines, 
3) Value added services, 4) Transport mode integration, 5) Relationship with inland 
transport providers, 6) Channel integration practices and performance. The paper 
presents correlation between supply chain integration parameters and parameters of port 
competitiveness (such as cost, quality, reliability, responsiveness and customization) 
from an empirical survey, which is followed up in a later paper on sea-port integration 
[80].
Marlow and Paixão [81, 82] discuss the development of lean ports within the container 
segment, and offer discussions on agility and flexibility of these. They argue that 20 to 
30 % of all transportation costs in chains are related to storage in ports, and that 80 % of 
port revenues come from 20 % of the activities. Costs incurred in ports are between 30 
and 80 % of all waterborne transportation costs, depending on the presence of short-sea 
shipping. This gives grounds for actions to reduce waste, where Paixão and Marlow 
suggest a Business Process Redesign (BPR) framework. Through using Just-in-time and 
Lean-methodologies, they claim that there is significant potential for reducing waste. 
Freed capacities and increased insight into their own systems can then be used to give 
the port a competitive advantage through increased flexibility and agility in the systems.  
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Rodrigue and Notteboom [83] argue that sea-ports and terminals increasingly are taking 
an active role in value creation in supply chains through optimizing flows through the 
systems, such as by imposing berthing windows, dwell time charges and time slots for 
trucks. They argue container terminals are increasingly used as cheap temporary storage 
of consignments for shippers, rather than just as smooth facilitators between modes. 
Terminals can be seen both as bottlenecks and as warehouses, to illustrate the changing 
and increasing role of terminals in maritime supply chains, they introduce the 
expression “terminalization”, and investigate effects of the changing role throughout the 
maritime supply chains.  
De Martino and Morvillo [22] investigate the interaction and interdependence between 
port stakeholders, as well as the change of ports from movement of cargo to value added 
logistics services. A part of this is to identify critical assets in the maritime supply 
chain, which is relevant, although the risk management perspective is not discussed. Li 
and Cullinane describe methods to reduce maritime liability risk, both for individual 
ship owners and for regulatory authorities [84]. Essentially, they argue that cost-benefit 
analysis is necessary for balancing the commercial interests of the ship-owners with the 
needs of society and other stakeholders doing business with these.
Little research exists on the overall maritime supply chain vulnerability. Carbone and 
De Martino [23] discuss the role of ports in supply chain management, with a practical 
case on Renault using the port of Le Havre, France. Their question is if and how port 
operators can face the challenge of higher supply chain integration. To understand this, 
they investigated four variables: 1) What kind of relationship exists between the port 
operators and the focal firm? 2) What services are supplied in order to satisfy customer 
requirements? 3) What information and communication technologies are used for the 
integration among the stakeholders? 4) Which key performance indicators (KPI) are 
shared by the actors of the supply chain? Through these, they are able to describe the 
relationships Renault has with its transportation suppliers.  
Bichou, Bichou and Gray [85-87] argue that ports are an integrated part of supply 
chains, and that they should be treated as such. Further, they argue benchmarking is 
possible between ports and other intermodal connection points, and that this has an 
underutilized potential. As ports are parts of a larger supply chain, security measures 
should follow through; a conceptual framework is offered for this, relating the ISPS 
code to other security measures, and expanding the approach of the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) to fit the extended supply chain security framework. 
Three challenges are given for port logistics and supply chain research: 1) The large 
number of firms involved. 2) The differences in functions and thereby strategic and 
operational viewpoints between a traditional port setting and a supply chain. 3) The 
large number of disciplines involved. They sum up that there is still much do be done in 
cultural integration between ports and supply chains.
Barnes and Oloruntoba [31] discuss the role of security in maritime supply chains, 
elaborating on various security initiatives such as the International Ship and Port 
Facility Security Code (ISPS), Container Security Initiative (CSI) and the Customs and 
Trade Partnership against Terrorism initiative (C-TPAT). Their argument is that the 
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complexity of interactions between ports, maritime operations and supply chains create 
vulnerabilities that require analysis that extends beyond the structured requirements of 
these initiatives. They argue that there is a need to assess the goodness-of-fit of these 
initiatives, and suggest a new classification scheme for mapping vulnerability within 
ports and across supply networks. Essential steps in vulnerability management are 1) 
Crisis recognition, seeing warning signs, recognizing emerging disruptions and 
understanding how the supply chain will be affected, 2) Crisis management, where 
skills need to be developed before an accident occurs, and 3) Concomitant management 
strategies, such as developing partnerships with other stakeholders. Parts of this doctoral 
thesis are relevant to their suggestions for future research in proposing a framework for 
“identifying generic vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure at major ports”, evaluating 
the current status of port-based institution, and assessing low-frequency high-impact 
scenarios.
Kristiansen [88] gives a though introduction to safety and risk management within a 
maritime context. Ranging from general introductions to risk and uncertainty to 
statistical methods, risk analysis methods and management and operations frameworks, 
this is the most comprehensive work that the author has found on the subject within the 
maritime domain.  
Harrald, Stephens and vanDorp [89] show that risk management methods can contribute 
to increasing the security of US sea ports, in particular against terrorist attacks, and 
argue that “any interventions that increase the security of ports must not only be 
effective, they must be economically sustainable”. Their perspective is that ports are 
complex systems composed of a set of loosely coupled economic systems, i.e. the port 
is a system of systems. For four shipping segments; Container, petrochemicals, bulk and 
ferry, they show an event chain in case of a disruption, the potential interventions, and 
the organizations responsible for these interventions 
Ho [90] describes the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) trade recovery 
program following a port disruption. A 2006 Booz Allen Hamilton study concluded that 
the economic impact on the 12 APEC economies as a result of a US port shutdown due 
to a terrorist attack would be significant, and increasing with the length of time that 
trade is disrupted. They cite that “if trade at the US port was impaired for 15 days, the 
cumulative loss of GDP for the 12 APEC economies for 3 years was estimated at 
US$82 billion dollars in 2006. The loss increases to US$175 billion for a 30-day 
impaired trade and to US$499 billion for a 60-day impaired trade.” This trade recovery 
program consists of three elements: 1) A plan of action for restoration to prevent 
unilateral and counterproductive actions, 2) A set of pre-established guidelines for re-
establishment, and 3) A communications protocol to establish relationships and to 
enable information sharing. While this program is directed towards terrorism, the 
insights presented in this thesis indicates that this program should have a wider scope, 
including trade resumptions after disruptions like labor actions and natural disasters.
Yang [91] studies the impact of risk factors from the container security initiative (CSI) 
on the maritime supply chain in Taiwan, using risk assessment methods to understand 
the implications for the CSI and the 24-hour rule (US rule stating that contents of all 
State of the art 
43
containers bound for or transiting through the United States must be sent to US 
Authorities 24 hours before the container is loaded. One of the conclusions is that 
supply chain security measures are leading to an increase in logistics costs.
2.2.3 Reliability engineering   
Learning from safety and reliability research, potential disruptive events may be 
categorized through the risk pyramid, see e.g. Bird and Germain [92]. In short, they 
presented that for each fatal accident, there were 10 serious accidents, 30 accidents and 
600 incidents. This is a concept that may be transferable to supply chain risk 
management; for every severe disruption, one may assume that there are a number of 
moderate disruptions and a large number of minor incidents 
Rausand and Høyland [44] present the evolution of risk and reliability engineering from 
the 1930s onwards. First, the approaches were used to improve the quality of industrial 
products and to reduce air crash probabilities. A decade later, reliability engineering 
analyses were used for designing the V-1 missile. Failure mode assessments, as 
presented below, were first introduced in the 1950s. Space and missile research, 
including the Apollo program and development of intercontinental ballistic missiles led 
to further refining of the fields. In the 1970s, safety and reliability engineering was used 
for creating more safe nuclear reactors and for developing the Norwegian offshore 
industry. In the 1990s, Reliability engineering became an integrated part of product 
design.
Saleh et al [93] provide the most recent comprehensive review of concepts and 
developments within reliability engineering throughout the last decades. They argue that 
the development of reliability engineering has followed three idea tracks; the 
“organizational”, including theories such as man made disasters, normal accidents and 
the high reliability organization; the probabilistic risk assessment track, and finally the 
defence-in-depth and barrier approach track. The authors argue that these tracks have 
culminated into the systems engineering and control theoretic approach to safety from 
the 1990s onwards.
The essence of these is that the first track came with realizations that accidents follow a 
pattern and can be analyzed; that due to complexity and interactive coupling, accidents 
are bound to appear; and that organizations with proper training and preparations can 
prepare themselves to cope with uncertainty. The probabilistic track utilized analytical 
approaches, where a stochastic chain of events lead to a disruptive event. The third track 
is about defending the system against disruptive events and to minimize damage. 
Finally, the synthesis in systems engineering approaches is accentuating that system 
safety is a “control problem” needing a system theoretic approach. Interactions between 
components (not just single components), subsystems and stakeholders can lead to 
failures, and these must therefore be considered as such. 
Seminal works in the reliability engineering domain include Turner’s “Man-made 
disasters” [94], Perrow’s theories on “Normal accidents”[33], Robert’s works on the 
high reliability organization [95], and the reactor safety study WASH-1400 report by 
Norman Rasmussen [96]. Systems engineering approaches are presented by e.g. 
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Blanchard and Fabrycky [97]. The most comprehensive work combining safety and 
systems engineering is Levesons “Engineering a safer world” [98], presenting why 
reliability and safety are not the same and that the interactions are what matters, as 
argued by Saleh et al. A summary of critiques of Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) 
approaches are presented by Apostolakis [99], which is relevant as approaches of this 
thesis are based on QRA approaches. Some of these works are discussed more 
thoroughly in section 5.
Aven and Kristensen [100] review the most common perspectives for understanding 
risk and uncertainty. The first partition they present in risk management is that of a 
positivist view – risk objectively exist and can be measured; and the Bayesian – where 
risk is a way of measuring uncertainty. Then, different paradigms of risk and 
uncertainty are presented: 1) The engineering approach using risk assessments, and 
looking to evaluate these using a cost benefit criteria. Quite often, risk assessments use 
predetermined risk acceptance criteria. 2) The economic decision-making perspectives, 
using utilities and rational decision making, often by assigning monetary values to all 
events. 3) The social science perspectives, considering people’s evaluation of and 
behaviour towards hazards. In essence, this is about subjective (individual) perception 
of risks and uncertainties. 4) The anthropological perspective, where clustered related 
convictions and perceptions of reality drive social responses towards risk. In essence, 
this is about a “group’s” perception of risk. Attempts towards unifying these above 
perspectives have been made by e.g. Renn and Klinke [101]. Aven and Kristensen [100] 
give their own perspectives on unifying the perspectives, demonstrating that such a 
unification is possible. Aven describes a structured and comprehensive approach in 
[102].
Vatn [103] give an overview holistic approaches to risk research in the offshore industry 
and how to systematically address this in a structured framework. Rausand et al.’s 
textbooks on risk management have given the author general insight into risk 
management [44, 104].  
2.2.3.1 Relevant risk assessment methods  
Some relevant risk assessment methods are presented below:  
PHA
Preliminary hazard analysis (PHA) is an initial semi-quantitative analysis that is 
intended to identify all potential hazards and accidental events that may lead to an 
accident [44]. Other names include Rapid Risk Ranking and Hazard Identification 
(HAZID). The essence of the analysis is to break down the system into its components, 
and to identify all events that may lead to malfunction. This listing is often assisted by 
accident records and earlier analyses for similar systems, hazard checklists and 
standards, and expert judgment.  
FMECA
The Failure Mode, Effect and Criticality Analysis (FMECA, sometimes also called 
FMEA) is a method to determine equipment functions, functional failure modes and 
possible causes and consequences of such failures [88]. In addition, fault detection and 
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inherent provisions in the system design to compensate for failures are considered. The 
approach uses standardized forms, including elements such as function description of 
components, the elements mentioned above, as well as a ranking of frequency and 
severity, and a specification of reliability data.  
HAZOP
The Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP) method is a detailed and comprehensive 
hazard identification method, often used in sectors such as process systems and software 
development [88]. The principle is to identify the components included in the system, 
define their purposes, and to analyze possible deviations from these. Normally, 
deviations are done through applying guide-words to processes, such as “too much” 
flow through a valve. HAZOP has been applied to supply chain problems by e.g. 
Adhitya et al. [105], who compare its use in supply chain to that of a chemical 
processing plant.
Fault- and event trees 
Fault tree analysis (FTA) uses Boolean logic to graphically model logical relationships 
between equipment failures, human errors and external events that can combine to cause 
specific mishaps of interest, also called top events [88]. In qualitative measures, a fault 
tree singles out one “top event” at a time, the hazardous incident, and shows which 
basic events lead to such incidents. In quantitative measures, a fault tree should lead to 
what is defined as minimal cut sets. These are the minimal number of basic events that 
need to occur to result in an accidental event – a low number of events is naturally bad, 
as there are fewer barriers to an event occurring.
Event tree analysis (ETA) uses decision trees to model the possible outcomes of an 
initiating event capable of causing consequences of interest [88]. This modelling 
technique is very effective at modelling the effects of barriers and mitigation means 
after an accident has happened. In short, it assumes a chain of possible events, where 
each level of the chain involves two mutually exclusive outcomes.  
Combining fault and event trees, and drawing this out creates what is called a bow-tie 
diagram. Drawing this out for all possible hazards creates a risk contribution tree. The 
risk contribution tree gives an overview of the entire system risk, including the direct 
contributing causes, the barriers which the system relies on, and the alternative levels of 
loss.
2.2.4 Humanitarian relief logistics 
Humanitarian relief organizations have become prevalent after the second world war 
[106], including agencies such as the United Nations Childrens´ fund (UNICEF) and the 
World Food Programme (WFP), as well as a wide range of non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) such as the Red Cross and Oxfam. Following a disaster, natural 
or man-made, delivery of aid is the cornerstone of the response of the humanitarian 
community. Logistics plays an important role in delivering this aid as it has been 
suggested that 60-80 % of the costs of NGOs are related to logistics. In monetary terms, 
an estimate is that the annual sum devoted to managing the humanitarian supply 
network exceeds USD 15 billion [107]. Up to half of logistics expenses occur before 
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relief aid reaches those in need [108]. Reducing the NGO emergency aid costs with 20 
% is realistic [109], freeing over USD 3 billion annually. 
Although the significance of logistics in delivering aid has been recognized, the role of 
logistics and supply chain planning in humanitarian relief organizations has been argued 
to be limited. Relief organizations suffer from three shortages compared to corporate 
and for-profit supply chains [110]: 1) Lack of depth of knowledge: NGO leaders tend to 
be value-led ‘activists’, where few have corporate experience in supply chain 
management. NGOs also tend to lack support structures such as supply chain expertise, 
corporate relationships and infrastructure. 2) Funding biased towards short-term 
responses: NGOs tend to be financed by grants, paying time-bound direct projects, 
which are often short and chronically underfunded. This leaves little room, nor 
incentive, for investing in competence and supply chain improvement. 3) Lack of 
investment in technology and communication: Many NGOs do not have advanced IT 
and logistics systems, and may have undervalued its role in the overall efficiency of the 
operation, e.g. in procurement procedures.  
While the majority of goods movement of practical and economical reasons has to be 
moved by sea, little relevant research has been found concerning the role of sea 
transportation and ports in humanitarian relief efforts, see e.g. Stephenson  [111]. Due 
to capacity and cost reasons, beyond the initial response phase in the first few days of an 
intervention, a majority of goods and equipment can not be transported in by air. The 
need for a humanitarian relief operation, beyond the immediate response phase, is to be 
able to move large amounts of goods and equipment. This requires reliable 
transportation, flexible to handle the uncertainty of local conditions, the ability to 
prioritize between goods to maximize the utility given limited resources, and the ability 
to coordinate between a large number of stakeholders and NGOs, shippers, local 
authorities et cetera. Physical plans for the supply includes identifying suppliers, 
potential pre-positioning of stores, shippers, as well as potential staging zones and 
export or trans-loading ports.
Humanitarian relief can be defined as a “foreign intervention into a society with the 
intention of helping local citizens” [112]. Unfortunately, it is expected that these types 
of interventions will be needed even more in the future as the amount of natural 
disasters are increasing, in fact the amount recorded has multiplied more than sixfold 
over the last 30 years [113]. Relief supply chains (SC) also constitute a substantial 
industry that responds to over 500 disasters annually and result in loss of 75 000 lives 
and affect over 200 million people  [114]. Academic research in humanitarian logistics 
prior to 2007 was mostly covered in practitioners’ journals [115], however although still 
scarce, research in the field has recently received a lot of attention by logistic academics 
to the extent of the establishment of a new journal, the Journal of Humanitarian 
Logistics and Supply Chain Management.
There are few common denominators of HL research. Topics vary from performance 
measurement to customer service, facility location to vehicle routing, agility to the 
application of lean concepts. Oloruntoba and Gray investigate the applicability of 
supply chain agility on humanitarian relief logistics [106], by creating a supply chain 
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that is lean and efficient on the supply side, while being agile and effective facing the 
end users. In light of a challenging funding environment, they argue that making donors 
understand that investment in routines and procedures necessary for longer-term supply 
chain efficiency and leanness – with low media impact, is a daunting task.  
Van Wassenhove [116] elaborates on the complex context of humanitarian relief effort, 
in particular on the mechanisms that uphold the short-sighted and inefficient 
“firefighting mentality” of humanitarian logistics. In summary, a myriad of logistics 
concepts have been applied to the field – though research has largely followed practice 
and rarely set its agenda. An efficiency focus has also led to the frequent oversight of 
equity considerations in research. 
Kovács and Spens present a framework for understanding humanitarian disaster relief 
logistics [115], distinguishing between actors, phases, and logistical processes, in 
addition to providing a solid literature review. Maon et al [117] highlight the potential 
for applying corporate insights into disaster relief, both through prevention and planning 
– as well as for the response and recovery phases. Parts of their contributions lie in that 
they provide a structured oversight over the elements and practices in disaster relief 
(table 1), an overview of challenges for disaster relief organizations (table 2), and 
examples of collaborations between corporations and relief organizations (table 3).
Research in the field is diverse, applying tools and techniques borrowed from other 
areas. Tatham and Pettit [107], however, argue that the contributions within 
humanitarian logistics can be characterized as considering the subject from a social, 
managerial or technological perspective; the implications of technical choices on the 
supply chain will be discussed later. Several articles that have appeared lately which 
describe the use of military concepts in the field of humanitarian logistics [118, 119]. 
Humanitarian relief efforts can adapt principles from commercial supply chain 
management as well as techniques and tools from other areas such as the military. This 
is what we have tried to capture in paper 3.
2.2.5 Optimization and planning 
As shown in the introduction, maritime transportation is performed in three modes: 1) 
liner, 2) industrial, and 3) tramp shipping. Liner services primarily moves containers 
according to fixed itineraries and schedules, much like a bus. Industrial operators own 
and manage their own fleet, seeking to minimize costs. Tramp shipping follow cargos 
like taxis, focusing on profit maximization [120]. Fleet size and mix, as well as routing 
and scheduling of ships, is vital in securing the profits of stakeholders in the MTS. To 
achieve this, the usage of vessels must be optimized, see reviews by Ronen, [121, 122] 
and Christiansen et al. [123]. Optimizing over a chain, production capacity and storage 
must be included. Grønhaug and Christiansen describe a solution to an inventory 
routing problem for a LNG supply chain [124].  
From the start, the operations research (OR) community worked with static and 
deterministic problems. This is relevant for many problems, and has contributed a great 
deal to resource utilization. However, the real world has considerable uncertainty 
associated with it. Also, if the problem is based on a real-life scenario, most likely new 
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information and constraints will appear. If the model should still be relevant, it needs to 
be updated. In essence, types of OR problems can be divided along two axes: 
deterministic versus stochastic and static versus dynamic problems [125].  
Given that a number of decisions have to be made in the presence of uncertainty, where 
ignoring this may lead to inferior or wrong decisions, it is important to include the 
modeling of uncertainty in transportation systems [126, 127]. One such way is 
stochastic optimization, where certain decision variables are unknown – this is a method 
that is still not fully implemented and in use in large scale commercial OR software. 
However, there is always a “trade-off between the realism of the optimization model 
[…], and the tractability of the problem”, making it possible to solve [127]. Recent 
relevant literature on optimization of LNG shipping problems includes Andersson et al. 
[128], describing an inventory management problem of a vertically integrated LNG 
supply chain, and Rakke et al. [129], who present a heuristic for creating annual 
delivery programs with the presence of a spot market. The multi-start local search 
heuristic that is used for the scheduling software for the simulations in paper 4 are 
described by Brønmo et al [130]. In short, it bases itself on a large amount of starting 
points for the optimization, then uses local search to improve the solutions. To speed up 
the heuristics, only the best solutions are improved.  
2.2.6 Conclusions from literature survey 
Insights from the state of the art-chapter can be summed up as follows:  
1) Supply chain risk management has been a field of growing interest the last 
decade, and has become fairly mature for land-based applications. Concepts and 
approaches can be adapted from this domain into the maritime field.  
2) Maritime supply chains, the risks and vulnerabilities of these have not been 
extensively investigated in literature. In general, this was found to be a 
promising niche for research.  
3) No structured framework for maritime supply chain risk management has been 
found. While general supply chain risk management frameworks, such as by 
Manuj and Mentzer [66], provide an overview of how to address risks. However, 
characteristics of the maritime transportation industry are not included, and the 
articles are, in the perspective of the author, too general to precisely contribute 
in addressing maritime supply chains.  
4) Stakeholders in ports and maritime supply chains have a very operational 
perspective on supply chain vulnerability:
a. Focusing on frequent events rather than the LFHI events.
b. Focusing on prevention rather than response.
In this, we argue that the focus of most reviewed literature has been “preventing 
incidents from happening”. Some have discussed resilience as a business 
strategy, e.g. Sheffi [26], others have discussed planning to restore the systems 
through using business continuity management, e.g. Zsidisin [62]. However, to 
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the extent of the reviews for this thesis, this subject has not been uncovered for 
maritime supply chains.  
5) Maritime supply chain risk management is very directed towards security, i.e. 
that someone deliberately seeks to destroy the system, (rather than the functions- 
oriented perspective argued in paper 1). Typically, existing research within the 
maritime domain was focused on symmetric (state-on-state) or asymmetric 
(terrorist) war. However, following Rice and Caniato [40], the cause of 
disruptions is not always relevant for low-frequency high-impact scenarios; 
whether a port is destroyed by earthquake or bombing, it is still destroyed. For 
those dependent on it for cargo flows, the port can either be restored, or 
alternative routes must be identified.  
6) No published research has been identified investigating the role of maritime 
transportation in humanitarian relief logistics. It is a field of growing focus, see 
e.g. [108]. The combination of an un-researched niche and the author’s interest 
in restoration of transportation capacity left this a promising field.  
7) The combination of reliability engineering methods and supply chain risk 
management problems has not been investigated. For technical systems, 
methods are tested and applied. However, technical systems are more tangible, 
where the interactions between components can be tested more easily compared 
to supply chains, in which large parts of dealings are taking place in what is 
essentially a social system.
8) Systems engineering perspectives to supply chain risk management can provide 
additional insight, by studying the interactions between components in a system, 
between systems and between stakeholders -  this is in line with the trend 
sketched out by Saleh et al. [93].
9) Research on robust solutions to ship optimization problems under uncertainty 
are being developed. Optimization tools can provide insights into providing 
quantitative data for risk and vulnerability analyses of maritime supply chains.  
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3. Context and research design 
"First there was the sky, high, pure and of a darker blue than he had ever seen. And 
then there was the sea, a lighter, immensely luminous blue that reflected blue into the 
air, the shadows and the sails; a sea that stretched away immeasurably when the surge 
raised the frigate high, showing an orderly array of great crests, each three furlongs 
from its predecessor, and all sweeping eastwards in an even, majestic procession."
- Patrick O'Brian, The Thirteen-Gun Salute 
3.1 Context 
As argued initially in this thesis, increasingly long and complex supply chains, in 
particular those reliant on shipping, are potentially vulnerable to disruptions. This is an 
aspect that NTNU wanted to address through the competence development project 
“Coping with Risks in Maritime Logistics – Managing risk, vulnerabilities and 
resilience in maritime logistics chains”. This was funded by the Norwegian Research 
Council in collaboration with industrial partners such as Det Norske Veritas [DNV].
The task of my research project was to investigate models to contribute in such 
assessments; how to understand how these systems were vulnerable, the consequences 
of breakdown, and how to create systems with higher damage tolerance and/or the 
ability to restore themselves.  
3.2 Delimitation 
The contributions of this thesis are within the engineering economics domain. Primary 
focus areas for the research has been to produce insight into how maritime 
transportation systems can be vulnerable with regards to the ability to move goods, what 
possible causes and consequences may be, how to systematically approach the problem, 
how to mitigate problems, and how to create systems that are less vulnerable.  
This thesis is not about health, safety and environment (HSE), although methods 
developed for this purpose are applied. Nor does it directly concern the financial side of 
disruptions. The thesis does not focus on sharing responsibilities between stakeholders, 
nor to discuss direct roles in planning to cope with and recovering from disruptions; 
only that such efforts should be collaborative.
Supply networks have not explicitly been included, although the general concepts 
should be applicable. For instance, figure 7 shows the elements of the maritime supply 
chain. However, there can be several systems competing in a marketplace. Also, within 
a single supply chain, relationships are not set in stone. On the short term, contracts may 
mitigate differences, on a longer term; collaboration may limit insularity between 
parties. Thereby, expecting a supply chain to act as one is an ideal state.  Such 
discussions have not been a focus for this thesis. 
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3.3 Research design and progress:
The uncertain nature of a doctoral research project involves a number of iterations on 
theme, research questions, methods and results. Figure 8 in the introduction illustrated 
the overview of the thesis.  
Yin [131] page 27 lists five components as vital for the research design: 
1.  Study questions: “who”, “what”, “where”, “how” and “why”-questions are 
relevant to describe what the purpose of the research is.
2.  Study propositions: The testable questions, stated through a set of propositions.  
3.  Units of analysis: What sort of data defines a “case”, what is relevant 
information, and how do these relate to both the question at hand and previous 
research.
4.  The logic linking the data to the propositions: the analytic techniques that 
compare the data with the propositions, such as statistical analysis of surveys. 
5.  The criteria for interpreting the findings: How certain can one be that the found 
results can be trusted, what are rival explanations for the findings? This is 
related to the question of validity.
3.3.1 Study questions 
The initial task of the research project was to create understanding of what vulnerability 
in maritime transportation systems is. The first steps were coursework and initial studies 
to give the author an insight into the domain. Courses included systems engineering, 
risk assessment and risk modeling, in addition to fleet optimization courses.  
Also, we set out to find practical cases for relating the research to the real world; a set 
goal for the research was that the insights should be applicable for practitioners. A plan 
was to collaborate with companies within LNG transportation to increase our 
understanding, thereby setting the stage for TA1 on LNG and energy security. Initial 
insights were reported in SP1 and SP2 on energy security, LNG shipping vulnerability 
and LNG import dependence.  
Literature reviews and attempts to apply existing methods on realistic cases, as well as 
the shortcomings in particular in SP1 led the way for TA2 and TA3, the failure modes 
and the formal vulnerability assessment framework. The lacking pieces were the focus 
on LFHI risks and particular characteristics of the maritime transportation systems. In 
essence, the gap analysis in the existing research gave way for this research.
3.3.2 Study propositions
Research questions 1 - 4 captures the essential insights of the literature surveys, 
belonging to TA2 and TA3.The preliminary results of which were first communicated 
in SP4 and SP3, respectively, before final results were communicated in P1 and P2, 
leading to contributions C1 and C2.
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Research questions 5 - 8 came from the author looking to apply the insight from P1 and 
P2 on practical problems, resulting in work done on TA4 and TA5. The results of which 
were communicated in P3 and P4, resulting in C3 and C4.  
3.3.3 Units of analysis 
The unit of analysis is the major entity that is analyzed in the study [132]. The general 
category is maritime supply chains (as seen in P1 and P2). Specific entities include the 
global LNG supply system (SP1 and SP2), three industrial supply chains (industy case 
1-3), the US port system (MIT CTL Port Resilience Project), humanitarian supply 
chains exemplified by the 2010 humanitarian chains to Haiti (P3), and an exemplary 
LNG supply chain (P4).
3.3.4 Analytic techniques
As this study was looking into an area where little research had been done before, much 
effort was put into understanding what the state of the art was, to which extent the 
stakeholders considered and had knowledge about the problem, as well as to understand 
their approaches to supply chain risk management. 
For this purpose, revealing stakeholders thoughts and ways of approaching the problem, 
Yin [131] suggests case studies, experiments, histories and analysis of historical data as 
methods for doing social science research. Case study methods are particularly 
recommended when “how” or” why” questions are being asked, and where the focus is 
on a contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context (p. 1).  
A combination of quantitative and qualitative data was used for the assessment. The 
most useful insights from the surveys came from descriptive statistics such as basic 
ratios. The interviews however allowed for follow-up of the results.
The analytic technique used for the interviews is called “explanation building” by Yin 
[133] (p. 141). In short, we had a set of working assumptions, as well as the interview 
guide as can be found in appendix C. Starting with initial statements, these were 
compared with what the interviewed stakeholders responded. Through several iterations 
of the statements, we believe that we could have confidence in our understanding.
The last paper addresses how to systematically address vulnerability in a maritime 
transportation system using a Formal Vulnerability Assessment approach, create 
quantitative measures of disruption risk and test the effect of mitigating measures. 
These quantitative data are prerequisites for cost efficiency calculations, and may be 
obtained without requiring excessive resources. Supply chain simulation using 
heuristics-based planning tools offers an approach to quantify the impact of disruption 
scenarios and mitigating measures. This was used to enrich a risk-based approach to 
maritime supply chain vulnerability assessment. Monte Carlo simulation is used to 
simulate a stochastic nature of disruptions.  
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3.3.5 Criteria for interpreting findings 
The validity discussions of this thesis can be found in section 5.
3.4 Research questions and methods 
Paper 1: Failure modes in the maritime transportation system – a functional approach 
to throughput vulnerability 
RQ1: How may one identify potential low-frequency high-risk disruption scenarios in 
maritime transportation systems?  
RQ2: How does one reduce systemic vulnerability towards low-frequency high-risk 
disruption scenarios in maritime transportation systems? 
The work on papers one and two went in parallel; where the insights of paper one were 
used to support the presented framework in the second paper.  
The foundation of this paper came from the realization that surveyed literature 
implicitly assumed that all risks could be foreseen. Sheffi [26] illustrated that 
vulnerabilities could be prioritized based on the dimensions frequency and consequence 
(p. 31), and that there was significant value in planning to restore the systems. This was 
called business continuity planning by Zsidisin et al. [62].  The basis for the six failure 
modes used in this paper is the MIT Center for Transportation and Logistics Supply 
Chain Response project, for which several hundred disruption scenarios were assessed 
and grouped through grounded theory Rice and Caniato [40]. The concept of failure 
modes is well known and used within safety and reliability application [43, 44]. 
Through the grounded theory work of Rice [39, 40], and expansions to these by Berle et 
al [41], the authors argue to have captured the high level ways maritime transportation 
systems may fail. The essential question is then; which functions do you need to back 
up to make your supply chain work?  
Challenges for this paper were in particular how to convey the message in a way so that 
the paper could be applicable beyond strict academic purposes. The solution chosen was 
a very example-rich form, where examples and cases were used to give the reader a 
perspective. For the same purpose (and for readability), the exact discussions on the 
selection of the failure modes were left out. Another challenge is how this process could 
be formalized for a practical example. Out suggestion is presented as paper 2, see 
below, where the failure mode approach towards supply chain disruption is done in 
parallel with a traditional methodology. 
Limitations include in particular a discussion on who should perform the assessment. 
We have left this out, but our perspective is that this should be a shared effort between 
stakeholders. As much of the larger disruptions would imply stoppage throughout the 
supply chain, the responsibility for restoring transportation capacity should be equally 
shared. For another reason, there may be several ways to restore transportation capacity; 
one single stakeholder may not have access to all, leaving out more cost-efficient 
solutions.  
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Paper 2: Formal Vulnerability Assessment: A methodology for assessing and mitigating 
strategic vulnerabilities in maritime supply chains  
RQ3: What would be a suitable framework for addressing maritime transportation 
system vulnerability to disruption risks? 
RQ4: Which tools and methods are needed for increasing the ability of operators and 
dependents of maritime transportation to understand disruption risks, to withstand such 
risk, and to prepare to restore the functionality of the transportation system after a 
disruption has occurred?
The work in paper two implied surveying a number of possible existing supply chain, 
safety- and reliability frameworks, to determine what would be the most suitable 
solution for the problem at hand. As for existing supply chain approaches not covering 
LFHI scenarios, this became apparent through several processes; First, investigation of 
existing frameworks increasingly gave this conclusion. Also, the author read “The 
Black Swan” by Taleb [134], which was an inspiration, likewise was Sheffi’s “The 
Resilient Enterprise” [26]. For a partner, the author took part in trying out doing a risk 
assessment for an industrial company’s supply chain, starting with a structured hazard 
identification process. However, the author has not taken part in the continued research 
of this project.
The Resilient Enterprise, as well as a paper titled “Building a secure and resilient supply 
network” by Rice and Caniato [40] led the author to do a year as an exchange fellow at 
MIT. It was during this stay that the failure modes presented in paper 1 were refined. 
However, the work was started before this; an earlier version was presented at the 
ESREL 2009 conference in Prague, Czech.
The criteria for the vulnerability assessment were set based on previous literature, in 
particular Oehmen et al. [135] and Kontovas and Psaraftis [136] and interviews with 
stakeholders: 
R1: The framework must be structured and systematic, with explicit declaration of 
responsibility for the framework and for updating it.  
R2: The framework must support quantification of risks. 
R3: The framework must anticipate risks and prepare for the unexpected. 
R4: The framework must be explicit on cost/benefit assessments of risk; both the 
business and the economics side of risk management should be considered.  
R5: The framework must be transparent. 
R6: The framework should give room for future implementations of dynamic 
monitoring of vulnerability, e.g. risk influence modelling.
Formal safety assessment proved a good candidate for modification for two reasons; 1) 
it was simple, but complete. 2) It had been applied and tested previously, so the 
strengths and weaknesses were to a degree known. The question was then which steps 
were necessary to adapt the framework to a maritime supply chain context. The 
solution, using the failure modes, was found throughout my time at MIT. The work on 
papers 1 and 2 therefore progressed in parallel.
Context and research design 
55
The questions remaining are how to actually use this, who should be responsible, and 
how could this be tested? As for paper 1, we believe this should be a collaborative effort 
throughout supply chain stakeholders. As the commercial operation depends on 
interaction between stakeholders, so should the risk- and disruption planning. For this 
research project, the full framework was not tested. However, an application of these 
was used in conjunction with paper three, to break down and understand the critical 
functions of a maritime component in humanitarian relief logistics.  
Paper 3: The role of the maritime transportation system in relief supply chains  
RQ5: How may maritime transportation systems contribute in humanitarian relief 
operations? 
RQ6: What are the essential factors (critical capabilities) necessary for a maritime 
logistics operation within a humanitarian relief context?  
The motivation for doing this paper came from a combination of events. As mentioned 
above, the author wanted to find a test case for the FVA and FM methodologies as 
described in papers one and two. The MIT Center for Transportation and Logistics had 
been doing research on humanitarian relief logistics. For this reason, Karen Spens spent 
a year at the center at the same time as the author.  
Some practical questions arise: First, what exactly is a humanitarian relief operation? As 
defined in the paper, humanitarian relief is foreign intervention into a society with the 
intention of helping local citizens. Our focus was those relief operations formed as a 
response to natural disasters, requiring rapid build-up of resources, answering to 
scenarios with lack of oversight, as well as often being characterized by severe damages 
to infrastructure, requiring agility and flexibility.  
What are the chokepoints and the largest constraints of this operation? We identified 
four factors that are relevant: capacity, time, cost and distribution. Capacity relates to 
how much goods you can move, the Haiti case proved that airports quickly get 
congested, limiting transportation capacity. The time to restore capacity is relevant; a 
sudden onset disaster scenario requires help to come fast. It has been suggested that 60-
80 % of the costs of NGOs are related to logistics, by performing these tasks more 
efficiently, more help can be given for the same amount of scarce funds. The end 
distribution of the goods is important to consider –damaged and congested roads can 
lead to problems moving goods out from a central distribution node such as an airport.
The approach presented is intended both for large NGOs and organizations such as the 
United Nations World Food Program (WFP). The key takeaway is that planners should 
consider incorporating plans to use the maritime mode in humanitarian logistics, and 
that this may contribute to increasing transportation capacity for lower cost, with limited 
time loss. Combined with short-sea transportation, distribution may be facilitated.
Beyond discussions with practitioners within the maritime transportation industry and 
humanitarian logistics practitioners, as well as having some of these proof-read the 
paper for face validity, no practical attempts at testing this approach has been carried 
out.
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Paper 4: Optimization, risk assessment and resilience in LNG transportation systems 
RQ7: Can risk assessment methods combined with results from fleet planning provide 
more insight in creating resilience in maritime supply chains? 
RQ8: Does the combination of risk assessment methods and deterministic optimization 
software provide adequate results for a supply chain planning problem under 
uncertainty? 
There are significant difficulties in coping with uncertainties in modelling maritime 
transportation systems. Stochastic optimization tools are still not mature, and no 
existing commercial approach has been found that solve a ship scheduling problems.  
Risk assessment methods combined with deterministic scheduling allows for including 
uncertainty about a supply chain scheduling, as well as to provide quantitative data of 
system reliability and its costs.  
This paper addresses how to systematically address vulnerability in a maritime 
transportation system using a Formal Vulnerability Assessment approach, how to create 
quantitative measures of disruption risk and how to test the effect of mitigating 
measures. These quantitative data are prerequisites for cost efficiency calculations, and 
may be obtained without requiring excessive resources. Supply chain simulation using 
heuristics-based planning tools offers an approach to quantify the impact of disruption 
scenarios and mitigating measures. This is used to enrich a risk-based approach to 
maritime supply chain vulnerability assessment. Monte Carlo simulation is used to 
simulate a stochastic nature of disruptions.  
In the paper, we argued that the combination of the Formal Vulnerability Assessment 
framework and using the commercial fleet planning tool TurboRouter with the Invent 
add-on to facilitate inventory routing, allows for enriching a vulnerability assessment of 
a transportation system. The Monte Carlo simulation combined with the inventory 
routing and scheduling tools illustrate how large impact combinations of disruption 
scenarios can do to a transportation system.   
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4. Results 
“In the land of the blind, the one-eyed man is king” - Desiderius Erasmus Roterodamus 
In the following, insights from the 20 interviews performed and the three industrial 
cases are presented, in addition to insights from two surveys; the MIT CTL Port 
Resilience Survey, and the MIT CTL Global Risk Survey. The author assisted in 
formulating the questions for the Port Resilience Survey and got direct access to the 
material. For the Global Risk Survey, the author got access to the material after the 
survey was completed, but did not in any way contribute to the results. 
4.1 Interviews 
In total, 20 interviews were performed to gain insight into the state of the art of supply 
chain risk management within commercial shipping operations. 16 of these were carried 
out as a part of the MIT CTL Port Resilience project. The author took part in all but four 
interviews, due to security clearance issues, such as with one U.S. Coast Guard Station. 
The final four were made by the author with four practitioners in Norway, all involved 
in the LNG transportation industry. 
The 16 semi-structured interviews were made with terminal operators, port authorities 
and the US Coast Guard in ports geographically distributed in California, Texas and 
New York and New Jersey, as well as in Panama. Operations of different sizes were 
included, terminals included both grounded and wheeled container shipping, break-
bulk, reefer and Ro-Ro. Questions included contingency plans, perspectives on 
resilience, approaches towards risk assessment and management, and description on 
previous disruptions, see appendix C for the questions form. 
There were substantial difficulties in finding relevant interview cases, the selection of 
the 16 interviewees can be described as a convenience sample. To find interviewees, we 
reached out to a number of suitable stakeholders in relevant ports. In addition, 
introductions were obtained through previous relationships of James Rice, project 
manager of the MIT CTL Port Resilience Project, and through the interviewees.  
Another relevant aspect was the “demographics” of the interviewees. To get a better 
grasp of the context, a wide spread of roles was desirable, to get a picture of a wide 
variety of roles in the MTS. To ensure to capture the efforts of the organization that the 
interviewee belonged to, we made sure that the subjects were “high enough” in the 
hierarchy, typically at managerial level.  
The spread in roles, through not only interviewing the security managers, made us 
confident that we had achieved a solid understanding of the state of vulnerability 
management in the MTS, although we had the above mentioned convenience bias in 
selection of subjects. Given that in the final interviews, we gained little new insight, the 
search for more subjects was abandoned.  
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4.1.1 Insights from the interviews 
Due to the explorative purpose of the research, the interviews were semi-structured in 
form. Questions asked revolved around investigating the subjects’ perspectives on risk 
and vulnerability within both their own organization and in the global transportation 
system. The concept of resilience was another focal point: How did the companies 
prepare to restore the system, and what sort of flexibility was put into their 
transportation systems.  
Examples of previous incidents were sought for. All interviewees could name at least 
one major maritime supply chain disruption, though most often not within their own 
organization. Through follow-up questions, we believe to have uncovered that most all 
respondents were very well aware of the risks of low-frequency high-impact scenarios, 
both that these occur and that transportation system downtime is very costly. However, 
respondents in general did not find that their organizations had specific plans or 
measures implemented to deal with this type of scenarios.
Discussions revolving around perceived vulnerability of maritime transportation 
systems in general tended to boil down to very security-related issues. This is 
understandable from the US operators’ perspective, in particular given that both the 
government and academics have the same focus (in the aftermath of 9/11). However, as 
Rice and Caniato [42] argued through the supply chain security project, the 
consequences of security related issues such as terrorism are similar to the consequences 
of other causes, such as natural disasters.
Informants gave that overall, few systematic approaches to supply chain risk 
management were used. Reasons for this included lack of good frameworks, resources, 
complaints about own importance and access to personnel: “we are a too small player to 
devote significant resources to this”.
A large operator provided an overview of their terminal risk management process. We 
did not get access to any background documentations around the workings of this, 
though through interviews it seemed the purpose was to provide a checklist of potential 
security hazards of the terminal. In particular, access control and anti-terrorism efforts 
were key factors in the hazard list we were shown. However, through follow-up 
questions, the risk management process seemed to be the result of a previous effort; no-
one were responsible for updating the hazard list, and no process for systematic 
subsequent surveys existed.
Respondents in general replied that little could be learnt from benchmarking other 
organizations, coming from the attitude of finding themselves unique. A catch-phrase 
that was expressed frequently was that “if you have seen one port, you have seen one 
port”. Causal factors leading respondents to giving this statement can range from 1) 
Actual lack of comparability between ports, 2) Lack of oversight between different 
ports and the operation of these, 3) Lack of willingness to realize similarities between 
ports, 4) Lack of willingness to learn from other organizations / to benchmark 
operations to best-practices. The author would argue that 2-4 are likely causation 
factors, although this was not pursued further. The basic processes are to move goods 
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on and off a boat to storage and then to another boat or hinterland. More particular, 
container shipping is by definition standardized, leading to the argument that 
benchmarking between transportation systems, and thereby creating taxonomies of 
vulnerabilities in the MTS is feasible. 
As we increasingly came to the conclusion that little new insight was gained from the 
interviews, the search for more respondents was aborted.  
4.2 Industry cases 
Three industrial cases were completed as a part of the PhD work within the MARRISK 
project, in addition to a number of preliminary meetings that did not result in specific 
cases. The goal was not clearly defined before starting, focusing more on explorative 
discussions on the context and challenges of the industry, perceptions on risk et cetera. 
Due to confidentiality clauses, the nature of the cases and the partners cannot be 
described in detail. 
4.2.1 Ship owner 
The partner is a large international shipping company that owns and operates a fleet of 
vessels within its segment. Results from the cases was more insight into how the sector 
is operated from the practitioners side, how practitioners think about risk and resilience, 
and how they adapt to such a setting. The main contributions of this case were increased 
insight in how essential explicit cost/efficiency estimations are for practitioners, the 
limits of resources available for such assessment, the “acceptance level” for theoretical 
concepts (i.e. that frameworks and tools should be hands on and applicable), and that 
our (at the time) initial ideas of focusing on LFHI risks were well founded.  
4.2.2 Industrial supply chain
– advanced technical product with a global customer base. 
The case was to identify potential risks and vulnerabilities for the spare parts 
warehousing and distribution for an advanced technical product. Due to the high cost of 
spare parts, the number of parts involved and the global distribution of customers, the 
client wanted to reduce global supply chain costs. However, the customers depended on 
high availability of the product, introducing significant constraints in the possibilities of 
removing warehouses.  
Examples of companies that are advanced in such methodologies include Caterpillar 
Inc., which cut costs by implementing flexible “virtual warehouses”, basically allowing 
for Caterpillar to buy back unused parts from its customers warehouses and 
redistributing these where needed [26] (p 229).
The research done around this project enforced the same insights as in the Ship Owner 
Case. In addition, it gave the author more insight into the workings of a global supply 
chain operator, the design of which, and practitioner’s perspectives on the tasks as hand.
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4.2.3 Port ontology 
The project was partially run by a partner company, where the goal was to develop an 
ontology for the port as a hub between maritime and land based transportation. This is 
in line with the resilience project of Mansouri et al. [137]. To start with the obvious 
question; An ontology can be described as by Howe [138] as:  
1. (philosophy) A systematic account of Existence. 
2. (artificial intelligence) An explicit formal specification of how to represent the 
objects, concepts and other entities that are assumed to exist in some area of interest and 
the relationships that hold among them. 
3. (information science) The hierarchical structuring of knowledge about things by 
subcategorising them according to their essential (or at least relevant and/or cognitive) 
qualities.
In short, the project sought out to create a model to describe the workings of a port by 
defining a “universe of discourse”, in which a set of agents could communicate about 
the domain without operating on a shared theory – or allowing people from a wide set 
of fields to collaborate in a discussion on the port. This could be achieved by defining a 
set of representational terms, where definitions associate the names of entities in 
the universe of discourse (e.g. classes, relations, functions or other objects) with human-
readable text describing what the names mean, and where formal axioms constrain the 
interpretation and use of these terms [138]. 
Our potential insight was that we could contribute in
1.       Enriching the ontology to make it cover elements that make it suitable as a basis 
for quantitative risk and vulnerability analyses. 
2.       Further study into the technology mapping sequence, where the ontology could 
contribute to a simulation model of the system.  
In particular the consequence side was deemed to be relevant, following the research 
done on LFHI risks. The areas studied by the author included accident scenarios based 
on:
- Blast effects (i.e. the propagation of a negative consequence throughout the system). 
- Emerging effects – i.e. observing when gradually increases of workload on a 
port/terminal system would result in that the system as such or some of its bottlenecks 
‘would choke’, with considerable reduction in throughput as a direct consequence. 
However, due to significant difficulties combining a very detailed and advanced 
theoretical approach with my focus on practitioners left us to not continue the 
collaboration on this project.
4.3 Surveys
Empirical insight into the problem was collected from interviews and visits to relevant 
ports in the US and Panama, and data from two MIT Center for Transportation and 
Logistics surveys were used. While the data material, except from the global risk 
survey, is only from US ports, insights may apply wider.  
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For the MIT CTL Port Resilience project, a survey was made with stakeholders in the 
port domain, including shippers, port authorities and terminal operators - the 
questionnaires can be found in appendix D.  A total 525 respondents provided insight 
into disruptions in the port environment [139]. The largest group of respondents was 
shippers (n=123), followed by carriers and terminal operators.  
A majority of respondents indicated that most delays were on average less than a day, 
and less than maximum two days.  However, adding up types of failures, it seems that a 
disruptive event on average will occur every two weeks. On the longest delays, for most 
categories of failures, the majority of respondents replied that delays were no more than 
2-3 days, except for labour-related disruptions. 
An observation from the Port Resilience Survey was that, although not conclusive, 
highly focused entities may not have a full view of the system. This is in line with what 
we experienced in these interviews. The respondents reported delays only for the 
elements that they were operating in, e.g. shippers provided information on intermodal 
connection delays, terminal operators on the terminal delays. This illustrates the need 
for models such as figure 7, showing the interactions between the stakeholders in the 
maritime transportation system. 
The 2010 MIT CTL Global Risk Survey, involving 2400 supply chain respondents 
worldwide gave us insight in thoughts on vulnerability mitigation and failure modes 
among supply chain stakeholders - the questionnaires can be found in appendix E. 
Three pieces of information were particularly relevant for the FM approach: 54 % of 
1,350 valid respondents would spend more or much more on planning and 
implementing risk prevention measures, 30 % would spend equal amounts on 
prevention and response. In this, a strong indication is given that prevention is 
considered more important than response among supply chain operators. The question 
did not specify whether already implemented measures should be considered. 
On being asked on the importance of failure modes on major supply chain disruptions, 
1317 valid responses were given, where the by the respondents perceived 1st, 2nd and 3rd
most important failure modes were weighted as 3, 2 and 1. The key insight is that loss 
of supply was the primary worry of supply chain stakeholders, followed by interruption 
of internal operations. Loss of communication was rated as the third most important 
mode. Labor availability was rated as the least important. At the time of the survey 
design, demand was considered a failure mode; in later revisions, estimating demand is 
considered a factor in the supply chain design, not a key capability or function of the 
system itself. Demand is therefore excluded as a failure mode. However, it is somewhat 
related to demand failure in the sense that it affects revenues. Therefore, financial flows 
(access to liquidity) are possibly more important than what the numbers indicate.  
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4.4 Port Capacity Study 
The Port Capacity study was focused on understanding where there major cargo flow in 
the US went. Its principal contractor was the US Department of Homeland Security, 
having realized that no-one actually knew the US port capacity for a set of goods. The 
model based itself on using the cargo volumes shipped in 2007 for all US ports, sorted 
by 10 commodity categories ranging from container to food and farm products. For 
each of these the model removed one port after another to study its total impact on the 
overall commodity category carrying capacity [140].
The results from the port capacity study showed that surprisingly few ports stood for the 
majority of goods movement. For all goods types except manufactured goods and raw 
materials, less than 20 ports handled 80 % of the volumes [140].  
In particular food and farm products and chemicals were relevant in the US setting. The 
top three ports handled respectively 45% and 40% of total volumes [140]. Given that a 
single of the most important ports would fail, over 25% additional port capacity would 
be needed to absorb the volumes. It is also relevant that all six ports were located in the 
Mexico Gulf area (Food and farm products top 3 Ports: South Louisiana, New Orleans, 
Plaquemines. Chemicals top 3 ports: Houston, South Louisiana, Baton Rouge). Some 
ports stand out in being top 3 most important in several categories; South Louisiana 
with six of the ten categories, New York / New Jersey with five, and Los Angeles / 
Long Beach with four. This illustrates that the US relies on a very limited set of ports 
for the majority of its exports and imports.  
Figure 10: Selected important ports in the US (based on [10]) 
South 
Louisiana
Houston
Baton Rouge 
Plaquemines 
New York / 
New Jersey Los Angeles / 
Long Beach 
Results
64
The contribution of this study was that it provided a quantitative measure of the US 
dependence on a limited set of vital ports, the loss of any of which would significantly 
reduce the overall transportation capacity of the US port system. Limitations exist in the 
model, in the data material behind the model and in the methodology chosen. 
4.5 Methods that have not been explored fully: possible continuation 
Scenario planning is a tool that has not been pursued in this thesis. Kroneberg in his 
thesis on innovation in shipping by using scenarios [141] defines these as “structurally 
different stories about how the future might develop”. To use this methodology, he 
presents a set of necessary and sufficient conditions (p 10) including that the future is 
uncertain, and presents three requirements; 1) The number of scenarios should be 
between two and five, 2) the time horizon of the scenarios should correspond to that of 
the strategic decisions to be made, 3) scenarios should embrace the extremes of the 
future. In other words, scenarios describe a limited set of extreme future scenarios, to 
which the organization in question may choose to adapt. Scenario planning methods 
could possibly be adapted to help generate failure modes and weak points of the 
assessment.  
Simulation methods could have given insight into how disruptions spread in 
transportation systems and how mitigating factors could respond to such events. As 
mentioned initially, large supply chains are complex with interconnected parts, where 
the connection and influence between the elements of the system are not necessarily 
readily apparent. The use of simulation based on heuristics-based optimization tools as 
done in paper 4 is a simplified version of this.  
Practical cases with industry stakeholders where the presented approaches could be 
tested and adapted to a real-life case could be a promising route. Such case methods 
were used for understanding the state of the art, but could be used more extensively to 
add value in weeding out flaws of the approach. 
4.6 Contributions from the research.
4.6.1 Contribution 1 
An overview of the critical functions necessary for a maritime transportation 
system’s ability to move goods. 
Corresponding to paper 1: Failure modes in the maritime transportation system – a 
functional approach to throughput vulnerability 
RQ1: How may one identify potential low-frequency high-risk disruption scenarios in 
maritime transportation systems?  
RQ2: How do one reduce systemic vulnerability towards low-frequency high-risk 
disruption scenarios in maritime transportation systems? 
One of the essential insights throughout this doctoral research was that most existing 
research, as well as the focus of practitioners, was on preventing events from occurring, 
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rather than to plan to restore systems after a disruption has occurred. The insight was 
that planning for LFHI events can be done by focusing on the system’s mission rather 
than the system itself. The loss of the ability to perform certain tasks or functions will 
limit or remove the ability of the system to perform its mission, i.e. move goods. In 
particular, through identifying these functions, preparing to restore these, the system has 
a greater ability to recover from low-frequency high-impact risks. 
4.6.2 Contribution 2 
A framework for systematically addressing vulnerabilities in maritime 
transportation systems, treating both operational and low-frequency high-impact 
risks, as well as incorporating cost/efficiency criteria in the assessment. 
Corresponding to paper 2: Formal Vulnerability Assessment: A methodology for 
assessing and mitigating strategic vulnerabilities in maritime supply chains  
RQ3: What would be a suitable framework for addressing maritime transportation 
system vulnerability to disruption risks? 
RQ4: Which tools and methods are needed for increasing the ability of operators and 
dependents of maritime transportation to understand disruption risks, to withstand such 
risk, and to prepare to restore the functionality of the transportation system after a 
disruption has occurred?
Reviewed literature showed that no comprehensive framework existed to assess the 
supply chain vulnerability in maritime transportation systems. Also, most existing 
supply chain research focused on preventing events from occurring. A number of 
possible approaches were examined, mainly from reliability and safety engineering. 
Most of these existing methods were used within maritime, offshore and nuclear safety 
assessments. In the end, the Formal Safety Assessment was found to be a satisfactory 
candidate, being comprehensive, flexible enough to be applied to a setting, straight-
forward, and explicitly including cost/efficiency evaluations.  
The drawbacks of the existing FSA framework was that it was focused solely on 
technical risk, that an implicit assumption was that threats could be foreseen, thereby 
aiming for removing sources of risk as long as this was cost-effective. Therefore, the 
insights shown in paper 1 were included, specifically introducing treatment of low-
frequency high-impact risks in addition to the aforementioned “foreseeable” risks.   
4.6.3 Contribution 3
The insight and understanding of failure and restoration of maritime 
transportation systems is applicable to humanitarian relief logistics, where the 
application of principles from commercial supply chain management is immature.  
Corresponding to paper 3: The role of the maritime transportation system in relief 
supply chains
RQ5: How may maritime transportation systems contribute in humanitarian relief 
operations? 
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RQ6: What are the essential factors (critical capabilities) necessary for a maritime 
logistics operation within a humanitarian relief context?  
The research done for paper 1 and 2 provided an overview of the maritime 
transportation system and the risks within this. Initially, it came as a surprise that 
existing academic research did not fully recognize the value of maritime transportation 
in relief logistics.  
Parts of the research went into understanding what the bottlenecks in a relief operation 
are. Our focus became the ability to move large amounts of goods swiftly into an area 
following a sudden onset disaster, and to distribute the goods to where these were 
needed. In particular, the three weeks needed to restore maritime transportation chains 
following the 2010 Haiti earthquake was surprising, given the significant cargo carrying 
capacity and cost advantage of the MTS compared to air transportation.  
4.6.4 Contribution 4
Combining supply chain risk assessment with optimization tools for an LNG 
supply chain increases the robustness and resilience of the system and thereby the 
energy security of the recipients, while ensuring efficiency resource usage of the 
supply chain. 
Corresponding to paper 4: Optimization, risk assessment and resilience in LNG 
transportation systems 
RQ7: Can risk assessment methods combined with results from fleet planning provide 
more insight in creating resilience in maritime supply chains? 
RQ8: Does the combination of risk assessment methods and deterministic optimization 
software provide adequate results for a supply chain planning problem under 
uncertainty? 
Optimization tools allows for structured analysis of complex problems, where 
mathematical formulation of problems allow for maximizing utilization of limited 
resources. Recent advances in algorithms and heuristics allow for design and operation 
of complex and more efficient global supply chains, exploiting synergies across 
geographic locations, supply chain functions and time. 
In particular, optimization tools for practical problems are typically designed to operate 
in a deterministic setting, assuming that the world is predictable, and that variability is 
limited. However, there is a growing focus on low-frequency high-impact scenarios. 
These are the scenarios that very seldom occur, but when they do, they create large 
problems for the supply chain. The large number of such possible scenarios makes the 
total possible impact significant; although little can be done to prevent all these events 
from occurring. Extreme examples are the 1994 Kobe earthquake and the 2002 Los 
Angeles dock lockout, both with massive consequences to business and infrastructure. 
Neither of these are encompassed in the sort of problems where operations research 
[OR] methods are normally applied.   
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This paper addresses the gap between optimizing a transportation system based on 
mathematical models and supply chain risk assessment of these systems. In essence; can 
risk assessment methods be used to improve the handling of uncertainty in decision 
planning in large and complex supply chains?  
To model a real life scenario, a stochastic model allows for investigating complex 
systems and including rare scenarios. Monte Carlo simulations introduce random 
numbers into a model. By repeating the analysis a large number of times, the properties 
of the system become evident. This paper uses risk assessment methods to determine 
what may go wrong in a maritime supply chain, and how to cope with disruptions. To 
determine the effects of disruptions and mitigating measures, Monte Carlo methods and 
operations research tools are used to quantify effects.
The purpose of the approach presented is not to give the final answer to how risk 
analysis and mathematical planning tools can be integrated. Rather, this is intended as a 
conceptual paper to present this novel approach. We argue that the combination of the 
Formal Vulnerability Assessment framework and using the commercial fleet planning 
tool TurboRouter with the Invent add-on to facilitate inventory routing, allows for 
enriching a vulnerability assessment of a transportation system.
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5. Evaluation and discussion of results 
“The only true knowledge is knowledge of one's own ignorance” - Socrates 
At the start of this research project, my questions revolved around questions such as 
what is a transportation system failure. How can we understand transportation systems 
in this context? How are transportation systems vulnerable? How do people think about 
vulnerability? How can we systematically address vulnerability, and what is it we are 
really trying to protect? 
To start with the first; a central definition that laid the foundation for much of the later 
efforts was what we termed the “mission centric approach”, in essence that the goal was 
to protect the mission of the transportation system. The mission was defined as the 
ability of the transportation system to move goods. Separating the ability of the system 
from the physical properties (the nuts and bolts) of the system laid the groundwork for 
the failure mode assessment, where a limited set of functions or capabilities had to be 
protected.
“The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable” by Taleb [134] was, for all his 
flaws, an eye opener for the author in how to approach risk and uncertainty. Taking it 
back to Socrates, Taleb quotes him on that “the only true knowledge is knowledge of 
one's own ignorance”. Taleb further bases his argument on Francis Bacon, stating that 
among the greatest of human fallacies is that of assuming more order than what actually 
exists in a chaotic nature. Taleb’s behavioral argument is that people are wired for 
narratives, not statistical uncertainties. Also, he argues people tend to expect past events 
to repeat, rather than preparing for those events that actually matter; those that are rare 
and unpredictable. His term for these are “Black Swans”, named after the positive 
certainty that existed in Europe until 1697 that all swans are white. In this thesis, such 
events have been termed low-frequency high-impact scenarios (LFHIs), accentuating 
that we care about those that may impact the system’s ability to perform its mission. 
Combining the insights in the paragraphs above, an argument on coping with supply 
chain vulnerability can be formed: Given that we know the draw towards preparing for 
the past, and that we believe that the most important events are those we do not foresee, 
systems need to be able to cope with unforeseen events. In other words, transportation 
systems need not only have the ability to resist disruptive events, they should also have 
the ability to restore themselves once a disruption occurs.  
In this line, the cost-efficiency argument is relevant. To which extent should 
transportation systems have the ability to withstand threats, and how fast should 
transport capacity be restored, given that a cost is incurred to give the systems such 
abilities? There is also a cost to having time delays in restoration. Sheffi [26] argues that 
there in essence are two strategies to coping with disruptions; robustness and flexibility. 
Robustness is the ability to withstand threats, flexibility is the ability to reconfigure 
system resources in possession to restore and uphold the ability to perform the mission. 
His argument is that both are needed. However, the balance and cost/efficiency trade-off 
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is not trivial. Tang [60] sums the lack of efforts up as no-one gets credit for an event 
that did not occur.
A foundation for doing credible cost-efficiency tradeoffs is the ability to quantify risk. 
Given that risk can be defined as a combination of scenario, probability and 
consequence, in particular the latter are relevant to put numbers to.  
However, quantifying risk is notoriously hard to do, due to a set of reasons: First, 
supply chain risk management does not allow for experimenting in the closed confines 
of a laboratory. This sets the potential for experiments apart from for instance risk 
assessments in technical systems, where a mechanical part can be stressed over time 
under observation. Second; transportation systems are characterized by complex and 
interactions between the components. Combined with high and increasing interaction 
between components, as argued by Perrow [33], is a recipe for breakdown. Third, the 
number of potential threats that may cause a disruption is immense. Combining this 
with limited oversight of the interactions and complexities of the transportation systems 
leaves putting exact numbers to the scenarios at hand at best as difficult.
The solution generally used when trying to assess a scenario characterized by one or 
more of the three factors above, is simplification; the easiest of which is “expert 
judgment”. In essence, someone with above average insight into the problem make their 
best guesses on what the occurrence rate or possible consequence of a disruption would 
be – a version is to average the numbers found by several experts. Such assessments can 
be helped by structured techniques, but in essence they are subjective. On the other side, 
“in the land of the blind, the one-eyed man is king”: an estimate may be better than no 
information, as long as it does not lead one into a false sense of knowledge.
Examples of organizations that are engineered to have very low occurrence rates of 
disruption, termed high reliability organizations [HROs], include aircraft carriers and 
nuclear power plans [142]. These are made in response to theorists such as Perrow [33], 
who in the Normal Accident Theory stated that accidents are inevitable and are bound to 
occur. Weick et al [142] (p 37) argues that high reliability comes from the capability to 
discover and manage unexpected events. This again comes from mindfulness of the 
situation, which originates from five factors; Preoccupation with failure, reluctance to 
simplify interpretations, sensitivity to operations, commitment to resilience and 
underspecification of structures. In essence, the approach is that of being incessantly 
searching for failures rather than focusing on success. The relevant argument is 
therefore; how much of the lessons from HROs can be included in a supply chain before 
the costs are too high, both through extra measures, and through reduced focus on 
profits? There are no easy answers to this.  
The author subscribes to the insights presented by Saleh et al. [93], stating that system 
safety is a “control problem” needing a system theoretic approach. Interactions between 
components (not just single components), subsystems and stakeholders can lead to 
failures, and these must therefore be considered as such. This is also the essence of the 
failure modes as presented in papers 1 and 2; the interactions between the components 
of the maritime transportation system, as well as the functions within these components 
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is fundamental to understanding how a transportation system can fail and how to 
prepare to cope with such failure. 
As described in paper 4 and section 4.6.4, we argue that understanding vulnerability and 
the effects of mitigating measures in complex systems is difficult. We argue that the 
combination of the Formal Vulnerability Assessment framework described in paper 2, 
and using Monte Carlo simulation and a fleet planning tool allows for quantifying 
vulnerabilities and the effects of mitigating measures in a transportation system, as done 
in paper 4. The ability to provide quantitative data allows for pricing vulnerability. Our 
approach is focusing on maximizing cargo moved. 
5.1 Practical implications of the research: 
The primary takeaways from this research can be summed up as follows:  
1) Organizations should accept that not all threats can be foreseen, nor can all of these 
be prevented from causing a disruption to the transportation system. This is in line with 
the Black Swan Theory, as described earlier [134].  
2) Likewise, organizations should accept that disruptions are bound to occur, in line 
with the Normal accident theory [33]. 
3) Organizations should plan to restore the most critical functions, as described in paper 
1 and 2. To cope with this, the organization first should describe the supply chain on 
which it is dependent. What are the flows in the system? Which of these flows are the 
most critical; i.e. without which the operations would have to shut down immediately, 
the cost incurred of shutdown would be large etc. Are there any nodes in which a single 
component of ability breakdown will cause significant damage to the system? This is 
generally referred to as a single point of error, and is detrimental to the reliability of the 
system.  
4) Supply chain stakeholders get a structured breakdown of the maritime transportation 
system as described in paper 1. This is describing for the entire system. However, a 
single stakeholder probably will not achieve large results by themselves, as measures to 
increase the overall ability of the transportation system would incorporate several 
stakeholders throughout the chain. The structured breakdown is a starting point for 
further discussions, also at a more detailed level. Supply chain stakeholders are 
presented with a framework on how to address the issue of supply chain vulnerability.  
5) The potential in using the MTS for both transportation of goods into a humanitarian 
relief area and using short sea shipping for final distribution is illustrated. 
Humanitarian relief operations are as illustrated in paper 3 dependent on moving large 
amounts of goods into areas often characterized by damaged infrastructure. Over-
reliance on air freight limits capacity and makes organizations incur high logistics costs.
Preparing to use and to restore maritime transportation in humanitarian relief can 
increase transportation capacity and reduce transportation cost.
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The last-mile distribution problem is relevant in a disaster context, due to the above 
mentioned risk of damaged infrastructure. As airports and the distribution of goods out 
from these may become bottlenecks in the immediate response phase of an operation, 
short sea shipping should be included as an alternative transport corridor in planning of 
spreading out and distributing of goods. This could be understood as an extended ‘last 
mile logistics’ problem, as described by Balcik et al. [143]. 
6) Vulnerabilities in a maritime transportation may be better understood using a Formal 
Vulnerability Assessment approach in combination with tools to create quantitative 
measures of disruption risk and test the effect of mitigating measures. These 
quantitative data are prerequisites for cost efficiency calculations, and may be obtained 
without requiring excessive resources. In our approach, we have simulated an LNG 
supply chain using heuristics-based planning tools. Monte Carlo simulation is used to 
simulate a stochastic nature of disruptions. The exemplary assessment of a maritime 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) transportation system illustrates the potential for providing 
quantitative data about the cost of disruptions and the effects of mitigating measures, 
which are foundations for more precise cost-efficiency estimates.  
5.2 Limitations of the thesis 
Limitations of this thesis touch several dimensions. In the scope, both the limited time 
available for doing a research project and the lack of initial structure in the work limit 
what is possible to achieve. The latter is relevant for both the process itself and the 
knowledge gained and created. The author would argue that any research process is an 
iterative one, not linear and stepwise – a certain maturity through iterations is therefore 
necessary to properly understand the subject, the limits of existing research and the 
potential and limits of one’s own work.  
Given that the field was not well described in theory, the majority of the work done has 
been in the qualitative domain. This descriptive approach serves well to illustrate the 
maritime transportation systems, the problems of vulnerability and the possible 
approaches to mitigating this. However, ideally, the research should have had a more 
quantitative focus, providing numbers that could be tested.
Also, while the research has given a solid theoretical foundation for risk assessment, it 
is not necessarily ready to use for practitioners. One question is who should be 
responsible for this assessment, to take the lead in effectuating and implementing the 
assessment and the conclusions of this – which has not been discussed thoroughly. The 
difficulties in finding industrial partners may have contributed to less off an industry 
perspective in the research than what would be ideal.
This research spans over several fields, ranging from maritime economics, supply chain 
management, risk analysis, to logistics and fleet optimization. It is not feasible to be an 
expert in all fields, nor has it been a goal. Ideally, the research could encompass an even 
broader theoretical foundation, including methods such as scenario assessments and 
simulations.  
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Practical problems include the difficulty of finding relevant cases and collaborators. The 
fact that not much industrial collaboration has led to anything beyond discussions and 
interviews has been a constraint to the research.  
An issue that has not been thoroughly discussed is the relation between vulnerability in 
ocean transit and in the port environment. The failure mode methodology does not 
include the ocean transit as somewhere to focus, although recent events continuously 
remind us that this is a source of vulnerability in maritime transportation systems. For 
instance, piracy has become a source of worry the latest decade [144]. Somali pirates 
operating in the Indian Ocean have taken control of a number of vessels the last five 
years (source): In 2010, 49 ships were successfully hijacked off the horn of Africa 
[145], currently. At the time of writing, 23 merchant ships are being held, with a total of 
510 crew members being hostages [146].  
Two more issues that have not been thoroughly investigated is firstly the diverging 
objectives of stakeholders and capacities to bear risk, and secondly how to properly 
account for and compensate for such disparities. Such differences are also relevant 
between “private” supply chain operators and “the public” in form of society dependent 
on the supply chain. This type of issue has been briefly described in this thesis and by 
other academics. One way to approach this is to consider differences in risk bearing 
ability by using insurance measures, although this has not been pursued thoroughly in 
this thesis.  
Practical implementation of the suggestion of this thesis has not been attempted. This is 
related to the lack of deep collaboration with industry stakeholders. However, to the 
extent possible, the research has been made with an industrial perspective in mind, to 
create applicable knowledge for industry stakeholders.
5.3 Evaluation of research questions 
The research questions were formulated as a part of the research leading to the 
individual papers. As the research was an iterative process, insights gained throughout 
gaining understanding of the problems forces the research questions to be reformulated 
to be more precise. Ideally, the process should be to formulate the final questions before 
commencing the project; this was not realistic for this research process. The author 
firmly believes that the overall contribution was reinforced by the iterations done to the 
research questions. In the end, the research questions precisely describe the questions 
asked and answered, such as RQ1: “How may one identify potential low-frequency 
high-impact scenarios in maritime transportation systems?”.  
The state of the art identified a set of gaps in existing research. While filling the gaps in 
existing research was an infeasible task for this PhD project, the research questions 
(RQ) set out to contribute in that direction.
Evaluation and discussion of results 
73
5.4 Evaluation of Contributions 
The contributions correspond to the research questions of the respective papers as 
indicated in section 4.6.
Contribution 1 provides a structured approach towards coping with low frequency high 
impact disruption scenarios in maritime transportation systems. This is a novel 
approach, both by setting out to solve a problem not previously described, and through 
the structuring of the problem by describing the critical functions and capabilities.  
Contribution 2 provides a structured framework for a comprehensive vulnerability 
assessment by combining the insights around low-frequency high-impact scenarios with 
the safety-oriented formal safety assessment framework. For safety issues, the FSA is 
widely applied and accepted. Given this and the potential of the failure mode approach, 
the FVA seems promising. However, the method has not been applied in practice, 
leaving this a negative issue. 
Contribution 3 similar to the above contributions provides a structured approach, and 
answers to the lack of existing research on the role of maritime transportation in 
humanitarian logistics. 
Contribution 4 mitigates one flaw of this research project, namely the lack of 
quantification. Also, it adds to general research by bridging reliability engineering 
methods and mathematical optimization within a maritime supply chain risk 
management context.  
5.5 Evaluation of Validity Threats 
Validity can be defined as “the best available approximation to the truth of a given 
proposition, inference, or conclusion”, as by Trochim [132]. In essence, there is a chain 
of circumstances: 1) is there a relationship between what is argued as cause and effect 
(conclusion validity)? 2) Is this relationship causal (internal validity)? 3) In this general 
within the construct (construct validity)? 4) Is this general to other places, times and 
people (external validity)?  
5.5.1 Conclusion Validity:
Conclusion validity is the degree to which conclusions we reach about relationships in 
our data are reasonable. [132] 
On the developed methodologies:
Insights and feedback from discussions with practitioners, as well as our own attempts 
to falsify these by seeing if challenging scenarios would fit into our frameworks lead us 
to argue that the conclusion validity of the methodologies is acceptable.  
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On the cases: 
Insights from the industrial cases provided practical insights and proofing that the initial 
thoughts and approaches could be valid for practitioners. Insights from these and the 
MIT CTL surveys were triangulated by interviews to ensure that we had a consistent 
picture of the understandings and thoughts on supply chain disruptions and risks. 
Follow-up questions in the interviews allowed us to investigate whether the lack of 
supply chain risk assessments was an actual case or a lack of reporting. Also, consistent 
throughout interviews was that no-one systematically prepared for LFHI incidents. This 
leaves us to believe that we have credibly explored and revealed the state of the art in 
the maritime transportation industry.  
On the insights provided: 
Failure modes:  
The failure modes have been presented at an academic conference (ESREL 2010), and 
have been discussed with academics and industry stakeholders. Also, the authors have 
through a number of iterations tried to find flaws in the argumentation and the 
structuring of the maritime transportation system. One effect of this assessment was that 
demand failure was not anymore considered a property of the system. Rather, the failure 
to respond to changes in demand was considered to be the supply chain property, as this 
was a factor that could be influenced in the system design.
Formal Vulnerability Assessment:  
The framework was first presented at an academic conference (ESREL 2009), and has 
been discussed with academics and practitioners. In addition to this, the FVA being 
based on an existing and tested safety and reliability framework after reviews of 
possible candidates, the authors are confident that the framework will provide insight in 
practical implementations. Possible improvements and further credibility may come 
from real-life realizations.  
Humanitarian logistics 
The functions of the humanitarian logistics’ system rely on the research done for paper 
one and two, as well as through exploring literature from previous humanitarian, 
military and civilian supply chains. In addition, practitioners were used for face validity 
of the paper. We believe that our insights contribute to a better understanding of the 
problem, although cases involving more stakeholders in the industry could better 
validate such results.
Optimization and risk assessment: 
System parameters were chosen so that the configuration to a large extent should 
represent an existing system. Given that the model and the optimization of this were 
done in a realistic, albeit simplified manner, the results are credible in our opinion.
5.5.2 Internal Validity: 
 “Assuming that there is a relationship in this study, is the relationship a causal one?” 
[132]
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The majority of the tasks in this research were exploration of the current state of the art, 
and to create structures to better understand and analyze transportation systems.  
The key questions for the surveys are whether our conclusions could be deduced from 
the data material, or if there were alternative explanations for the answers. The 
triangulation of data through follow-ups in the interviews allowed for some insights. 
However, we did not interview respondents directly on their answers (e.g. “in question 
5.1, why did you answer …?”), but rather through explorative questions (e.g. “How 
does your organization build in resilience?”). We do believe that we were able to enrich 
the data with the follow-up, thereby strengthening our confidence in the material.  
A problem for the internal validity of this thesis is that by design, it was “non-
experimental” [132], i.e. that there was no control group or similar – we only surveyed 
stakeholders in the industry, where there was a strong selection bias (as mentioned 
earlier).
5.5.3 Construct Validity: 
 “Assuming that there is a causal relationship in this study, can we claim that the 
program reflected well our construct of the program and that our measure reflected 
well our idea of the construct of the measure?” [132] 
Did we actually measure the parameters that we sought out to investigate? Or in other 
words, were our methods well suited for the problem at hand? 
The port resilience survey set out to map the current rate of disruptions as experienced 
by industry stakeholders. Respondents gave that most disruptions are minor, although 
some major events do occur – just as expected. We saw that the respondents informed 
us mainly of disruptions within the parts of their value chain where they worked, not a 
surprising result neither. This survey basically confirmed what we believed from before.  
Theories such as that stakeholders lack oversight were deduced from the lack of 
responses about other parts of the value chain – this could not be confirmed from the 
survey. However, as we did interviews, we could follow up on leads, strengthening our 
belief that this theory in fact could be relevant. Interviews with a limited number of 
stakeholders cannot statistically confirm such a statement, leaving us concluding that 
for this purpose, it was not well designed. The general perspective was that we got 
insight into what we looked for, and that the method was suited.  
5.5.4 External Validity: 
 “Assuming that there is a causal relationship in this study between the constructs of the 
cause and the effect, can we generalize this effect to other persons, places or times?” 
[132]
Our study revealed that there is little understanding of low-frequency high-impact 
scenarios in the maritime transportation industry. Hence, little efforts are made to 
Evaluation and discussion of results 
76
protect the system against these, as we suggest through preparing to restore a limited set 
of essential functions. A general insight that may apply wider is that such planning may 
be limited.  
In essence, our interviews confirmed that Taleb’s description of understanding of risk 
(being fooled by assuming history would repeat itself and by oversimplification and 
expecting order in a chaotic system) was prevalent also in the maritime industry. We 
believe that although the major part of the empirical research was done in a US context, 
the insights can be generalized to the maritime transportation industry in general. We 
also think that results can be applied outside of the maritime domain, although then in 
parallel to similar research.  
The combination of risk assessment methodologies, simulation and operations research 
methods is promising, where little existing research has been found. This approach may 
be extended beyond the maritime supply chain risk management domain.  
5.6 Reflections on the research context 
This research has been performed as a result of “research push”, rather than “industry 
pull”. In this, the author with associates and supervisors has identified that maritime 
supply chain risk management is an important field, that supply chains are in fact 
vulnerable towards disruptions, and that there currently is not a large focus towards 
mitigating this problem.  
Naturally, no ready made solution could be presented to industry stakeholders 
throughout the process of searching for potential industry partners. A number of 
fruitless, or at least not fertile enough, discussions with representatives have not led into 
a continued closer collaboration. Generally, they were “looking for something more 
ready-to-use” or more “hands-on”. On the other side, these have, like the interviewees, 
expressed that the research is timely and relevant.  
The wish of the author is that, while the research is theoretical and untested, it may 
contribute to better understandings of maritime supply chain vulnerability in the future. 
Also, given that the approach has been drawn out through the papers, a more applicable 
framework is ready for future research.  
Research is not done “in a vacuum”. At the very general level, the author belongs to a 
Western modern cultural setting, with a market-based perspective on allocation of 
limited resources. It is not given that all assumptions, arguments, reflections and 
conclusions would be identical if the author had a different cultural perspective. On the 
more specific side, the thesis belongs to a subject rooted in the intersection between 
engineering and economy subjects. A social scientist may argue that systems as 
presented are more about the interactions between people, and less about nuts and bolts. 
This has certainly been a factor in structuring the approach. At the methodological level, 
the choice of methods, using selected reliability engineering methods on a supply chain 
problem has provided certain insights and contributions. Would similar results have 
been obtained using other methods, and what would be different? And would other 
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research partners have given other insights? To conclude, the author firmly believes 
there is no single best approach to address the questions asked in this thesis. All that 
remains is having confidence in that the thoroughness and methods chosen has provided 
a solid result for both practitioners and academics. 
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78
6. Conclusion 
‘Plans are nothing; planning is everything’ – Dwight D. Eisenhower 
‘We are what we repeatedly do” – Aristoteles  
World trade increasingly relies on longer, larger and more complex supply chains, 
where maritime transportation is a vital backbone of such operations. The “mission 
centric approach” is the essence of this thesis, focusing on transportation systems ability 
to move goods. Numerous and complex interactions between parts, combined with 
strong focus on lowering costs by removing buffers create systems that are more prone 
to being vulnerable. In particular, this is visible in the LNG transportation industry. 
Very high infrastructure outlays needed provides incentives for lowering costs by 
removing buffers; combined with high societal dependence on LNG imports for 
purposes such as electricity generation create vulnerabilities.  
This research has contributed in creating a structured approach for understanding how 
maritime transportation systems can break down, what possible consequences may 
result from such breakdowns, how organizations may approach such problems in a 
structured manner, and how supply chains may be given the ability to restore 
themselves after a disruption has occurred. In particular, this is relevant for low-
frequency high-impact scenarios, given that while the individual probability of 
occurrence for these is low, the almost endless number of possible disastrous failures 
lead to a combined high probability. Real-life observation confirms this impression; 
Black swans, thousand-year waves and catastrophic failures of systems do happen.  
Through the failure mode assessment, a structure for assessing and reducing the 
disruption vulnerability for a maritime supply chain has been created. The method 
focuses on identifying the key functions that uphold the mission of the supply chain; to 
ensure the throughput of goods from source to the end user, and to shield the operation 
from the negative consequences of disruptive events. A key point is that preparing to 
uphold a limited set of key capacities and functions is a powerful approach compared to 
preparing for hundreds or thousands of potential disruptive events.
The proposed formal vulnerability framework sets out to create a platform for a 
systematic, structured and transparent overview of a specific defined maritime 
transportation system. Through a thorough structuring of the current status of the 
system, a joint platform for a shared understanding between the stakeholders can be 
made. Then in turn, using both the hazard- and the mission focus for addressing the 
vulnerabilities of the system, a wide spectrum of potential disruptive events has been 
covered. This approach is novel compared to reviewed supply chain risk assessment 
frameworks. 
In essence, the sea-side of a humanitarian maritime transportation system does not differ 
from commercial transportation systems. However, on the port – and hinterland side, a 
set of challenges occur. Our approach seeks to use a concept for reducing the 
vulnerability of commercial sea transportation systems on a humanitarian relief 
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problem. Through planning to restore the critical functions of the MTS, larger amounts 
of goods may be moved into a relief area at a lower cost, contributing to both higher 
efficiency and effectiveness. Short sea shipping should be included as an alternative 
transport corridor in planning of spreading out and distributing of goods. 
Risk assessment methods combined with deterministic scheduling allows for including 
uncertainty about a supply chain scheduling, as well as to provide quantitative data of 
system reliability and its costs. We have provided a conceptual approach for testing the 
sensitivity of an LNG transportation system to disruptions. In this, the cost of 
introducing mitigating measures can be compared to the potential benefits these offer. 
Essentially, a foundation for a cost-benefit assessment is thereby provided. 
The essence of this thesis is that interactions between the components of the maritime 
transportation system, as well as the functions within these components is fundamental 
to understanding how a transportation system can fail and how to prepare to cope with 
such failure. 
6.1 Contributions 
The following are the essential output of this research: 
C1: An overview of the critical functions necessary for a maritime transportation 
system’s ability to move goods. 
C2: A framework for systematically addressing vulnerabilities in maritime 
transportation systems, treating both operational and low-frequency high-impact risks, 
as well as incorporating cost/efficiency criteria in the assessment. 
C3: The insight and understanding of failure and restoration of maritime transportation 
systems is applicable to humanitarian relief logistics, where the application of principles 
from commercial supply chain management is immature.
C4: Combining supply chain risk assessment with optimization tools for an LNG supply 
chain increases the robustness and resilience of the system and thereby the energy 
security of the recipients, while ensuring efficiency resource usage of the supply chain. 
6.2 Future work 
This thesis has been limited to the engineering economics domain and the ability to 
move goods. As mentioned in the delimitations in section 3.1, this thesis is not about 
health, safety and environment, although methods developed for this purpose are 
applied. Nor does it directly concern the financial side of disruptions. The thesis does 
not focus on sharing responsibilities between stakeholders, nor to discuss direct roles in 
planning to cope with and recovering from disruptions; only that such efforts should be 
collaborative. All of these are rich potentials for future research.  
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Societal dependence on maritime transportation systems is the condition that this thesis 
relies on. The author sees interactions between single companies, supply chain networks 
of multiple companies and society dependent on this as a promising field of future 
research. What are the wants and incentives of these “levels of stakeholders”, and how 
may clarification of these roles provide a situation where all stakeholders are better off? 
One of the future works is that a publishing company, based on paper 2, invited the 
authors to write or edit a full book based on the subject. Possible expansions of this 
research are numerous, and would include further discussions on the intersection 
between a number of fields, including supply chain management, supply chain risk & 
resilience, and reliability engineering, where the latter is a primary source of knowledge 
for the former in the context of supply chain management. One way to approach this 
book would be to reach out to selected researchers to write about relevant subjects. We 
would need to know what exactly the organization is looking for with regards to extent 
and theme. Our approach could be based on the issue of risk, reliability and 
vulnerability of transport systems as such, with a specific focus on maritime transport 
and logistics systems in examples and applications.  
Practical implementations of the ideas could be relevant for both direct tasks and more 
indirect effects, and may provide benefits both for research communities and for 
practitioners. By direct, we mean contributing to increasing the understanding of how 
supply chains may break down, and how to reduce such vulnerability. Indirect may be 
for stakeholders in supporting industry, such as maritime insurance companies looking 
to expand their product portfolios by offering insurance for a wider scope of risks in the 
maritime supply chain. 
6.3 Concluding remarks 
Supply chain risk management is a subject to which significant research interest has 
been devoted in the last decade. As this thesis has shown, limited efforts have so far 
been devoted to the maritime side of global supply chains, although seaborne trades are 
indispensable for a number of commodities and goods flows. Hopefully, this thesis and 
the papers may contribute to new insights, both for academics and practitioners.  
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8. Glossary 
Accidental event - event or chain of events that may cause loss of life, or damage to 
health, the environment or assets [147] 
Agile - Agility is a business-wide capability that embraces organizational structures, 
information systems, logistics processes and, in particular, mindsets. A key 
characteristic of an agile organization is flexibility [148].
Barrier - Hollnagel [46] describes the concept of barriers as an obstacle, an obstruction 
or a hindrance that may either: 1) Prevent an event from taking place, or 2) thwart or 
lessen the impact of the consequences after an incident has happened. Hollnagel divides 
the types of barriers into four: physical, functional, symbolic and incorporeal 
(immaterial) barriers.  
Damage tolerance – essentially robustness, the ability to withstand a threat from 
resulting in an accidental event 
Defense in depth – Flemming and Silady provides three definitions for the term:  
1. (direct) A set of well defined design features in an installation (nuclear power plant) 
that provide multiple and physical lines of defense between the hazard and the public 
2. (process defense-in-depth) Incorporates defense-in-depth thinking into the licensing  
requirements. These requirements include the single failure criterion, safety margins 
reflected in various acceptance criteria, special treatment requirements, and the General 
Design Criteria. 
3. (scenario defense-in-depth) This type of defense-in-depth reflects the PRA 
(probabilistic risk assessment) perspective of safety philosophy in which all conceivable 
combinations of initiating events and successes and failures of plant safety features are 
considered in the definition of scenarios 
Effectiveness – Effectiveness is the extent to which goals are accomplished [149]. 
Efficiency – Efficiency is a measure of how well resources expended are utilized [149]. 
Failure modes - Failure modes are defined as the key functions and capabilities of the 
supply chain, loss of any such would reduce or remove the ability of the system to 
perform its mission, see Berle et al [41] for a comprehensive discussion. 
Framework – Frameworks can be defined as [150]
1. A structure for supporting or enclosing something else, especially a skeletal support 
used as the basis for something being constructed. 
2. An external work platform; a scaffold. 
3. A fundamental structure, as for a written work. 
4. A set of assumptions, concepts, values, and practices that constitutes a way of 
viewing reality. 
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Flexibility – see robustness and flexibility 
Hazard - A hazard is a source of potential damage [55]. 
Lean - Lean is about doing more with less [148]. The term is often used in connection 
with lean manufacturing, as illustrated by Womack [38], following the “just in time”-
philosophy.
Logistics - Logistics management is that part of supply chain management that plans, 
implements, and controls the efficient, effective forward and reverses flow and storage 
of goods, services and related information between the point of origin and the point of 
consumption in order to meet customers' requirements [151]. 
Mercantilism - (Economics) Also called mercantile system Economics a theory 
prevalent in Europe during the 17th and 18th centuries asserting that the wealth of a 
nation depends on its possession of precious metals and therefore that the government 
of a nation must maximize the foreign trade surplus, and foster national commercial 
interests, a merchant marine, the establishment of colonies, etc. [152] 
Minimal cut sets –The least number of basic events that need to occur to cause a top 
(hazardous) event [88].
Mitigate – To mitigate is to make something (or become) less severe or harsh; moderate 
[152].
Ontology - An ontology can be described as by Howe [138] as:
1. (philosophy) A systematic account of Existence. 
2. (artificial intelligence) (From philosophy) An explicit formal specification of how to 
represent the objects, concepts and other entities that are assumed to exist in some area 
of interest and the relationships that hold among them. 
3. (information science) The hierarchical structuring of knowledge about things by 
subcategorising them according to their essential (or at least relevant and/or cognitive) 
qualities.
Resilience – Resilience can have two meanings [150]:  
1. The ability to recover quickly from illness, change, or misfortune; buoyancy. 
2. The property of a material that enables it to resume its original shape or position after 
being bent, stretched, or compressed; elasticity. 
Risk - Risk may be defined according to industry standards, as: a triplet of scenario, 
frequency and consequence of events that may contribute negatively [55].
Risk acceptance criteria (RAC)- criteria that are used to express a risk level that is 
considered tolerable for the activity in question [147] 
Robustness and flexibility - Sheffi [26] argues that there in essence are two strategies 
to coping with disruptions; robustness and flexibility. Robustness is the ability to 
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withstand threats, flexibility is the ability to reconfigure system resources in possession 
to restore and uphold the ability to perform the mission. 
Supply chain - A supply chain exists to move a product or service from suppliers to 
customers. The network can be seen both as a single system and a collection of 
interacting systems, involving people, technology, activities, information and resources.
Supply chain management - Supply chain management encompasses the planning and 
management of all activities involved in sourcing and procurement, conversion, and all 
logistics management activities. Importantly, it also includes coordination and 
collaboration with channel partners, which can be suppliers, intermediaries, third party 
service providers, and customers. In essence, supply chain management integrates 
supply and demand management within and across companies [151]. 
Supply chain mission - The mission of the supply chain is to serve as a throughput 
mechanism of goods, and in hardship, protect the dependents from the consequences of 
disruptive events.
Supply chain resilience - Supply chain resilience has become a field of research the 
latest 10 years, numbers of definitions have been made, see e.g. Jüttner et al. [57]. 
Resilience is the ability of the supply chain to handle a disruption without significant 
impact on the ability to serve the supply chain mission. Resilience is about handling the 
consequences of a disruption, not about preventing a disruption from occurring. 
However, the effort to create a resilient system is made before a disruption occurs. 
Supply chain vulnerability - Vulnerability is defined as: the properties of a 
transportation system that may weaken or limit its ability to endure, handle and survive 
threats and disruptive events that originate both within and outside the system 
boundaries, inspired by Asbjørnslett and Rausand [52].
Threat – treated as a synonym of hazard 
Uncertainty - The state or condition of being uncertain, i.e. that the true value is not 
known. [152] 
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World trade increasingly relies on longer, larger and more complex supply chains, where maritime
transportation is a vital backbone of such operations. Long and complex supply chain systems are more
prone to being vulnerable, though through reviews, no specific methods have been found to assess
vulnerabilities of a maritime transportation system. Most existing supply chain risk assessment
frameworks require risks to be foreseen to be mitigated, rather than giving transportation systems
the ability to cope with unforeseen threats and hazards. In assessing cost-efficiency, societal
vulnerability versus industrial cost of measures should be included.
This conceptual paper presents a structured Formal Vulnerability Assessment (FVA) methodology,
seeking to transfer the safety-oriented Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) framework into the domain of
maritime supply chain vulnerability. To do so, the following two alterations are made: (1) The focus of
the assessment is defined to ensure the ability of the transportation to serve as a throughput
mechanism of goods, and to survive and recover from disruptive events. (2) To cope with low-
frequency high-impact disruptive scenarios that were not necessarily foreseen, two parallel tracks of
risk assessments need to be pursued—the cause-focused risk assessment as in the FSA, and a
consequence-focused failure mode approach.
& 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The World Economic Forum (WEF) 2008 Global Risk Report
identified four emerging global risks—hyper-optimization and
supply chain vulnerability, and energy supply security were two
of them [1]. Integration of regional economies has come as a
result of reduction in trade barriers and improvement in global
logistics and technology. A result is that international and intra-
regional trade growth rate has surpassed the global economy
growth rate over the last twenty years. The above mentioned
report asserts that effective preparation and management of
supply chains may prevent contagion of a localized risk
event—lack of sufficient preparation may amplify the disruptive
impacts of events beyond the industrial sector into the societal
domain. In particular, this is relevant in energy supply. Never-
theless, risks in long and complex supply chains are obscured by
the sheer degree of coupling and interaction between sources,
stakeholders and processes within and outside of the system;
disruptions are inevitable, management and preparation are
therefore difficult—in accordance with the Normal Accident
Theory [2]. The WEF 2009 report upholds the warning—‘‘risk
management must also account for interlinkages and remote possi-
bilities. Low-probability, high-severity events, such as the terrorist
attacks of 9/11, the Asia tsunami of 2004 and the current global
credit crisis do happen’’ [3].
Systemic risk in global infrastructure is emphasized in the
2010 report [4], page 23—‘‘a major terrorist attack that closed a
port such as Rotterdam, Hong Kong or Los Angeles for weeks would
have severe economic consequences on world trade because it would
inflict major disruptions in complex just-in-time supply chains that
comprise the global economy’’. The conclusion from WEF is: ‘‘there
is a need to balance the additional private costs to operate more
safely that might negatively affect the firm’s bottom line with the
benefits of reduced global risks; that is the trade-off between private
efficiency and public vulnerability.’’ The cost-efficiency or ‘‘lean’’
trend of the past 30 years [5], where organizations have mini-
mized excess inventory and capabilities to cut cost, has made
industry and society more vulnerable to disruptions in transpor-
tation systems—one may fear that some cost cuts have reduced
the damage tolerance of systems.
Maritime transportation is a prerequisite for global trade, as
over 80% of global trade in goods are effectuated by ships [6].
A general trend is that world merchandise trade grows two to
three times faster than the world economy, represented by the
global gross domestic product. The multiplier effect may be
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explained through globalized production and trade in parts and
components, greater economic integration and deeper and wider
global supply chains. Seaborne trade accounted for 8.17 billion
tons of trade, where dry cargos (except bulk) represented 40% of
volume, oil 34% and dry bulk 26%. The growth rate of the world
seaborne trade was about 3.6% in 2008, down from 4.5% in 2007
due to the recent financial crisis.
The industrialized world, thereby including the European
Union, USA, Korea and Japan, is increasingly dependent on
imported natural gas, whereof an increasing share of these
imports is liquefied natural gas (LNG). Security of energy supplies
is a complex field, involving political, economical and military
policies, as well as logistics and supply chain issues, and is of vital
interest to all industrialized nations.
Through reviews, little research has been found on the dis-
ruption vulnerability of Maritime Transportation Systems (MTS).
To gain insight into the practitioners’ perspective, 20 semi-
structured interviews were made with stakeholders in the LNG
industry, port authorities, coast guards, terminal operators and
support services for the maritime industry. A majority were
located throughout the US and Panama, the remainder in Norway.
General insights were as follows:
I1—respondents have an operational focus; in this, they spend
their efforts on frequent minor disruptions rather than the
larger accidental events.
I2—stakeholders do know that larger events do happen, and
they know that these are very costly, yet they do not prepare
systematically to restore the system.
I3—MTS stakeholders find their systems unique. As a conse-
quence, they consider that little may be learnt from bench-
marking other MTS’ efforts in improving vulnerability
reduction efforts.
I4—there seems to be little visibility throughout the maritime
transportation system.
This research was triggered by the observation that major
disruption risk in supply chains and transportation systems is a
field that is not yet described in academic literature. Through
interviews with industry stakeholders, respondents gave lack of
understanding, methods and frameworks, as well as resource
constraints, as reasons for not devoting time to seek to reduce the
vulnerability of transportation systems of large scale supply chain
risks. This leads to the following research questions:
RQ1—what would be a suitable framework for addressing
maritime transportation system vulnerability to disruption risks?
RQ2—which tools and methods are needed for increasing the
ability of operators and dependents of maritime transportation
to understand disruption risks, to withstand such risk, and to
prepare to restore the functionality of the transportation
system after a disruption has occurred?
Through this conceptual paper we seek to meet the challenges
posed by the WEF, by applying insight from methods and frame-
works well known and tested within safety and reliability
engineering on maritime supply chain risk management pro-
blems. Society’s reliance on maritime transportation mandates
that understanding how these systems may break down, and how
to quickly restore the ability to move goods, is an important task.
The Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) framework [7] provides the
structure for the proposed vulnerability assessment, while the
concept of failure modes [8] is used to prepare the system to
handle unexpected hazards and threats and low-frequency high-
impact scenarios.
In the following chapters, a literature review is presented in
Section 2, relevant concepts in Section 3, the Formal Vulnerability
Assessment framework is presented in Section 4, before discus-
sions with a case and conclusions are given in Sections 5 and 6.
2. Literature review
2.1. Definitions
The key mission of the supply chain is to serve as a throughput
mechanism of goods, and in hardship, protect the dependents from
the consequences of disruptive events. Continued, in the context of
maritime supply chain risk management, maintaining a supply
chain mission focus, vulnerability is defined as the properties of a
transportation system that may weaken or limit its ability to endure,
handle and survive threats and disruptive events that originate both
within and outside the system boundaries, inspired by Asbjørnslett
and Rausand [9].
Risk may be defined as a triplet of scenario, frequency and
consequence of events that may contribute negatively (in this case to
the transportation system’s ability to perform its mission [10]).
A hazard is a source of potential damage; Kaplan and Garrick
describe risk as hazards divided by safeguards. In this, risks
cannot be completely removed, only reduced. Numerous defini-
tions exist for supply chains; see e.g. Mentzer et al. [11]. In this
article, the following definition is used: a supply chain or logistics
system exists to move a product or service from suppliers to
customers. The network can be seen both as a single system and a
collection of interacting systems, involving people, technology, activ-
ities, information and resources.
Supply chain resilience has become a field of research the past
10 years, and a number of definitions have been made, [12,13]. In
this paper, resilience is defined as the ability of the supply chain to
handle a disruption without significant impact on the ability to serve
the supply chain mission. Resilience is about handling the con-
sequences of a disruption, not about preventing a disruption from
occurring. However, the effort to create a resilient system is made
before a disruption occurs. A good understanding of system
failure modes can be relevant for this.
Failure modes are defined as the key functions and capabilities
of the supply chain, loss of any such would reduce or remove the
ability of the system to perform its mission [14].
2.2. Previous research
Recent broad reviews of academic supply chain risk manage-
ment papers include Rao and Goldsby [15], who present a
typology of risks based on reviewed papers, Vanany et al. [16],
who sort papers based on types of risk and industry sector, and
Tang [17], who develops a framework to classify supply chain risk
management literature into supply, demand, product and infor-
mation management. Tang also offers a review on quantitative
methods in supply chain risk management. Kleindorfer and Saad
[18] develop a conceptual framework for managing supply chain
disruption risk, stating that sources of risks need to be specified,
assessed and mitigated. Zsidisin et al. [19] structures supply chain
risk assessment techniques, in particular with an agency theory
perspective—the message is that business continuity planning
methods may be used to manage supply risk.
Manuj and Mentzer [20] bring together concepts from logistics,
supply chain management, strategy, operations and international
management to propose a five step framework for comprehensive
risk management and mitigation in global supply chains. This is
comparable to the FSA method, except the fourth step, where cost/
efficiency is not the sole parameter. Rather, they include factors
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such as complexity management and organizational learning in
addition to performance metrics. Manuj and Mentzer present
seven risk management strategy categories—avoidance, postpone-
ment, speculation, hedging, control, sharing/transferring and
security, although they stress that these are closely related.
Risk assessment methods, as shown above, are in general
focused in identifying sources. Nonetheless, transportation sys-
tems are inherently vulnerable and disruptions do occur—source
focused risk assessment approaches cannot prepare to mitigate all
risks; transportation systems must therefore also be prepared to
restore essential functions.
Limited research exists on the overall maritime supply chain
vulnerability. Carbone and De Martino [21] discuss the role of
ports in supply chain management, with a practical case on
Renault using the port of Le Havre, France. Bichou and Gray [22]
argue that ports are an integrated part of supply chains, and that
they should be treated as such. Further, they argue benchmarking
is possible between ports and other intermodal connection points,
and that this has an underutilized potential, which is in line with
I3. De Martino and Morvillo [23] investigate the interaction and
interdependence between port stakeholders, as well as the
change of ports from movement of cargo to value added logistics
services.
Barnes and Oloruntoba [24] discuss the role of security in
maritime supply chains, identifying weaknesses in security over-
sight, such as the lack of oversight in vessel registration and
ownership and the use of flags of convenience. The contents of
central security programs, such as the International Ship and Port
Facility Security (ISPS) Code are presented in the context of
maritime supply chains. The remainder of this paper is relevant
to their suggestions for future research in proposing a framework
for ‘‘identifying generic vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure at
major ports’’, evaluating the current status of port-based institu-
tion, and assessing low-frequency high-impact scenarios.
Supply chain disruptions are unavoidable, the severity
depending on the number of entities (nodes) affected. Supply
chain density, supply chain complexity and node criticality may
serve as explanatory variables for severity of a disruption to the
supply network and how it spreads; see e.g. Craighead et al. [25]
and Juttner [26]. Mitigation depends on visibility, recovery and
warning capabilities; see Rice and Caniato [27] and Asbjørnslett
and Rausand [9]. The industrial cost of larger disruptions is
significant; Hendricks and Singhal [28] found that the abnormal
stock return in the two years following disruption announce-
ments were ÿ40%, and the equity risk was 13.50% higher in the
year following the disruption than the year before. Societal cost of
supply chain disruptions is particularly high for critical goods
such as energy [29]. Seen in light of the known high cost of
disruptions, both to industries and society, efforts to understand
supply chain vulnerability and to quantify costs are needed and
timely.
3. Relevant concepts
3.1. Maritime transportation system—system definition
The sea transport part of maritime transportation is configured
in the following three ways: (1) liner, (2) industrial and (3) tramp
shipping. Liner services primarily moves goods such as containers
according to fixed itineraries and schedules, much like a bus.
Industrial operators own and manage their own fleet, seeking to
minimize costs. Tramp shipping follow cargos like taxis, focusing
on profit maximization [30]. Fleet size and mix, as well as routing
and scheduling of vessels, is vital in securing the profits of
stakeholders in the MTS. To achieve this, the usage of vessels
must be optimized; see reviews by Ronen [31,32] and Christiansen
et al. [33]. Optimizing over a chain, production capacity and
storage must be included. Grønhaug and Christiansen [34]
describe a solution to an inventory routing problem for an LNG
supply chain.
The maritime transportation system as a whole can further be
described as being composed of five elements. A set of ‘‘port
objects’’, involving ports, terminals, intermodal connections and
navigable waterways, as well as a set of vessels constituting the
shipping networks, as described above, can describe the maritime
transportation system (Fig. 1).
Understanding of the transportation system from a supply
chain operator’s perspective can be made at several system levels.
A vessel operator controls a fleet of vessels, composed of single
vessels with a set of characteristics. Similarly, the land side can be
understood as a system of ports both on a local, national and
regional level. The individual ports have several terminals, serving
different types of loading technology and cargo. Maritime trans-
portation systems need to be understood as a part of a larger
industrial system, as well as the provider of societal supply needs.
If disruptions in a port or terminal go beyond the buffers, ripple
effects can spread to the greater economy leading to wider
shutdowns. Given the limited number of nodes, e.g. ports and
terminals in a system, failures may spread beyond foreseen
limits; see Table 1 for an example.
Land
Public
infrastructure: 
highway, rail, 
pipeline
systemVessel
Navigable
waterways – 
Terminal
operations
Intermodal 
connection
point 
Intermodal
connection:
Road, rail, 
pipelines,
bridges
Water 
Port environment 
Open sea 
Fig. 1. Sea-land interface of maritime transportation system [4].
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3.2. Failure modes
By preparing to restore the ability of the system to transport
goods, the system may be better equipped to handle low-
frequency high-impact scenarios. Through combining the critical
way a transportation system may fail with the elements of the
transportation system; the failure modes of the MTS are identified
[14]; see Table 2. These describe the key functions and capabil-
ities that are necessary for the system to perform its mission.
The critical ways a transportation system may fail can be
summed up as the loss of capacity to supply, financial flows,
transportation, communication, internal operations/capacity and
human resources, which may be described as follows: supply
capacity is the ability necessary to source provisions needed for
the element to perform its function; for a factory, this is inbound
materials, utilities and electricity. Financial flows cover the ability
to access capital and liquidity/cash flow. Transportation is the
ability to move materials, including those presently at work.
Communication would include enabling technology, and is vital
for transparency in the supply chain. Internal operations entail
the organization’s processing capacity (e.g. converting materials
into a good). Quality issues reducing outputs fall into internal
operations. Loss of human resources singles out the human factor
explicitly from internal operations—what are the personnel needs
for the supply chain functions?
3.3. Formal safety assessment
Quantitative risk assessments have been used in a variety of
industries. In the maritime context, Formal Safety Assessment
(FSA) is made to describe a rational and systematic risk-based
approach for safety assessment [7,36]. While FSA for maritime
applications could be criticized, see e.g. Kontovas and Psaraftis
[37], there is much to gain by linking safety and reliability
engineering to maritime risk assessment, and for applying FSA
beyond vessel risk assessment to understanding vulnerabilities in
maritime supply chains.
Benefits of the FSA include that it is a tested and already
established method, and that there is considerable knowledge
about the method in the maritime sector. Drawbacks take in that
the framework is dependent on expert judgment for quantifica-
tion, uses simplifications in ranking of risks, allows for use of a
variety of methods in the steps and that it can be manipulated.
However, these objections do not exclusively apply to FSA; they
could also be relevant for other methods.
3.4. Requirements of framework for addressing disruption
vulnerability for maritime transportation system
The research questions were divided into the following two
aspects: (1) identifying a framework for addressing the disruption
risk to the system, and (2) identifying approaches, tools and
methods to support this framework. Based on the literature, in
particular Oehmen et al. [38] and Kontovas and Psaraftis [37] and
Table 1
Levels in maritime transportation system.
Component Example failure
System of local,
national and
regional ports
Failure of coordination on development of regional and
national infrastructure, e.g. not planning for alternative
ports for critical cargos
Port Natural disasters removing usability of an entire port,
such as 1995 port of Kobe earthquake [35]
Terminal Failure of vessel loading system
Table 2
Failure modes in maritime transportation.
Element failure mode Port services—loss of Terminal—loss of Intermodal
connection—loss of
Navigable waterways
loss of
Vessels—loss of
Supply Port supplies, utilities
and infrastructure, tugs,
safety boats
Terminal supplies,
utilities and super-
structure
Infrastructure leading to
public infrastructure
system, supplies for
transportation and
maintenance
Navigable water Availability of vessels
in market—type, size,
features, characteristics
Financial flows Access to capital,
liquidity and revenue to
fund operations and
expansion of
infrastructure
Access to capital,
liquidity and revenue to
fund operations and
investments in super-
structure
Revenues, access to
capital and liquidity to
invest in warehouses,
storage yards and
connecting infrastructure
Access to capital and
investment for dredging,
safety measures and
expansion
Revenues, access to
capital and liquidity, for
operating and investing
in vessels
Transportation Ability to move
equipment and people
within and through port
Ability to move goods
and people within
terminal
Equipment for moving
and transloading goods to
surface transportation,
e.g. trucks and trains
Ability to move goods
and people within and
through the navigable
waterways
Ability to move vessels
Communication Communication,
coordination and
information systems
across port players and
between ports
Communication,
coordination and
information systems
within terminal and to
port
Oversight and ability to
document and coordinate
cargo shipment,
communication between
parties—stevedores,
truckers, terminal
operators
N/A—redundant with
port communication
Coordination and
control with other
vessels and land
Internal operations/
capacity
Ability to move and
position vessels, maintain
safety and security,
invest, develop and
market port
Loading/unloading,
processing,
documentation, capacity
Ability to transload goods
between surface
transportation and
vessels, including
processing and storage.
Air and sea draft, width of
channels
Loss of ability to
operate vessels,
including, including
failure of loading gear
and pumps
Human resources Personnel operating port
functions, supporting
business
Personnel operating
terminal
Personnel responsible for
managing and
performing transloading
operations
Support services
personnel for clearing
waterways, dredging,
maintenance.
Skilled vessel crew for
operation
Ø. Berle et al. / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 96 (2011) 696–705 699
interviews with stakeholders, the requirements to a framework
can be defined as follows:
R1—the framework must be structured and systematic, with
explicit declaration of responsibility for the framework and for
updating it.
R2—the framework must support quantification of risks.
R3—the framework must anticipate risks and prepare for the
unexpected.
R4—the framework must be explicit on cost/benefit assess-
ments of risk; both the business and the economics side of risk
management should be considered.
R5—the framework must be transparent.
R6—the framework should give room for future implementa-
tions of dynamic monitoring of vulnerability, e.g. risk influence
modeling.
4. Formal vulnerability assessment
To shift the FSA framework into risk management in design
and operation of maritime transportation system, the additional
risk picture will have to be understood. Hazards and threats may
destroy the transportation systems’ ability to deliver goods,
which may harm both the involved stakeholders, as well as the
society, which is dependent on the flow of goods.
The outline of the suggested assessment is presented in
Table 3. The original FSA method is analogous to the left flow in
the figure; the steps are the same in the proposed FVA. The two
paths may be termed the hazard path and the mission (conse-
quence-focus) path. Details about the steps are described in the
discussions in part five.
As seen, the system definition and recommendation steps are
shared between the hazard focus and the mission focus paths, as
the overall goal is to decrease the vulnerability of a given
transportation system. However, the frequent risks are treated
in the hazard path, while the LFHI-risks are treated in the mission
path. In this, the goal is to have a separate focus on LFHI-risks
without being caught in the details of daily operation.
5. Discussion and cases
The Formal Vulnerability Assessment can be illustrated using
the LNG transportation industry as an example: To increase the
understanding of the operational context, four of the interviews
made were with stakeholders in the LNG industry, to gain insight
into planning and operation of the LNG maritime transportation
system.
5.1. LNG market background, characteristics and insights
World LNG production increased by 9% in 2007, making it the
fastest-growing energy source, continuing the total growth of 53%
the preceding 5 years [39]. The total 2006 volume of natural gas
shipped as LNG was 215 billion cubic meters (bcm), a number the
International Energy Association (IEA) expects to increase to
300–320 by 2010.
For the LNG shipping industry, contracts and sales is a relevant
factor. Traditionally, piped natural gas is sold on contracts invol-
ving some sort of a Take-or-Pay contract [40,41], while LNG is
sold on long term (often 20 years) fixed contracts. However, the
market is rapidly changing, in particular through the emergence
of a global spot market for LNG. The International Group of
Liquefied Natural Gas Importers claims that the spot and short-
term (less than 4 years) contracts in 2007 amounted to 586
cargoes, 20% of the total amount of loads [42].
Drivers of the LNG markets include the introduction of larger
and more cost-efficient vessels, the general high growth rate of
the LNG industry and European diversification from Russian piped
gas. The North American markets were long expected to be major
markets, though the US shale gas development projects may
lower the need for increased LNG imports.
A particular feature of the LNG industry is the high cost of
infrastructure. To reduce capital and operational expenses, LNG
supply chains are optimized to a high degree, leading to lean and
tightly integrated systems with little slack. This is in essence what
the WEF presents in the 2008 ‘‘Global Risks’’ report, fear of over-
optimization and energy supply security [1]. In the LNG case, these
two are coupled. In particular, this analysis is relevant to study
energy import dependencies, as current LNG supply chains are
optimized to the level that much of the system storage and
flexibility can be found in the shipping element, lacking on-shore
infrastructure [39,43]. The IEA claims that natural gas supply
security is deteriorating through lack of field development, grow-
ing dependence on imported gas and longer transportation routes,
in addition to growing worries of creation of a ‘‘Gas OPEC’’ [44].
From the four interviews with LNG shipping stakeholders,
insights particular to the LNG market were as follows:
I5—cost drivers of the LNG industry were liquefaction, storage
tanks, vessels, terminals and technology development. Primary
factors affecting robustness were utilization factors of the
liquefaction plant, export harbor storage and number of export
harbor berths; the crucial resilience factor was the possibility
of recursive optimization plans for vessels and inventory.
I6—rigorous deterministic planning is made for a stochastic
system. There is large variability in demand, and tight require-
ments to booking. Some plans must be completed up to 18
months ahead; this is for instance the deadline for some LNG
receiving terminal.
I7—flexibility is not introduced in the system design; resi-
lience is added through introducing slack. However, given the
cost of excess capacity, redundancies in inventories can only
cover minor incidents.
While significant resources are spent to operate the transpor-
tation systems more efficiently and to fulfill contracts, informants
consistently reported that planning for large scale disruptions
was not done in a systematic way; the focus was to reduce the
likelihood for events occurring, where added slack was intended
Table 3
Outline of FVA process.
Hazard focus Mission focus
Step 0—preparation 0—define system, parameters, criteria, borders, etc.
Step 1—hazard identification 1a—what may go wrong 1b—which functions/capabilities should be protected
Step 2—vulnerability assessment 2a—investigation/quantification, most important risks 2b—investigation/quantification, all relevant failure modes
Step 3—vulnerability mitigation 3a—measures to mitigate most important risks 3b—measures to restore functions/capabilities
Step 4—cost/benefit assessment 4a—cost/benefit assessment 4b—cost/benefit assessment
Step 5—recommendations for decision making 5—recommendation and feedback to assessment
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for additional buffers. One informant expressed that the planning
branch had commenced scenario work, but lacked the tools and
managerial commitment to price vulnerabilities and to imple-
ment potential measures.
5.2. Exemplary FVA assessment of LNG maritime transportation
system:
In the following, some exemplary elements of the proposed
FVA assessment on the generic LNG transportation system are
drawn out, including insights from interviews with industry
stakeholders. For context relevant insight into the FSA methodol-
ogy, Vanem et al. [45] has performed a thorough review of safety
risks in LNG carrier operations.
5.2.1. System description
The preparatory stage of this assessment should include a
thorough description of the system—identifying the inherent
capacities of the system, as well as relevant constraints. It is vital
for the stakeholders to share an understanding of the system, to
create a foundation for further discussion. The focal stakeholder
should be clearly defined—whose business is the assessment
meant to improve. Likewise the scope of the system, how
comprehensive it should be, and the borders of the system should
be clearly defined. For the exemplary FVA of an LNG transporta-
tion system, the components can be described as in Fig. 2 and
Table 4.
Optimization of LNG inventory is necessary to ensure cost
minimization. Operational constraints, as described by infor-
mants, include tank levels, security margins, production and
consumption rates, vessel capacities and speed, number of berths
with loading gear, etc. The optimization approach is determinis-
tic, with fixed plans and delivery programs made up to 18 months
before delivery. However, the problem carries stochastic charac-
teristics. There is variability in demand, transit times for vessels,
as well as general delays for disruptions. These are not well
covered in the optimization of the sea transport system, fleet of
vessels as well as the supply chain interlinkages. Vessel owner-
ship introduces other constraints, as not all are owned by the LNG
supply chain operator, although these constraints may be relaxed
in abnormal situations. Some are owned by several owners,
introducing requirements that all vessels should be used equally
much. Other constraints are political. Pooling of resources, as
found in for instance the container shipping industry, is not
common. In general, vessels are very seldom redirected once
sent, nor are they sent out with half loads—this sets the industry
apart from e.g. crude shipping.
Clearly defined risk acceptance criteria allows for objective
selection of which risks and resulting vulnerabilities should be
accepted and which should not. As mentioned by the World
Economic Forum, there is a need for a trade-off between private
efficiency and public vulnerability—risk acceptance criteria
should include measures for both individual (supply chain) and
societal risks [46]. For instance, accepting higher degree of
optimization and decreasing buffers may be beneficial for the
operators of an LNG transportation system, at least in the short
term. Society, dependent on natural gas imports, is exposed to the
consequences of missed delivery. Parameters that could be
included in the risk acceptance criteria discussion include price,
quality and continuity plans; see e.g. Tang [17].
As an example, As Low as Reasonably Practicable (ALARP)-
criteria [47] could be used for this assessment, creating a triage of
risk into acceptable, unacceptable and ALARP-risks. The latter are
risks that should be reduced as long as the cost of implementing
measures compared to benefits gained do not exceed a given
upper limit. An initial assumption is that most risks identified will
either be acceptable, or will need cost/efficiency evaluations
owing to being in the ALARP area. Metrics to define what is
acceptable risk to the stakeholders will need to be quantified in
the system description, Examples include metrics such as Value-
at-Risk (VAR), which aims to provide a single risk metric for the
financial loss of a portfolio of given assets; see e.g. Allen et al. [48]
for an extensive review. Supply-at-Risk [49], which is a modifica-
tion of VAR for supply portfolios, could serve as a metric for
acceptable supply loss both for industry and society at large.
Export
port
storage
Vessels
and
shipment
Interface
and
loading
Interface 
and
unloading
Import 
port
storage
Regasi-
fication
and use 
System border
Feed gas 
and lique-
faction 
Fig. 2. Components and border of LNG transportation system.
Table 4
Components of LNG chain.
Components Description Characteristics Goals/challenges
Feed gas Natural gas from fields Transported in pipelines Steady usage
Liquefaction plant Cleans and cools gas to liquid state at
ÿ161 1C
High investment and operational cost Maximize utilization without interruption
Export storage Storage of LNG before loading High investment cost Minimize required capacity
Loading Moving LNG to vessel Specialized infrastructure Safe loading, maximize throughput capacity
Port/vessel interface Scheduling and coordinating of vessels Vessels serve as storage in system Minimize time for berthing
Shipping network Owned, chartered (and spot) vessels Decisions on utilization of owned and
chartered fleet
Maximize profits, recourse action for deviation
management
Port/vessel interface Scheduling and coordination of vessels Planned delivery of gas Minimize time for berthing
Unloading Moving LNG from vessel Specialized infrastructure Safe unloading, maximize throughput capacity
Storage Storage of LNG High investment cost Minimize capacity requirement
Regasification Evaporating LNG to natural gas Moderate investment Meet gas demand without interruption
Gas consumption/gas
storage
Use of gas, gas to transportation system, gas
to storage
Variability in demand with stochastic
uncertainty
Meet gas need
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According to informants, the system design has still not
reached maturity; design parameters of the system have been
selected with imperfect information, particularly regarding the
system’s ability to cope with operational variability and uncer-
tainty. The industry experiences rapid growth; contracts of
delivery are typically made for 20–30 years, while empirical
knowledge of such systems have been lacking. Challenges with
respect to inventory routing are a result of this. One system had
tank capacity of only three days of production between empty
and full storage—if full, the production of the liquefaction plant
had to stop. There seems to be a separation between operational
planners and those making investment decisions with regards to
investing in infrastructure and balancing capacities through the
supply chain. Technical robustness is contrary; vessels are strictly
maintained with frequent service intervals, leaving almost no
disruptions due to vessel breakdown.
5.2.2. Hazard identification
5.2.2.1. Hazard focus. The common approach to risk management,
which is seen both in the FSA, in the reviewed supply chain risk
management literature and as described by industry stakeholders,
is to try to list all conceivable risks, sometimes helped by a source
categorization. For the proposed framework, the ambition is to
cover frequent and readily apparent risks. Investigating historical
data on previous incidents is typically the first step, in addition to
structured brainstorming sections with practitioners. A typical
approach in safety and reliability engineering involves that
screening of hazards should be performed to identify which
hazards should be treated further, and the number should depend
on the resources available for the result; irrelevant hazards
should be removed.
According to reviews and informants, the LNG shipping indus-
try does not have documented extensive experience with supply
disruption, given the small scale of the systems until recently.
Rapid growth and technological development limits the avail-
ability of empirical data on chain disruptions. This curbs such
assessments to methods such as expert judgment and structured
breakdown of the systems, possibly aided by existing frameworks
on risk sources. Another option is the use of simulation to identify
weak points of the system; see e.g. Kleijnen [50] and Kleijnen and
Smits [51].
5.2.2.2. Mission focus. What are the key functions and capabilities
that the system relies on to be able to perform its mission, that is,
to be able to move goods and protecting the dependents of the
system from disruptive events? The failure modes in Table 1 offer
guidance to the key functions of the transportation system.
Depending on the scope of the assessment, not all elements of the
maritime transportation system may directly be relevant; loss of
any of these may still impact the transportation system. A system
wide assessment should be performed, where the failure modes
provide a structure for breaking down the system. Stakeholders
with insight in each failure mode should continue the assessment
for these, specifying infrastructure, equipment, processes,
personnel needed, as well as identifying how the function relates
to the system’s ability to move goods. It is relevant to see whether
there is something not covered, and if all personnel performing
assessment understand the failure modes.
5.2.3. Risk assessment
5.2.3.1. Hazard focus. As for the FSA, step two should investigate
all hazards identified as relevant. Methods are not specified, other
than that identified relevant risks, their causes and consequences
should be well understood through the use of appropriate risk
assessment methodologies. In FSA, the risk assessment is often
divided into a qualitative and a quantitative part [7]. Qualitative
methods for exploring risks could be influence diagrams, e.g.
showing interrelations between regulatory, operational and
organizational influences, etc. Quantitative methods include fault
and event trees and Bayesian Belief Networks, where barriers that
prevent events from occurring or mitigate consequences should
be included. Quantification of probabilities and consequences lay
the foundation for cost/efficiency calculations.
Quantification of risks in the LNG industry can be done
through making fault and event trees for hazards; see Vanem
et al. [45] and Trbojevic and Carr [52] for examples. However,
lacking empirical data and experience with operation of rapidly
evolving maritime transportation systems, not all factors will be
uncovered, nor can all hazards and threats be treated; insignif-
icant risks should not be pursued. For instance, scenarios such as
vessel collisions, mooring failures and extreme weather are
tangible and may be pursued further. Security-related events
should also be treated according to its expected occurrence;
e.g. piracy in the horn of Africa-region is more likely than bombs
planted aboard vessels. Discrete event simulations as well as
expert judgment may be used to generate data. It is important
that low-frequency risks, as well as not foreseen threats will not
be included by typical FSA selection criteria; the failure modes set
out to cover this aspect.
5.2.3.2. Mission focus. For each identified failure mode, the pur-
pose of the analysis is to understand the function and its effect on
the system’s ability to perform its mission. For instance, com-
munication in ports has several elements—phone lines, mobile
phone networks, radio communication systems, intra and inter-
net connectivity, as well as database and data management
systems. What would the consequence of a loss of any of these be
to the throughput mission of the supply chain?
Identifying barriers help creating an understanding of the
system’s ability to cope with disruption. For a supply chain
context, barriers may be understood through an analogy to
reliability engineering [53]. Passive barriers include buffers such
as extra storage of goods, excess transportation capacity and
hardened infrastructure, as well as parallel terminals and ports.
Functional barriers may be factors such as having made contin-
gency plans, having prepared contracts for alternative suppliers of
services, etc. Symbolic barriers could encompass e.g. early warn-
ing signals within planning systems. Non-material barriers
include the industry and organizational culture; are there orga-
nizational procedures present in case of a disruption, and have
people been trained to handle disruptions?
Consequences of loss of failure modes can be understood
through using event trees, where the barriers are those events
that may prevent the most severe consequences. One example is
below in Fig. 3. Loss of a loading berth is used as an example;
consequences are illustrated for export port and import port at a
high level. Going into more detail, consequences could be broken
down to vessel-owner, terminal operator, customers, etc. For
example purposes, consequences have been broken down to
major and minor consequences, depending on whether LNG
production or gas consumption have been harmed (major) versus
only incurred extra cost (minor).
Given that probabilities are unknown with the failure modes,
criticality cannot be determined through multiplying probability
and consequence. Rather, the cost of loss of the function could
be used. Quantification of risk may be done through the simula-
tion and optimization models of a maritime supply chain.
A ranking of criticality of partial and complete loss of failure
modes should be made as input for prioritization of mitigating
measures, starting from a qualitative ‘‘what if’’-analysis to using
simulation methods.
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5.2.4. Mitigating risks
5.2.4.1. Hazard focus. The result from the risk assessment stage is,
as in the FSA, a systematic oversight over major risk, contributing
causes and potential consequences, including the barriers that
may reduce probabilities and consequences. Individual risks can
be compared up against risk acceptance criteria, supporting ALARP
and VAR approaches. The goal of this step is to further identify
measures that may mitigate relevant risks. In FSA assessments,
risk control measures are grouped into risk control options to
simplify selection and to minimize overlap of measures.
5.2.4.2. Mission focus. Business continuity plans for all identified
failure modes, where arrangements to restore important functions
and capabilities are included, is a robust approach to prepare for
risks that have not been treated in the hazard focus approach.
Assessments of dependency on other functions may reveal weak
points in the supply chain, and possibilities to mitigate any such.
For instance, established emergency coordination plans between
ports, both nationally and regionally, may facilitate restoration of
transportation capacity, although a single port may lose its
throughput capacity. Informants reported that business continuity
planning was not frequently used in the US for cost saving reasons,
partially due to the competitive situation between ports. However,
larger terminal operators with setups in several ports stressed
their ability to reroute goods and vessels fast between their own
terminals. Effectiveness of potential business continuity plans
should be evaluated as for mitigating measures.
Another example is that one informant reported the problem
of using loading gear in a terminal without electricity provided by
the grid, while reporting previous utilities outages. Would sec-
ondary power supplies, such as generator capacity, allow for
operation of a terminal to full or partial capacity? A key issue is
to quantify the robustness of as well as the effect of the loss of
failure modes—how significant would this be for the system’s
ability to operate, how much time and resources are required to
restore the failure mode and what other input is necessary for
doing so?
5.2.5. Cost/efficiency estimation
Cost/efficiency estimations require identifications of relevant
costs and relevant benefits, which is an intricate task [54]. Both of
these are subject to considerable uncertainty; costs are not only
investment, but also running costs through a life-cycle perspec-
tive. Benefits can be indirect, hard to measure and may in some
cases only be identified after a disruption has occurred. Methods
to provide quantitative data include heuristics, scenario analyses,
benchmarking and sensitivity analyses. However, due to lack of
precise data, expert judgment in parallel with simulation may
prove the most accurate assessments tool at hand.
The cost–efficiency estimation needs to consider the societal
interest in critical infrastructure. While a measure may be
unprofitable for the individual supply chain operator, it may be
cost-beneficial from a societal perspective. To ensure that the
interests of society are included, supply contracts may specify risk
higher acceptance criteria and/or compensate the operators for
reducing supply chain vulnerability, for instance through intro-
ducing additional buffers.
5.2.5.1. Hazard focus. Cost-benefit assessments of risk control
options compare the vulnerability reduction gained from each
option with the cost of implementation. Explicit cost/efficiency
estimations are what set FSA-based frameworks apart from others.
The traditional measure is whether benefits are higher than the
implementation cost, using a Net Present Value (NPV) criteria,
following Saleh and Marais [55]. Benefits include reduced number
of disruptions, reduced impact from each disruption, and increased
availability of assets. Costs include investment, operation and
training expenditures. A value based ranking of options could be
made to simplify selection, using for instance cost–benefit ratios,
capital investment and operational expenses as criteria.
5.2.5.2. Mission focus. Identifying the cost of disruption by multi-
plying probability and consequence is more difficult for the failure
modes than in the FSA, as the probability of delays or failure is
hard to estimate. However, the cost of system failure, both entirely
or partially, can be estimated, and is probably the most accurate
valuation available. This may be both the direct loss through
contract breaches and spot prices to cover volumes, to immaterial
assets such as reputation. Similar to the hazard focus, a cost-based
ranking of measures may be the best available estimate.
Furthermore, investments in flexibility could provide benefits
to normal operation. For instance, operating a homogenous fleet
of standard size (130–160 000 m3) LNG vessels would take away
scale effects of using larger tankers. However, all vessels would be
able to serve all ports, which offer more flexibility in routing.
Larger vessels such as the 210 000 m3 Q-flex tankers can only
serve about two-thirds of the world ports, and the 260 000 m3
Q-max tankers can only serve about half, both with some
modifications of ports [56].
5.2.6. Recommendations for decision making
An objective comparison of the identified options, as for the
FSA, should be made based on potential reduction of vulnerability,
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                Major Major 
              Major Major 
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             Major Minor 
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Fig. 3. Event tree for loss of terminal internal operations.
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both to frequent and infrequent risk. The recommendations for
decision making should be a synthesis of the formal process,
selecting which measures to include. For instance, interviews
reveal that deterministic optimization of inventory and routing
of vessels does not include the stochastic nature of an LNG
transportation system. Furthermore, there seems to be a too
strong separation between the investment part and operational
planning part of the system. Rather than investing in more
flexibility in the system, for instance through allowing complete
rerouting the fleet after incidents, planners are forced into leaving
margins in the system, such as setting a cap for tank loading and
emptying.
Larger disruptions cannot be mitigated by such buffers, as they
have no effect after these are exhausted—allowing rerouting of
vessels and cargos would decrease the likelihood of having to shut
down production. This requires interchangeable vessels and
cargos, flexibility on the customer side and a routing system able
to identify such changes. Currently, cargo swaps are ‘‘almost
never’’ performed (informant). Furthermore, when done, a criter-
ion has been to have as few changes to the existing annual
delivery plan as possible, although additional permutations
would create more cost-efficient solutions.
Feedback to the earlier process includes suggestions for
improving the process, such as increased detail level in specifying
failure modes. Recommendations for follow-up and reviews of the
assessment should be specified. If possible, insight from the
assessment should be used as input in creating better indicators
of anomalies in the system; an effective early warning system
may significantly reduce the impact of a disruptive event.
5.3. General discussion
The conceptual framework meets the requirements presented.
Following the FSA, it is structured and systematic with explicit
responsibilities (R1), supports quantification of risks (R2), antici-
pates risk and prepares for the unexpected (R3), promotes an
explicit cost/benefit assessment (R4) and is transparent in
describing the assessments made (R5). Dynamic monitoring of
vulnerability is currently not prevalent in maritime supply
chains; implementation is a topic for further research. The
authors believe the framework can accommodate dynamic mon-
itoring, hence supporting (R6).
Existing supply chain risk management frameworks tend to
focus on mitigating sources of risk. However, following Craighead
et al. [25], disruptions are unavoidable, and supply chain stake-
holders should set up continuity plans to recover the key func-
tions the transportation system depends on [19]. In particular, for
the maritime transportation system, existing research is fragmen-
ted. Comparatively much research exists on security, although the
consequences of a security breach may result in similar conse-
quences as other sources, such as technical or systemic hazards,
or natural disasters.
Negative spillover effects [54], affecting those who are not
directly involved, is relevant in discussing supply chain risk
management in global LNG transportation systems. The ultimate
end users, dependent on delivery of LNG may bear the conse-
quences of a disruption, given societal dependence on energy
imports, as pointed out by the world economic forum [4].
Cost–benefit assessments can reveal different preferences for
reliability between the transportation system stakeholders and
society as the customer, allowing for realignment through con-
tracts, as illustrated in Section 5.2.5.
The underpinning of this paper is that unconditional optimiza-
tion, reduction of buffers and lack of investment in resilience will
increase supply chain vulnerability. In particular, the MTS is
relevant for societal supplies, due to the share of coal, crude oil
and products, and LNG transported by sea. Disruptions in supply
chains come at a high cost [28], justifying why coping with this
vulnerability should be of high priority. By transferring insights
from safety and reliability engineering, it may be possible to
increase the understanding of how maritime transportation
systems fail and how to cope with this. In particular, this paper
responds to some of the suggestions for future research by Barnes
and Oloruntoba [24] on creating indentifying critical vulnerabil-
ities in ports and assessing high frequency low consequence and
low frequency high consequence scenarios.
Limitations of the framework include that it has not been
tested on an industrial system. Quantification and pricing of
risk is a challenge, in particular for low-frequency high-impact
scenarios.
6. Conclusions
There is a need for methodologies for assessing vulnerabilities
in maritime supply chains, which allows for systematic and
transparent identification and mitigation of vulnerabilities to
the ability to move goods. Given that supply chains are increas-
ingly complex and are dependent on, and have an impact on a
number of stakeholders, getting a realistic overview of potential
hazards and threats to the supply chain is a considerable task.
A Formal Vulnerability Assessment methodology may offer a
transparent and systematic way to assess and systemize risks,
both to evaluate the current state, as well as to allow for assessing
the impact of changes to the existing supply chain. It is beneficial
that the methodology is based on existing and tested methods. No
current method, to the authors’ knowledge, exists to assess
mission-oriented vulnerability of maritime transportation
systems. Through a comprehensive structuring of the current
status of the system, a joint platform for a shared understanding
between the stakeholders can be made. Then in turn, using both
the hazard and the mission focus for addressing the vulnerabil-
ities of the system, a wide spectrum of potential disruptive events
has been covered. This conceptual approach is novel compared to
reviewed supply chain risk assessment frameworks.
6.1. Future research
Applications of the FVA methodology need to be tested. In
collaboration with industrial partners, an exemplary assessment
will be made of a real industrial case. An interesting follow-up to
a full FVA assessment to an LNG supply chain would be to test the
methodology on other shipping segments, such as crude oil,
container, car freight, chemicals, etc.
Quantification of risks for this assessment is still untested. In
particular, modeling of the consequences, factors contributing to
preventing severe consequences from occurring and modeling
interaction between failure modes needs more research. One
approach is using Bayesian Belief Networks to model influencing
factors on risk.
A challenge for a real-world application is to determine
indicators and metrics that allow for real-time monitoring of
the risk levels of the supply chain, thereby allowing a continuous
picture of the system’s vulnerability. Risk influence modeling [57]
and modeling of degradation of barriers could prove to be useful
tools in this process. One example is a maritime transportation
system with good fleet optimization software but weak
planners—if training and increasing the competence of planners
is not done, this would lead to a degradation of the human
barriers over time, as the capacity to find flexible solutions to
problems may be inadequate.
Ø. Berle et al. / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 96 (2011) 696–705704
Acknowledgements
We wish to express our sincere gratitude to two anonymous
referees for their constructive comments and review, as well as
Kai Trepte at the MIT Center for Transportation and Logistics for
inputs and comments on earlier versions of this paper. Øyvind
Berle would like to express his gratitude to the Norwegian
Research Council through the MARRISK research project for
financing his doctoral fellowship, along with the Fulbright foun-
dation, the Jansons’ fellowship and the DNV fellowship for
financial support for his research stay at the MIT Center for
Transportation and Logistics.
References
[1] WEF. Global risks 2008—a global risk network report. World Economic
Forum; 2008.
[2] Perrow C. Normal accidents. Living with high-risk technologies. New York:
Basic Books; 1984.
[3] WEF. Global risks 2009—a global risk network report. World Economic
Forum; 2009.
[4] WEF. Global risks 2010—a global risk network report. World Economic
Forum; 2010. p. 23.
[5] Womack JP, Jones DT, Roos D. The machine that changed the world : the story
of lean production. New York: Harper Perennial; 1991.
[6] UNCTAD. Review of maritime transport. In: Proceedings of the United
Nations conference on trade and development. New York, Geneva: 2009.
[7] Kristiansen S. Maritime transportation—safety management and risk analy-
sis. Elsevier Butterworth-Heinemann; 2005.
[8] Rausand M, Høyland A. System reliability theory: models, statistical methods
and applications. 2nd ed.. New York: Wiley; 2004.
[9] Asbjørnslett BE, Rausand M. Assess the vulnerability of your production
system. Production Planning and Control 1999;10(3):219–29.
[10] Kaplan S, Garrick JB. On the quantitative definition of risk. Risk Analysis
1981;1:1.
[11] Mentzer JT, et al. Defining supply chain management. Journal of Business
Logistics 2001;22:2.
[12] Ju¨ttner U, Peck H, Christopher M. Supply chain risk management: outlining
an agenda for future research. Internation Journal of Logistics: Research and
Applications 2003;6(4):197–210.
[13] Sheffi Y. The resilient enterprise—overcoming vulnerability for competitive
advantage. Cambridge: MIT Press; 2005.
[14] Berle Ø, Rice JB Jr, Asbjørnslett BE. Failure modes in ports—a functional
approach to throughput vulnerability. In: Proceedings of ESREL. Rhodes,
Greece: Taylor & Francis; 2010. p. 190–97.
[15] Rao S, Goldsby TJ. Supply chain risks: a review and typology. The Interna-
tional Journal of Logistics Management 2009;20(1):97–123.
[16] Vanany I, Zailani S, Pujawan N. Supply chain risk management: literature
review and future research. International Journal of Information Systems and
Supply Chain Management 2009;2:16–33.
[17] Tang CS. Perspectives in supply chain risk management. International Journal
of Production Economics 2006;103:451–88.
[18] Kleindorfer PR, Saad GH. Managing disruption risks in supply chains.
Production and Operations Management 2005;14(1):53–68.
[19] Zsidisin GA, Melnyk SA, Ragatz GL. An institutional theory perspective of
business continuity planning for purchasing and supply management. Inter-
national Journal of Production Research 2005;43(16):3401–20.
[20] Manuj I, Mentzer JT. Global supply chain risk management. Journal of
Business Logistics 2008;29:1.
[21] Carbone V, DE Martino M. The changing role of ports in supply-chain
management: an empirical analysis. Maritime Policy and Management 2003;
30(4):305–20.
[22] Bichou K, Gray R. A critical review of conventional terminology for classifying
seaports. Transport Research Part A 2005;29:75–92.
[23] De Martino M, Morvillo A. Activities, resources and inter-organizational
relationships: key factors in port competitiveness. Maritime Policy and
Management 2008;35(6):571–89.
[24] Barnes P, Oloruntoba R. Assurance of security in maritime supply chains:
conceptual issues of vulnerability and crisis management. Journal of Inter-
national Management 2005;11:519–40.
[25] Craighead CW, et al. The severity of supply chain disruptions: design
characteristics and mitigation capabilities. Decision Sciences 2007;38(1):
131–56.
[26] Ju¨ttner U. Supply chain risk management: understanding the business
requirements from a practitioner perspective. International Journal of Logis-
tics Management 2005;16(1):120.
[27] Rice Jr JB, Caniato F. Building a secure and resilient supply network. Supply
Chain Management Review 2003;7(5):22.
[28] Hendricks KB, Singhal VR. An empirical analysis of the effect of supply chain
disruptions on long-run stock price performance and equity risk of the firm.
Production and Operations Management 2005;14(1):35.
[29] Broadman HG. The social cost of imported oil. Energy Policy 1984;14(3):
242–52.
[30] Korsvik JE. Heuristic solution methods for ship routing and scheduling
problems. Trondheim: Department of Marine Technology. Norwegian Uni-
versity of Science and Technology; 2009.
[31] Ronen D. Ship scheduling: the last decade. European Journal of Operational
Research 1993;71:325–33.
[32] Ronen D. Cargo ships routing and scheduling: survey of models and
problems. European Journal of Operational Research 1983;12:119–26.
[33] Christiansen M, Fagerholt K, RONEN D. Ship routing and scheduling: status
and perspectives. Transportation Science 2004;38(1):1–18.
[34] Grønhaug R, Christiansen M. Supply chain optimization for the liquefied natural
gas business. In: Bertazzi L, editor. Innovation in Distributions Logistics, 2009.
[35] Chang SE. Disasters and transport systems: loss, recovery and competition at
the Port of Kobe after the 1995 earthquake. Journal of Transport Geography
2000;8:53–65.
[36] IMO. Guidelines for formal safety assessment (FSA)—for use in the IMO rule-
making process. In: Organization IM, editor, 2002.
[37] Kontovas CA, Psaraftis HN. Formal safety assessment: a critical review.
Marine Technology 2009;46(1):45–59.
[38] Oehmen J, et al. System-oriented supply chain risk management. Production
planning and control 2009;20(4):343–61.
[39] IEA. Natural gas market review—optimizing investments and ensuring
security in a high-priced environment, 2008.
[40] ECN. Long term gas supply in an enlarged Europe. In: Van Oostvoom F, editor.
Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands; 2003.
[41] IEA. Natural gas review 2007. In: Hulst NV, editor. International Energy
Agency; 2007.
[42] GIIGNL. The LNG industry in 2007. 2009 cited.
[43] IEA. World Energy Outlook, 2008.
[44] IEA. Natural gas information 2007. In: Reece M, editor. International Energy
Agency; 2007.
[45] Vanem E, et al. Analyzing the risk of LNG carrier operations. Reliability
Engineering & System Safety 2008;93:1328–44.
[46] IMO. SAFEDOR—design, operation and regulation for safety. 2009 cited.
Available from /www.safedor.orgS.
[47] Melchers RE. On the ALARP approach to risk management. Reliability
Engineering & System Safety 2001;71:201–8.
[48] Allen L, Boudoukh J, Saunders A. Understanding market, credit and opera-
tional risk—the value at risk approach. Malden: Blackwell Publishing; 2004.
[49] Hakso¨z C- , Kadam A. Supply portfolio risk. Journal of Operational Risk 2009.
[50] Kleijnen JPC. Supply chain simulation tools and techniques: a survey.
International Journal of Simulation & Process Modelling 2005;1(1/2):82–9.
[51] Kleijnen JPC, Smits MT. Performance metrics in supply chain management.
The Journal of the Operational Research Society 2003;54(5):507–14.
[52] Trbojevic VM, Carr BJ. Risk based methodology for safety improvemt in ports.
Journal of Hazardous Materials 2000;71:467–80.
[53] Hollnagel E. Barriers and accident prevention. Ashgate Publishing Limited;
2004.
[54] Mishan EJ, Quah E. Cost–benefit analysis. 5th ed.. Oxon: Routledge; 2007.
[55] Saleh JH, Marais K. Reliability: howmuch is it worth? Beyond its estibation or
prediction, the (net) present value of reliability Reliability Engineering &
System Safety 2006;91:665–73.
[56] DNV. Nakilat is an integral part of the LNG Supply chain. 2008 [cited 2010
2409]. Available from /http://eng.dnv.pl/industry/maritime/publicationsand
downloads/publications/dnvtankerupdate/2008/no12008/Nakilatisaninte
gralpartoftheLNGsupplychain.aspS.
[57] Øien K. A framework for the establishment of organizational risk indicators.
Reliability Engineering & System Safety 2001;74:147–67.
Ø. Berle et al. / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 96 (2011) 696–705 705
                                                                                                                                          Appendix A                             
Paper 3 
BERLE, Ø., SPENS, K., and ASBJØRNSLETT, B.E., The role of maritime 
transportation in humanitarian logistics. Submitted to the International Journal of 
Ocean Systems Management, in review. [50] 
 
Is not included due to copyright 
                                                                                                                                          Appendix A                             
Paper 4 
BERLE, Ø., NORSTAD, I., and ASBJØRNSLETT, B.E., Optimization, risk assessment 
and resilience in LNG transportation systems. Supply Chain Management: An 
International Journal, accepted for publication. [51] 
Optimization, risk assessment and resilience in LNG transportation systems
Øyvind Berle 
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Abstract
Purpose: This paper addresses how to systematically address vulnerability in a maritime 
transportation system using a Formal Vulnerability Assessment approach, create quantitative 
measures of disruption risk and test the effect of mitigating measures. These quantitative data 
are prerequisites for cost efficiency calculations, and may be obtained without requiring 
excessive resources.  
Design/methodology/approach:  
Supply chain simulation using heuristics-based planning tools offers an approach to quantify 
the impact of disruption scenarios and mitigating measures. This is used to enrich a risk-based 
approach to maritime supply chain vulnerability assessment. Monte Carlo simulation is used 
to simulate a stochastic nature of disruptions.  
Findings:
The exemplary assessment of a maritime liquefied natural gas (LNG) transportation system 
illustrates the potential for providing quantitative data about the cost of disruptions and the 
effects of mitigating measures, which are foundations for more precise cost-efficiency 
estimates.  
Research limitations/implications: 
This simulation was done on a simplified version of a real transportation system. For resource 
reasons, several simplifications were made, both with regards to modeling the transportation 
system and with the implementation of the Formal Vulnerability Assessment framework. 
Nevertheless, we believe the paper serves to illustrate the approach and potential outcome.  
Practical implications:  
Practitioners are provided with an approach to get more precise quantitative data on disruption 
costs and cost/efficiency of mitigating measures, providing background data for decisions on 
investing in reduction of supply chain vulnerability.
Originality/value:  
The combination of risk assessment methods and inventory routing simulation of maritime 
supply chain problems is a novelty. Quantifying vulnerability, effects of disruptions and 
effects of mitigating measures in maritime transportation systems contributes to a little-
researched area.
Key words: Supply chain risk, maritime transportation, LNG, fleet routing and scheduling, 
Monte Carlo simulation.  
1 Introduction
The World Economic Forum (WEF) publishes annual reports of present and emerging global 
risks. In 2008, energy security and hyper-optimization were pointed out as two of four 
emerging global risks (WEF 2008). Access to energy is essential for the world economy, 
where most countries rely on energy imports. WEF warnings about societal vulnerability to 
disruptions in energy supply continue: “Risk management must also account for interlinkages 
and remote possibilities. Low-probability, high-severity events […] do happen“ (WEF 2009). 
Systemic risk in global infrastructure is emphasized in the 2010 report (WEF 2010): “there is 
a need to balance the additional private costs to operate more safely that might negatively 
affect the firm’s bottom line with the benefits of reduced global risks; that is the trade-off 
between private efficiency and public vulnerability.” The 2011 report emphasizes resource 
security, thereof energy, as one of five key risks to watch.
Natural gas supplies are critical for societies dependent on its use for industrial production 
and electricity generation, roughly 40% is used for industrial purposes and the US Energy 
Information Agency (EIA) expects that 36 % of all electricity generation in 2035 use natural 
gas (EIA 2010). A growing share of traded natural gas is transported on ships in the form of 
liquefied natural gas (LNG). EIA anticipates the shipped LNG volumes to increase 2.4 times, 
from 226 billion to 538 billion cubic meters between 2007 and 2035. LNG is natural gas 
cooled down into liquid form and thereby compressed 600 times. Shipment capacity of LNG 
increased from 5 million cubic meters in 1980 to 35 million cubic meters in 2007 and was 
expected to reach 55 million cubic meters by 2010 – total traded volumes reached 483 million 
cubic meters in 2010. These systems are complex and tightly interconnected, leaving them 
vulnerable to disruptive events. Failures in critical infrastructures may have large implications 
on society, and should be addressed appropriately (Utne et al. 2011).
The aim of energy security is to make sure that energy supply needs are covered, that these 
systems can withstand disruptions to supply and adapt to changes to minimize the impact on 
the end users. Although optimization is a general good, minimizing waste in the line of good 
resource management, unconditional optimization of production and transportation systems 
may introduce risks and expose vulnerabilities to the system’s ability to perform its mission.  
Optimization tools allows for structured analysis of complex problems, where mathematical 
formulation of problems allow for efficient utilization of limited resources. Recent advances 
in algorithms and heuristics allow for design and operation of complex and more efficient 
global supply chains, exploiting synergies across geographic locations, supply chain functions 
and time (Shapiro et al. 1993). However, it is vital to recognize that optimization models 
solves the mathematical problem as it is formulated, “models do not replace human 
judgment” (Shapiro et al. 1993).  
In particular, optimization tools for practical problems are typically designed to operate in a 
deterministic setting, assuming that the world is predictable, and that variability is limited. 
However, there is a growing focus on low-frequency high-impact scenarios, see e.g. (Berle et 
al. 2011a; Berle et al. 2011b; Hendricks and Singhal 2005; Kleindorfer and Saad 2005; Sheffi 
2005a; Sheffi 2005b; Taleb 2007). These are the scenarios that very seldom occur, but when 
they do, they create large problems for the supply chain. The large number of such possible 
scenarios makes the total possible impact significant; although little can be done to prevent all 
these events from occurring. Extreme examples are the 1994 Kobe earthquake (Chang 2000) 
and the 2002 Los Angeles dock lockout (Sheffi 2005b), both with massive consequences to 
business and infrastructure. Neither of these are encompassed in the sort of problems where 
operations research [OR] methods are normally applied.   
This paper addresses the gap between optimizing a transportation system based on 
mathematical models and supply chain risk assessment of these systems. In essence; can risk 
assessment methods be used to improve the handling of uncertainty in decision planning in 
large and complex supply chains?  
Risk management encompasses as set of well-known methods to identify, assess and manage 
risks and uncertainties. Benefits of risk assessment methods include room for discussion of 
uncertainties, that experts may be used to fill in gaps in data, that the “world view” may 
accept that not all factors are known, and that quantification may be difficult, that it may 
require simplifications, and that calculations may be very costly in labor resources.  
From the start, the operations research (OR) community worked with static and deterministic 
problems. This is relevant for many problems, and has contributed a great deal to resource 
utilization. However, the real world has considerable uncertainty associated with it. Also, if 
the problem is based on a real-life scenario, most likely new information and constraints will 
appear. If the model should still be relevant, it needs to be updated. In essence, types of OR 
problems can be divided along two axes: deterministic versus stochastic and static versus 
dynamic problems (Stålhane 2011). Stochastic is still a developing technology and 
calculations become complex and computationally demanding. Also, operations research 
methods do not easily include low-frequency high-impact risks. 
To model a real life scenario, a stochastic model allows for investigating complex systems 
and including rare scenarios. Monte Carlo simulations introduce random numbers into a 
model. By repeating the analysis a large number of times, the properties of the system become 
evident. This paper uses risk assessment methods to determine what may go wrong in a 
maritime supply chain, and how to cope with disruptions. To determine the effects of 
disruptions and mitigating measures, Monte Carlo methods and operations research tools are 
used to quantify effects.
The purpose of the approach presented is not to give the final answer to how risk analysis and 
mathematical planning tools can be integrated. Rather, this is intended as a conceptual paper 
to present this novel approach. This paper is based on two research questions: 
RQ1: Can risk assessment methods combined with results from fleet planning provide more 
insight in creating resilience in maritime supply chains? 
RQ2: Does the combination of risk assessment methods and deterministic optimization  
software provide new insight for a supply chain planning problem under uncertainty? 
Transportation of natural gas in its liquid state as LNG may serve as an illustrating example of 
society’s dependence on maritime transportation systems and the vulnerability of such 
systems. High cost of investment in LNG supply chain infrastructure and operation provides a 
strong incentive to create lean and tightly coupled systems, to increase resource utilization, 
thereby minimizing cost. 
In the following, definitions, relevant previous research and methods are presented in section 
two, the system definition and simulation setup in section three, results and discussion in 
section four, and conclusions in section five.
2 Background 
2.1 Definitions 
The mission of the supply chain is to serve as a throughput mechanism of goods, and in 
hardship, protect the dependents from the consequences of disruptive events (Berle et al. 
2011b). In maritime supply chain risk management, given a supply chain mission focus, 
vulnerability is defined as the properties of a transportation system that may weaken or limit 
its ability to endure, handle and survive threats and disruptive events that originate both 
within and outside the system boundaries (Berle et al. 2011b), inspired by Asbjørnslett and 
Rausand (1999).
Risk may be defined according to industry standards, as: a triplet of scenario, frequency and 
consequence of events that may contribute negatively (Kaplan and Garrick 1981). Resilience 
is the ability of the supply chain to handle a disruption without significant impact on the 
ability to serve the supply chain mission. Resilience is about handling the consequences of a 
disruption, not about preventing a disruption from occurring. However, the effort to create a 
resilient system is made before a disruption occurs (Berle et al. 2011b). 
2.2. Relevant literature 
Supply chain risk management has been a research area of increasing focus within the last ten 
years, see reviews like Manuj and Mentzer (2008), Juttner (2005) and Vanany et al. (2009). 
Other relevant research include papers on supply chain disruptions (Chopra and Sodhi 2004; 
Craighead et al. 2007; Kleindorfer and Saad 2005), supply chain vulnerability (Asbjørnslett 
2008; Peck 2005; Wagner and Bode 2006),  and supply chain flexibility and resilience 
(Ponomarov and Holcomb 2009; Tang and Tomlin 2008). More practical approaches towards 
supply chain risk management can be found in the workbook on supply chain risk by 
Cranfield University (Cranfield 2003), and in the Supply Chain Council SCOR model on risk 
management (2009).   
Limited previous literature has been found within maritime supply chain risk management. 
Barnes and Oloruntoba give an overview of risk management from a security perspective 
(2005), Bichou and Gray (Bichou and Gray 2004) focus on port performance management 
and the role of ports in supply chains. Carbone and De Martino similarly study the role of 
ports in maritime supply chains (Carbone and De Martino 2003). Li and Cullinane (LI and 
Cullinane 2003) assess the economic means ship owners may deploy to reduce their 
vulnerability towards maritime risks. Panayides (Panayides 2006) bring forth a general 
discussion on the integration of maritime logistics and global supply chain management, in 
particular within the container shipping segment. Panayides also suggests an integration of 
operations research perspectives within maritime logistics in his recommendations for future 
research, which is a goal of this paper.
Reviews on ship routing problems include Ronen (Ronen 1983, 1993), Christiansen et al. 
(Christiansen et al. 2004), Brønmo et al. (2007) and Korsvik (2009). Given that a number of 
decisions have to be made in the presence of uncertainty, where ignoring this may lead to 
inferior or wrong decisions, it is important to include the modeling of uncertainty in 
transportation systems (Kleywegt and Shapiro 2001; Ruszczynski and Shapiro 2003). One 
such way is stochastic optimization, a method that offers a rich modeling approach, but is still 
under development. However, there is always a “trade-off between the realism of the 
optimization model (…), and the tractability of the problem”, making it possible to solve 
(Kleywegt and Shapiro 2001). Recent relevant literature on optimization of LNG shipping 
problems includes Andersson et al. (2010), describing an inventory management problem of a 
vertically integrated LNG supply chain, and Rakke et al. (2011), who present a heuristic for 
creating annual delivery programs with the presence of a spot market.  
Monte Carlo methods have been applied on several supply chain problems: You et al (2009) 
study a chemical supply chain problem, and show how a stochastic model can aid 
management in reducing financial risk towards variability of customer demand, freight and 
energy prices. Applequist et al (2000) use Monte Carlo simulations to model the economic 
risk and rewards to investment in supply chain design and planning projects under 
uncertainty. Supply chain disruptions were modeled using Monte Carlo and discrete-event 
simulation by Schmitt and Singh (2009), allowing for testing effects of disruptions and 
quantifying consequences for a large consumer product company’s supply chain.  
2.3 Relevant risk assessment methods 
Risk analysis approaches may involve both qualitative and quantitative methods. Before 
commencing, a definition of the system in question and the limits of this system constrain the 
task at hand to be tangible. In general, as for the Formal Vulnerability Assessment (FVA) 
(Berle et al. 2011b)  framework illustrated in table 1, the hazards to the system should first be 
described qualitatively to get an overview of the context, both on the cause and consequence 
sides.
The FVA framework is based on the Formal Safety Assessment framework, used to describe a 
rational and systematic risk-based approach for safety assessment (IMO 2002; Kristiansen 
2005). The adaptation of this framework is described in Berle et al (2011b), arguing that there 
is much to gain by linking safety and reliability engineering to maritime risk assessment, and 
for applying FSA beyond vessel risk assessment to understanding vulnerabilities in maritime 
supply chains.
Initially, qualitative methods give grounds for structuring and describing how the 
transportation system may break down, while not requiring the resources and much 
information of the exact characteristics of the hazards and breakdown, typically probability, 
possible consequences and the impact of these. Typically, a qualitative approach would use 
checklists, expert judgment and brainstorming.   
Later in the process, when the widest possible scope of hazards and potential breakdowns are 
identified, a selection of the key risks is necessary to limit the task at hand. Semi-quantitative 
methods draw on quantitative methods, but do not actually use exact numbers for parameters 
such as probability and consequence. Rather, quantification may be done using scales, e.g. by 
ranking probability on a scale from one to five. Examples of methods include Preliminary 
hazard analysis (PHA), Failure Mode, Effect and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) and Hazard 
and Operability Studies (HAZOP). 
Quantitative methods offer the potential to give exact numbers of risk, given that the input 
data is correct. Examples of quantitative risk assessments include fault and event trees, and 
approaches such as Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA) (Vanem et al. 2008). However, 
obtaining such quantitative data is difficult, in particular for complex systems with limited 
historical data. For this purpose, quantitative data will be obtained by the use of simulation 
and operations research methods. Quantitative results from the simulation are returned into 
the risk models.  
Aven et al. (2005; 2007) give an overview holistic approaches to risk research in the offshore 
industry and how to systematically address this in a structured framework, as do Vatn (2011). 
Rausand et al.’s textbooks on risk management provide insight into risk management methods 
(2011; 2004). Some relevant risk assessment methods are presented below:  
Preliminary hazard analysis (PHA) is an initial semi-quantitative analysis that is intended to 
identify all potential hazards and accidental events that may lead to an accident (Rausand and 
Høyland 2004). Failure Mode, Effect and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) is a method to 
determine equipment functions, functional failure modes and possible causes and 
consequences of such failures (Kristiansen 2005). Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP)
is a detailed and comprehensive hazard identification method, often used in sectors such as 
process systems and software development (Kristiansen 2005). HAZOP has been applied to 
supply chain problems by e.g. Adhitya et al. (2009), who compare its use in supply chain to 
that of a chemical processing plant.  
Fault tree analysis (FTA) uses Boolean logic to graphically model logical relationships 
between equipment failures, human errors and external events that can combine to cause 
specific mishaps of interest, also called top events (Kristiansen 2005). Event tree analysis 
(ETA) uses decision trees to model the possible outcomes of an initiating event capable of 
causing consequences of interest (Kristiansen 2005). Examples of fault and event trees in 
LNG shipping can be found in Vanem et al. (2008).
2.4 Relevant optimization / planning methods 
Most ship routing and scheduling problems can be formulated as mathematical programs 
which can be solved by using a commercial MP solver. However, due to the complexity of 
these problems, most real life instances cannot be solved to optimality without spending hours 
or days. Therefore, heuristic solution methods are often used instead. These methods can 
provide good (but not necessarily optimal) solutions in reasonable time. 
TurboRouter
TurboRouter is a heuristics-based decision support system created by MARINTEK made to 
aid shipping companies in managing their fleets through solving complex ship routing and 
scheduling problems (Fagerholt and Lindstad 2007). Presently, this tool is used by a few 
shipping companies. The essential technology is a multi-start local search heuristic, which is 
connected to a graphical user interface and an advanced distance calculation module 
Invent
Invent is an application developed by SINTEF ICT Applied Mathematics (Kloster 2009). It is 
a software library for solving maritime inventory problems. This library includes a set of 
meta-heuristic methods that can be used. The Invent solver can be integrated with 
TurboRouter through a XML-based interface, and in this way serve as a solver for inventory 
routing problems modeled in TurboRouter. For this paper, with a huge number of scenarios to 
solve, keeping the computational time as low as possible is essential. Therefore a constructive 
heuristic has been chosen in order to solve the scheduling problems. This method provides 
solutions that are very close to optimality in just a few seconds. 
3 Systems definition & simulation setup 
Berle et al described the Formal Vulnerability Assessment framework for addressing 
vulnerability in the ability to move goods of a maritime transportation system (Berle et al. 
2011b). This paper presents connecting this risk-related method to planning tools. Being a 
conceptual paper, this is a simplification, although the general lines are followed.
In short, the FVA adaptation of the safety-oriented Formal Safety Assessment framework is 
used to understand how maritime transportation systems may break down, the consequences if 
this happens, and how the transportation system may prepare to restore itself after a disruption 
has occurred. To facilitate credible cost-efficiency estimation, some quantitative results are 
needed. On the other hand, this paper is intended as an example of how to perform a 
vulnerability assessment, not as a full assessment. Thereby, a selection of tasks will be 
performed for each of the steps in the FVA assessment, as illustrated in table 1. The approach 
is split into two parts; traditional risk assessment approaches focusing on “what may go 
wrong” (the hazard focus), and a mission centric path, where the critical capabilities of the 
system are considered. The latter ensures that unforeseen risks and low-frequency high-
impact risks are explicitly included. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
Table 1: Outline of the FVA process (Berle et al. 2011b) 
Hazard focus Mission focus 
Step 0: Preparation 0: Define system, parameters, criteria, borders etc 
Step 1: Hazard identification 1a: What may go wrong 1b: Which functions / capabilities 
should be protected 
Step 2: Vulnerability assessment 2a: Investigation / quantification, 
most important risks 
2b: Investigation / quantification, all 
relevant failure modes 
Step 3: Vulnerability mitigation 3a: Measures to mitigate most 
important risks 
3b: Measures to restore functions / 
capabilities 
Step 4: Cost / benefit assessment 4a: Cost / benefit assessment 4b: Cost / benefit assessment 
Step 5: Recommendations for 
decision making 
5: Recommendation and feedback to assessment 

3.1 System definition 
An LNG transportation system can be described through the components as in table 2. The 
system borders are defined to be from the LNG export harbor storage tanks to the LNG 
import harbor import tanks. This is due to that the set goals on the supply and demand sides, 
as can be seen in table 2: The liquefaction plant should ideally be run at 100 % capacity to 
maximize profits. Likewise, end users demand that their gas needs are met, requiring steady 
deliveries. Optimization on the system is therefore done given that the export port storage 
should never run full, and that the import harbors never should run empty. Risk acceptance 
criteria set limits of how much vulnerability should be accepted, measured in either economic 
loss, time or volume unavailability.  
Insert Table 2 about here 
Table 2: Components of the LNG chain (Berle et al. 2011b) 
Components Description Characteristics Goals/challenges 
      
Feed gas  Natural gas from fields Transported in pipelines Steady usage 
    
Liquefaction plant 
Cleans and cools gas to 
liquid state at – 161˚C
High investment and 
operational cost 
Maximize utilization without 
interruption 
    
Export LNG storage 
Storage of LNG before 
loading  High investment cost Minimize required capacity 
    
Loading Moving LNG to ship Specialized infrastructure  
Safe loading, maximize 
throughput capacity 
    
Port/ship interface 
Scheduling and coordination
of vessels 
Vessels serve as storage in 
system 
Need for frequent loading, long 
planning horizon, maximize 
utilization 
    
Shipping network 
Owned, chartered (and spot) 
vessels
Decisions on utilization of 
owned and chartered fleet 
Maximize profits, recourse 
action for deviation 
management 
    
Port/ship interface 
Scheduling and coordination 
of vessels Planned delivery of gas 
Limited capacity, long planning 
horizon, maximize capacity 
utilization 
    
Unloading Moving LNG from ship Specialized infrastructure 
Safe unloading, maximize 
throughput capacity 
    
Import  LNG storage Storage of LNG High investment cost Minimize capacity requirement
    
Regasification 
Evaporating LNG to natural 
gas Moderate investment 
Meet gas demand without 
interruption 
    
Gas consumption / gas 
storage 
Use of gas, gas to 
transportation system, gas to 
storage 
Variability in demand with 
stochastic uncertainty Meet gas need 
3.2 Hazard identification  
The hazard identification stage encompasses methods such as PHA, literature surveys, 
accident databases, checklists and structured brainstorming by experts to identify a wide 
scope of potential risks. Besides the focus on the functions and capabilities the system is 
reliant on, the approach is analogous to previous supply chain risk assessment frameworks 
such as by Manuj and Mentzer (2008).
3.3 Vulnerability assessment and quantification 
A foundation for doing credible cost-efficiency tradeoffs is the ability to quantify risk. Given 
that risk can be defined as a combination of scenario, probability and consequence, in 
particular the latter are relevant to quantify. However, quantifying risk is notoriously hard to 
do, due to a set of reasons: First, lack of historical data is relevant, as one cannot easily learn 
from the past. Supply chain risk management does not allow for experimenting in the closed 
confines of a laboratory. This sets the potential for experiments apart from for instance risk 
assessments in technical systems, where a mechanical part can be stressed over time under 
observation. Second; transportation systems are characterized by tight coupling between the 
components. Combined with high and increasingly intractable interaction between 
components, as argued by Perrow (1984), is a recipe for breakdown. Third, the number of 
potential threats that may cause a disruption is immense. Combining this with limited 
oversight of the interactions and couplings of the transportation systems leaves putting exact 
numbers to the scenarios at hand at best as difficult.
“Expert judgment” is used as initial quantification of technical risk assessments of scenarios 
characterized by one or more of the three factors above. In essence, someone with above 
average insight into the problem make their best guesses on what the occurrence rate or 
possible consequence of a disruption would be – a version is to average the numbers found by 
several experts. Such assessments can be helped by structured techniques, but in essence they 
are subjective. On the other side, “in the land of the blind, the one-eyed man is king”: an 
estimate may be better than no information, as long as it does not lead one into a false sense 
of knowledge.
The presented approach uses simulation to quantify the effects of disruptive events and 
mitigating measures, as discussed in section 2.3. Quantitative data can then be fed back into 
the assessment for more precise cost benefit assessments and ultimately better informed 
decisions.
3.4 Risk mitigation 
For a supply chain problem, mitigating vulnerability can in essence be done through two 
strategies; robustness and flexibility (Sheffi 2005b). Robustness is about having excess 
resources (such as transportation capacity) to withstand threats, flexibility is about having the 
ability to reconfigure the resources. In supply chain terminology: what are the bottlenecks of 
the transportation system? More general; what are the critical functions that the transportation 
system is dependent on? For identified relevant risks, mitigating measures can be considered. 
However, the cost/benefit assessment that follows in the next step is necessary to determine 
whether the measures are worthwhile. 
3.5 Cost benefit assessment 
To which extent should transportation systems have the ability to withstand threats, and how 
fast should transport capacity be restored, given that a cost is incurred to give the system such 
abilities? There is also a cost to having time delays in restoration. However, this balance and 
cost/efficiency trade-off is not trivial.  
We argue that in a cost-benefit assessment of mitigating measures, one should compare the 
vulnerability reduction gained from each measure with the cost of implementation, using e.g. 
a net present value [NPV] criteria (Saleh and Marais 2006).  Benefits include reduced number 
of disruptions, reduced impact from each disruption, and increased availability of assets. 
Costs include investment, operation and training expenditures. Tang (2006) argues that the 
lack of efforts towards investing in reducing supply chain vulnerability is due to that no-one 
gets credit for an event that did not occur. Being able to quantify the cost of disruptions and 
effectiveness of mitigating measures is the reason of existence for this conceptual framework.  
3.6 Recommendations for decision making 
The Formal Vulnerability Assessment framework suggests that an objective comparison of 
the identified options should be made based on potential reduction of vulnerability, both to 
frequent and infrequent risk. The recommendations for decision making should be a synthesis 
of the formal process, selecting which measures to include based on which are the most 
critical.  
4 Case – Energy security in LNG supply chains 
4.1 Case description
The current LNG transportation system may be described as in figure 1. This is based on a 
real case, although with changes to anonymize the facility and to simplify the assessment, as 
well as to preserve confidentiality clauses with industry partners. A single export port serves a 
number of customers, at any time serving a fleet of 10 vessels on long-term contracts. Due to 
high capital investments in the liquefaction plant, a goal of operation is to minimize down 
time; the goal of the transportation planning system is to never require the LNG liquefaction 
plant to reduce production. Limited on-shore LNG storage facilities, about 72 hours of 
production time from empty to full, require vessels to be available to load regularly.
According to industry sources, about 85% of volumes of the LNG productions are delivered 
to long-term (over 4 years) contract customers. About 15 % of volumes are sold on the spot 
market. What is referred to as a spot market in LNG trades are in fact 0.5 – 4 year contracts. 
Single journey trades, as for instance the typical spot trade in tramp trades, are almost non-
existent due to lack of available cargo; this is rather done as rerouting of an already planned 
journey. To simplify, this model does not include a spot market. Vessels always load full 
cargoes, serve only one port, and there are no partial discharges.
Figure 1: The transportation system 
Several simplifications have been made to this conceptual model. All vessels are considered 
to be identical with 130,000m3 cargo carrying capacity and a service speed of 18 knots, so 
one ship can replace another. Cargo types are reduced into only one cargo grade (no rich or 
lean gas). Customers are considered identical, that is; the only parameters are distances from 
export port, consumption volumes and cargo storage. Customer may have different LNG 
volume needs and storage capabilities. Demand is steady, unlike real markets: Normally, 
summer and winter demands for natural gas is higher in summer and winter than in the spring 
and fall, as the gas is used for heating and electricity generation (used in air conditioning). 
There are no seasonal sailing constraints in this model, in real-life applications one would 
have to consider that winter storms may require vessels to reduce speeds and leave in 
appropriate buffers for such. Navigational channels etc. are not considered as potential 
sources of disruption in transit (such as missing a Suez convoy, causing a layover),  
Disregarding the simplifications, this is still a complex system, and serves to illustrate the 
approach towards risk management of maritime transportation systems. For more thorough 
descriptions of real cases with actual operational constraints, readers are advised to study e.g. 
Andersson et al. (2010) and Rakke et al. (2011). 
An initial constraint introduced in the model reflecting on experts’ description on how 
transportation system routing is performed today, was that vessels had restrictions on which 
ports that could be served; vessels were dedicated to certain ports. A general comment is that 
existent vessel planning is done with a large number of additional constraints introduced, such 
as which vessels can serve which customers, equal usage of one or more vessels, tight 
delivery windows, low flexibility in re-routing vessels et cetera. In other words, a number of 
constraints are introduced on the optimization problem without a thorough review of 
additional costs introduced to the system. The result is sub-optimization towards a large 
number of individual goals rather that the system as a whole.  
LNG exporter 
Production rate: 2528 m3/h 
(168 loads per year) 
Storage: 200 000 m3 
LNG importer 1 
Distance: 6200 nm 
Consumption:  542 m3/h  
(36 loads/year) 
Storage: 200,000m3  
LNG importer 3 
Distance: 6200 nm 
Consumption: 542 m3/h  
(36 loads/year) 
Storage: 200,000m3 
LNG importer 4 
Distance: 1000 nm 
Consumption:  902 m3/h  
(60 loads/year) 
Storage: 200,000m3 
LNG importer 2 
Distance: 6300 nm 
Consumption: 542 m3/h  
(36 loads/year) 
Storage: 200,000m3 
4.2 Identified risks: expert judgment  
In collaboration with experts, the scenarios presented in table 4 were selected as the most 
critical, using a-priori (prior) estimates of both probabilities and consequences. The experts 
are practitioners from the LNG industry representing several stages in the value chain as well 
as operational fleet planning practitioners, to encompass the scope of LNG supply chain 
vulnerability in the widest sense. The probabilities for these scenarios occurring were 
assigned in collaboration with experts, the consequences were determined through the 
simulation.  
Table 4: Generated disruption scenarios for simulation 
Generated scenarios: Description Probability per day 
Production LNG Production capacity is down 50 % for 48 hours 0.01
Loading port Loading port is completely unavailable for 48 hours 0.002
Discharge port One discharge port is completely unavailable for 96 hours 0.002
Tank capacity Loading port storage tank capacity is down to 24 hour 
production for 7 days 0.005
Loading rates Loading rates is down 50% for 7 days 0.001
Berth availability – loading? Only 4 of 6 loading berths are available for 5 days 0.005
Unloading rates Unloading rate in one port down 50% for 14 days 0.001
Berth availability – unloading? Only 1 of 2 unloading berths are available for 14 days 0.001
Extra-ordinary dry-dock 
schedule 
Maintenance need removes 1 vessel for 14 days outside 
of schedule, plus the vessel needs to be repositioned to 
the Far East for a suitable yard 0.005
As this is a conceptual paper, we limit our choice of disruption scenarios to four: 1) 
Production being down 50% for 48 hours, 2) Loading port being completely unavailable for 
48 hours, 3) One discharge port being closed for 96 hours, 4) Vessel needing unexpected 
repair at Far East yard for 14 days, plus repositioning.
4.3 Mitigating measures:
Potential mitigating measures were identified in collaboration with experts to illustrate the 
approach. These were, including an estimation of costs: 
1) Investing in 400,000 m3 additional LNG storage at the export port. Investment costs 
would be in the magnitude of USD 125 million, operational expenses about USD 
2m/year. Assuming that the investment has to be written off in ten years and a 
weighted average cost of capital (WACC) of 8%, operational expenses included, the 
annual cost is about USD 16.5m.  
2) Introducing additional storage at import port – either at two or at four of the ports. We 
estimate that the investment and operational costs would be comparable to that of the 
export port, i.e. USD 67.5m or USD 125m, and total operational expenses of USD 1m 
or USD 2m, respectively, resulting in annualized cost of USD8.25m or USD16.5m. 
3) Introducing additional vessels as a robust buffer. Renting one 130,000 m3 LNG vessel 
cost about USD 80,000/day in the current market on a 10 year charter. In addition, 
USD12,000/day in operational expenses (fuel and crewing) must be included. Annual 
price is then USD 33.6m per vessel. 
Our optimization uses a basic setup with 10 vessels and 200,000 m3 of LNG storage in the 
ports, referred to as case 0. We test various system setups with adding combinations of 
mitigating measures one to three, with half or full implementation of Measure 2. Measure 1 
adds one vessel to allow for greater flexibility in using the fleet. Measure 2 adds 400,000 m3
of storage in the export port. Measure 3 is thought of as a robust and flexible system, albeit at 
a high cost. To estimate the difference, two vessels and 400,000 m3 of export port storage is 
added. This leaves four system setups for the optimization.  
4.4 Consequence quantification
The simulation is based on annual delivery programs. Scenarios for 1000 simulations, each of 
one year, are generated with random occurrences of disruptive events based on probabilities 
as shown in table 4. The number was chosen to get a large dataset to establish confidence 
intervals, while limiting run-time of the model in the calculation. For each year, a delivery 
program is generated. In case of disruptive events, re-calculations of the delivery plan are 
done according to the defined constraints.  
As we have identified a set of mitigating measures, we have 12 potential system setups, as 
shown in table 5 below. Case 0 is the base case. The 1000 simulations with generated 
disruptions are run for these 12 system setups.  
Table 5: Description of the 12 system setups 
Case Number of vessels Export port storage Import port storages 
0 10 Low (200,000 m3) 4 low (200,000 m3) 
1 10 Low 2 low (200,000 m3), 2 high (300,000 m3) 
2 10 Low 4 high (300,000 m3) 
3 10 High (600,000 m3) 4 low 
4 10 High 2 low, 2 high 
5 10 High 4 high 
6 11 Low 4 low 
7 11 Low 2 low, 2 high 
8 11 Low 4 high 
9 11 High 4 low 
10 11 High 2 low, 2 high 
11 11 High 4 high 
Goal functions for the optimization can be defined in several ways. The goal of the problem is 
to maximize delivered quanta of LNG in the system, under storage restrictions. For this 
problem, the most relevant are optimizing on time-slots or inventory, whereof the last is 
chosen. Production and consumption rates are assumed constant, storage volumes are fixed, 
and the goal is to not allow production storage tanks to exceed a loading limit. Similar 
constraints are set on the import storage tanks. A supplement that was not included is to add 
an operational limit for tank loading smaller than the physical maximal / minimal volumes. 
Then, penalty cost for violations of storage limits can be added up to the maximal/minimal 
storage volumes. The planning problem becomes how to create annual delivery problems for 
the vessels to ensure that the constraints are not violated, i.e. creating feasible solutions that 
maximize the annual delivered volume of LNG, while meeting storage requirements.  
Figure 2: Flow chart of the simulation 
Step 2
j= 1, 2, ... 11
For each system setup j 
Optimize base case and let the result be 
the ADP (annual delivery problem)
Step 3
d = 1, 2, ... 365
For each day in the planning period d 
Reschedule = false
Step 4
k = 1, 2, ... 4
For each disruptive scenarion k 
If random number < probability scenario k
Reschedule = true
Step 5
For each system setup j 
Change the problem definition according 
to the disruption
Step 6
If Reschedule = true 
For each system setup i
Fix the ADP up to day d
Optimize the ADP from day d to day 365
Step 1
i= 1, 2, ... 1000
For each simulation run i
Model: parameters
The system is dimensioned to have ten 130,000 m3 vessels operating at 18 knots; one vessel, 
serving the short route to LNG importer 4 (LNGI-4) (6 days per round trip), three to each of 
the others (30 days per round trip). Resulting LNG consumption rates are 902 m3/h for LNGI-
4, and 542 m3/h for the others. To balance the system, production must equal consumption, so 
the LNG export plant produces 2528 m3/h of LNG. Production storage is set to be 200 000 
m3, which is about 79 hours of production, which is a realistic figure. Import storage must be 
larger than vessel capacity to allow for some flexibility in routing. Also, for import security of 
supply, larger stores are normally utilized. Import storage is therefore set to 220,000 m3 for 
the ports. Loading rates per berth, both for ports and vessels are set to 10,000 m3/h, which is 
comparable to existing systems.  
Results are measured on two criteria; 1) what is the average delivery potential of the system 
setup, and 2) what is the downside, i.e. what is the minimal downside we can expect with 95% 
certainty?   
Running a simulation series took ca 42 hours on a computer with a 2.2 Ghz Intel core2 
processor with 4 Gb RAM. 
4.5 Results 
The results are presented as in table 6 and in figure 3.
Table 6: Delivered volumes – average, 95th percentile and “disruption-free”  
Average 
volume 
Deviation: 
average 
95th 
percentile
Deviation 95th 
percentile
"Disruption-
free" volume 
Dev. avg. of 
max vol. 
Dev. 95th. perc. 
of max. vol. 
Case 11 18128760 0,0 % 15730000 -0,8 % 21840000 -17,0 % -28,0 %
Case 5 18098990 -0,2 % 15860000 0,0 % 21710000 -16,6 % -26,9 %
Case 4 17865380 -1,5 % 15600000 -1,6 % 21320000 -16,2 % -26,8 %
Case 10 17852250 -1,5 % 15600000 -1,6 % 21840000 -18,3 % -28,6 %
Case 8 17670250 -2,5 % 15340000 -3,3 % 21450000 -17,6 % -28,5 %
Case 3 17659980 -2,6 % 15470000 -2,5 % 21060000 -16,1 % -26,5 %
Case 9 17647890 -2,7 % 15340000 -3,3 % 21580000 -18,2 % -28,9 %
Case 7 17500730 -3,5 % 15210000 -4,1 % 21320000 -17,9 % -28,7 %
Case 6 17311710 -4,5 % 15080000 -4,9 % 21190000 -18,3 % -28,8 %
Case 2 17164550 -5,3 % 15080000 -4,9 % 21060000 -18,5 % -28,4 %
Case 1 17061590 -5,9 % 14950000 -5,7 % 20930000 -18,5 % -28,6 %
Case 0 16930290 -6,6 % 14690000 -7,4 % 20670000 -18,1 % -28,9 %
What we see above is that the base case (Case 0), the average annual delivered volume is 
16.93 million m3 of LNG, with 95% of the certainty that annual delivered volumes will be 
above 14.69 million m3. The best performing system setups are not surprisingly Cases 5, 10 
and 11, namely those with the most mitigating measures added.  
Secondly, we see that comparing where storage should be located, this simulation gives more 
benefit to adding storage volume at the export port rather than in the import ports, see Case 2 
versus Case 3. This difference is evened out with one additional vessel, as can be seen in Case 
8 versus Case 9.
On comparing whether to add distributed storage (Measure 2) partially or fully, we see that 
there is a linear effect of adding volume in Case 1 and 2, where the vessel capacity is limited. 
When vessel capacity is abundant (Measure 3), there is a diminishing return to adding 
distributed storage (Case 7 and 8). 
The maximal volumes that can be delivered for the various system setups range between 
20.67 and 21.84 million m3. This indicates that planning for a system without disruptive 
events lead to an overestimation of system transportation capacity with c21.4% for the 
average load and with c39.2% for loads delivered within a 95% confidence interval.
A physical representation of the individual distribution of disruption costs for the 1000 
scenarios can be seen below for the four cases. These are sorted in order of declining 
delivered volumes, to smooth results to allow for illustrating the performance of the system 
setups. We see is that there are very few cases where delivered volumes are close to the 
“disruption-free” delivery capacity, i.e. the deterministic volumes. Likewise, figure 3 
illustrates that increasing the confidence level of the system from 95% to e.g. 99% or 99.9% 
decrease the delivered volume disproportionally. This illustrates that a system that can only 
accept very limited disruptions becomes costly, and that having redundant systems may be 
more cost-effective than requiring very high operational availability of one single system. 
Figure 3: distribution of disruption cost 
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To challenge our model, we ran the simulation series two more times, with half the 
probability of disruptions and double the probability of disruptions, respectively. This allows 
for testing the robustness of our conclusions. In all three simulation runs, case 5 – the setup 
with additional storage, was preferred. The order of the remaining solutions varies a little, but 
the general impression is that our analysis is robust.
4.6 Cost benefit analysis 
The value of increased robustness in the system is illustrated in figure 3. For a practical case, 
the cost of adding robustness measures should not exceed the potential value in committing to 
delivering higher volumes. Assuming an exemplary value of USD 50 per m3 of LNG 
delivered, and annual costs of the three mitigating measures as described in section 4.3, the 
resulting system value can be described below. We have used the average value in this 
example; using the same input parameters, Case 5 is the preferred setup using both average 
delivered volumes and 95th percentile volumes. The resilience in our system comes from the 
potential of re-planning the delivery schedule after a disruptive event has occurred.
Our results suggest that the base setup for the transportation system, given our estimates for 
value of delivered cargo, was inadequate with regards to storage. Adding additional storage to 
the system, both at the export and import sides, result in higher delivered average volumes in 
95% of cases.
Table 7: Cost/efficiency estimates for the 12 system setups 
USDm Value delivered cargo Additional vessel Export storage Import storage System value 
Case 5 904,9 -16,5 -16,5 871,9 
Case 4 893,3 -16,5 -8,25 868,5 
Case 3 883,0 -16,5 866,5 
Case 0 846,5 846,5 
Case 1 853,1 -8,25 844,8 
Case 2 858,2 -16,5 841,7 
Case 11 906,4 -33,6 -16,5 -16,5 839,8 
Case 10 892,6 -33,6 -16,5 -8,25 834,3 
Case 8 883,5 -33,6 -16,5 833,4 
Case 7 875,0 -33,6 -8,25 833,2 
Case 9 882,4 -33,6 -16,5 832,3 
Case 6 865,6 -33,6 832,0 
5 Discussion 
In our introduction, we presented two research questions: 
RQ1: Can risk assessment methods combined with results from fleet planning provide more 
insight in creating resilience in maritime supply chains? 
RQ2: Does the combination of risk assessment methods and deterministic optimization 
software provide new insight for a supply chain planning problem under uncertainty? 
There are significant difficulties in coping with uncertainties in modeling maritime 
transportation systems. Stochastic optimization approaches are developing, but do still pose 
computational challenges and no existing commercial approach has been found that solve a 
ship scheduling problems. Risk assessment methods combined with deterministic scheduling 
allows for including uncertainty within supply chain scheduling, as well as to provide 
quantitative data of system reliability and its costs.  
This paper addresses how to systematically address vulnerability in a maritime transportation 
system using the Formal Vulnerability Assessment approach, how to create quantitative 
measures of disruption risk and how to test the effect of mitigating measures. These 
quantitative data are prerequisites for cost efficiency calculations, and may be obtained 
without requiring excessive resources.
Supply chain simulation using heuristics-based planning tools offers a potential to quantify 
the impact of disruption scenarios and mitigating measures. This is used to enrich a risk-based 
approach to the maritime supply chain vulnerability assessment. Monte Carlo simulation is 
used to simulate a stochastic nature of disruptions, providing a quantification of the system’s 
ability to perform its mission, namely to move goods.  
In section four, we have gone through the steps of the Formal Vulnerability Assessment, as 
illustrated in table 1. As a preparatory exercise, we have defined the system at hand, including 
the constraints of the system, the parameters in question and that the purpose of the system is 
to move LNG with minimal disruption to operation, that is to maximize the annual volume of 
LNG that the maritime supply chain system can transport given disturbing events.  
First, we identified what may go wrong, and what the critical functions of the system at hand 
are. For resource constraints, as well as that the purpose is to illustrate an approach, we have 
not completed a full hazard identification study and vulnerability assessment. However, with 
industry experts, we have identified critical risks relevant for this assessment.  
Second, we have identified three mitigating measures, based on where we believe the most 
vulnerable stages of the system is. Our setup allows for testing a number of system setups 
based on implementation of these mitigating measures. Our results showed that LNG storage 
facilities, in particular on the export side, provided increased overall delivered volumes for the 
system. This suggests that the transportation system at hand was set up as “too lean”. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that this has been the case for several existing LNG supply 
chains.
Lastly, the cost/efficiency estimation allows for pricing the value of having additional 
flexibility and robustness into the base case system setup. Flexibility in this case, is the 
recourse actions provided through the inventory routing and fleet scheduling system, that 
when a disruption scenario matures the planning system re-plan the fleet schedules to 
maximize the volume throughput of LNG. For the given parameters, we saw that the high cost 
of LNG carriers made adding additional tonnage too expensive in all scenarios – the 
flexibility in being able to move more cargo could not outweigh the cost of hiring in an 
additional vessel.
The combination of the Formal Vulnerability Assessment framework and using the 
commercial fleet planning tool TurboRouter with the Invent add-on to facilitate inventory 
routing, allows for enriching a vulnerability assessment of a transportation system. The Monte 
Carlo simulation combined with the inventory routing and scheduling tools illustrate how 
large impact combinations of disruption scenarios can do to a transportation system.   
Limitation to this study includes that the assessment was performed on a simplified dataset 
rather than an existing system. As an illustration of the approach, it serves its mission, 
although the potential for generalizing the insights is limited. 
Statistical analyses on the data material to generalize insights on the severity of the different 
scenarios are not justified. This is due to that the assessment was performed using a fictive 
(albeit realistic) scenario with a set of simplifications, that the risk assessment procedures 
were not comprehensive. 
The design of LNG transportation systems are in general made to create lean and cost-
efficient systems. However, in this paper we argue that most are created assuming that the 
world is more stable than what is the case, and that the planning is not considering the energy 
import dependency of the customers. The consequence is that critical energy transportation 
infrastructure may be too vulnerable compared to what would be optimal. We believe that the 
above discussion answers our research questions. 
6 Conclusion
The presented approach illustrates how risk assessment approaches combined with 
optimization tools can provide insight into how maritime transportation systems are 
vulnerable, what the potential consequences there are to such vulnerabilities, and how 
potential mitigation measures may be assessed.  
The World Economic Forum Global Risk Reports (WEF 2008, 2009, 2010) argue that more 
insight and knowledge on vulnerabilities highly optimized energy supply systems is needed. 
This paper contribute to this, as practitioners and researchers are given an approach to get 
more precise quantitative data on disruption costs and cost/efficiency of mitigating measures, 
providing background data for decisions on investing in reduction of supply chain 
vulnerability. We argue identifying the “vulnerability inducing bottlenecks” of a 
transportation systems allows for realizing more robust versions of these systems in a cost-
effective manner.  
Societies are increasingly becoming more dependent on natural gas as an energy source, 
where LNG is an enabling technology for both trading and storing this gas. The high cost of 
infrastructure require high utilization, where optimization tools contribute. All the while, 
societal demand for high energy supply security requires that gas supply systems are designed 
to cope with realistic operational conditions, accounting for low-frequency high-impact 
scenarios. This paper bring these factors together through an approach to analyze and to verify 
the robustness of energy transportation systems in delivering natural gas. 
The presented approach has been demonstrated on a conceptual level in this paper; we argue 
no material changes is necessary for a larger scale implementation. However, this requires 
industry involvement and resources on a much larger scale than what has been the scope of 
this paper.
Future research 
An opportunity for future research is to see how stochastic optimization tools can be 
combined with risk assessment tools to further enrich the understanding of vulnerabilities in 
sea transportation systems.  
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Appendix B: Secondary papers 
SP1: Vulnerability in global natural gas supply chains: 
A qualitative assessment of disruption risks in LNG maritime logistics 
BERLE, Ø. and ASBJØRNSLETT, B.E.,  
Published: Logistics Research Network Annual Conference 2008. Liverpool, UK. 
Abstract
Transportation of Liquefied Natural Gas, LNG, is an industry of considerable growth, 
and is of increasing relevance to the world energy supplies. Long, complex and tightly 
integrated value chains may be vulnerable to disruptions, in particular as capacities to 
offset a sudden lack of ability to deliver goods not necessarily are readily available. This 
paper discusses consequences and solutions to a low-probability high-impact disruption 
scenario in the LNG shipping industry, centered on the importance of sea lines of 
communication. A certification system on disruption risks is suggested as an incentive 
for stakeholders to assess threats which may interrupt a supply chain one may take part 
in or depend on. Partaking in any such may bring global benefits as well as being 
rational to single actors, and may also give a competitive advantage. 
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SP2: Vulnerability in European natural gas supply chains: 
A qualitative assessment of threats and risks in LNG maritime logistics 
BERLE, Ø. and ASBJØRNSLETT, B.E. 
Published: SAMRISK. 2008: Oslo. 
Abstract
The European Union is increasingly dependent on imported natural gas, whereof an 
increasing share of these imports is liquefied natural gas [LNG]. The LNG trade relies 
on complex, integrated and tightly engineered supply chains, in which shipping is a 
significant element.  
There is an inherent conflict of interests in the current trade between producers and 
receivers of LNG, in particular with regards to the optimal trade-off between cost 
efficiency in production and transportation factors and the robustness and flexibility of 
the supply chain. As producers govern the investment decision in their own best 
interest, recipients will have to adapt with measures to better serve their own measure.  
Measures to reduce receiving countries vulnerability towards disruption in their natural 
gas supply are suggested. Sorted by time horizon in which they may be implemented, 
these measures range from increased global sourcing to military protection of sea lanes, 
the use of inexpensive excess LNG carriers as seasonal storage, various contractual 
measures, and construction of new storage facilities.   
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SP3 Formal Vulnerability Assessment: A methodology for assessing and mitigating 
strategic vulnerabilities in maritime supply chains 
BERLE, Ø. and ASBJØRNSLETT, B.E. 
Published: ESREL 2009. Prague, Czech. 
Abstract
The Industrialized world, thereby including the European Union, USA, Korea and 
Japan, is increasingly dependent on imported natural gas, whereof an increasing share of 
these imports is liquefied natural gas [LNG]. Security of energy supplies is a complex 
field, involving political, economical and military policies, as well as logistics and 
supply chain issues, and is of vital interest to all industrialized nations. Both hyper-
optimization of logistics chains and energy security were emphasized in the World 
Economic Forum Global Risks 2008 report [34] as two of four emerging global risks. A 
structured Formal Vulnerability Assessment methodology is presented, aiming at 
assessing vulnerabilities in maritime supply chains. Initial insight from case studies in 
the LNG shipping industry is presented, including system descriptions, hazard 
identification, and an example of piracy as an unforeseen disruption risk. 
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SP4: Failure modes in ports – a functional approach to throughput vulnerability 
BERLE, Ø., RICE JR, J.B., and ASBJØRNSLETT, B.E. 
Published: ESREL. 2010, Taylor&Francis: Rhodes, Greece. p. 190-197. 
Abstract
Maritime supply chain risk management is a field of growing interest. Through 
interviews with maritime transportation industry stakeholders and two surveys, we have 
observed that while stakeholders in the industry have a solid focus on frequent 
operational risks, there is a lack of methods for addressing low-frequency high-impact 
disruption scenarios, in particular in seaports. Keeping a systems perspective, the 
maritime transportation system is seen as a throughput mechanism. Using the failure 
mode approach, the key functions and capabilities of the system are identified. To 
increase the system’s resilience, the creation of a “business continuity plan” for each of 
these failure modes is suggested. This is a powerful approach that allows for handling 
unforeseen disruptive events by preparing to restore a limited number of critical 
functions, rather than preparing for hundreds or thousands of potential disruptive events. 
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Appendix C: Port resilience interviews.
All questions were held with stakeholders within the maritime and port industry. All 
questions were therefore asked in this context.  
Table X: Questions for Port Resilience interviews.  
Theme Question asked 
Disruptions Please describe your thoughts on disruptions 
 How can supply chains break down? 
 Your experiences of supply chain disruptions? 
 Experiences of others that you have heard of? 
 Previous disasters in your organization? 
SCRM planning What is the state of the art? 
 How would you ideally approach the problem? 
 Future plans of SCRM planning? 
Resilience What does resilience mean to you? 
 How do your organization build in resilience? 
 Future plans for resilience? 
Methods and approaches Development of methods and approaches? 
 Who’s responsible and who should be responsible? 
 Updating the assessment? When, routines, 
comprehensive? 
 Background of the methods? 
 Your experiences with these methods? 
 Organizational involvement around the approach? 
 Collaborative versus single person responsible? 
 Future plans for methods and approaches? 
 Why not more structured methods and approaches? 
LFHI-scenarios? Has LFHI-scenarios been discussed in your organization? 
 Do you find it relevant? 
Collaboration with 
others
Do you seek to learn across larger organizations? 
 Do you seek to learn from other ports & terminals? 
 Do you seek to learn from other fields? 
Inspiration Can you think of other organizations that are 
forward/thinking with regards to resilience? 
 Do you find it feasible for stakeholders in the port- and 
maritime industry to learn from other fields? 
General Is there anything you want to add? 
 Is there anything you want to ask us? 
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Appendix D: MIT CTL Port Resilience Survey 
Questions for the MIT CTL port resilience survey? 
Relevant questions from the MIT CTL Global risk survey? 
PAGE 1 
Researchers at the MIT Center for Transportation and Logistics (CTL) are working to 
develop ways to make the maritime transportation system - in particular port 
operations - resilient to disruptions. This survey seeks input from practitioners to 
help focus and guide our research in this area. It should take about 10 minutes to 
complete. 
Additionally, CTL is part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Center of 
Excellence that is focused on Port Resilience (Center for Secure and Resilient Ports) 
and the results of this survey will help advance CTL's efforts in the research initiative. 
All responses will be kept confidential and individual responses will not be revealed 
or shared outside of the research team. All those participating in the survey may 
receive a copy of a draft paper outlining the initial scan of this issue upon request.
Note that participation is voluntary; you may decline to answer any or all questions, 
and you may decline further participation, at any time, without adverse consequences. 
Thank you in advance for your candid input and feedback. Please contact us directly 
if you have specific input that the survey does not cover. 
Sincerely,
Jim Rice 
Deputy Director - MIT Center for Transportation and Logistics 
Director - MIT Port Resilience Project 
617-258-8584
jrice@mit.edu 
P.S. For the purposes of this survey, we consider a disruption to be any time there is a 
delay to the process and/or flow of materials through the port. 
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PAGE 2 
Q1: What port operations, processes and systems need to be resilient? 
(By resilient, we mean being capable of handling disruptions and delays without 
long term impact on continuing operations and without significant impact on the 
ability to serve the customer). 
Not important Important but not 
critical
Critical Not applicable
Terminal equipment (e.g. cranes, manifolds, piping systems) 
Screening/inspection operations 
Yard/storage operations (containers, tankage) 
Maritime transportation (ship operation, reliability) 
Truck/tank loading and unloading operations 
Electric utilities 
Waterway operation and coordination (availability of tugs, pilots, air draft, etc.) 
Communication/Information Systems 
Water/waste water systems 
Intermodal equipment (e.g. trucks, material handling equipment) 
Labor agreements/availability 
Gate operations/port entry operations 
Berths
Intermodal connections (access to rail and road capacity) 
Q2. What are the most important actions that can be taken to reduce the impact 
of disruptions to ports? 
Not important Important but not 
critical
Critical
Add terminal capacity - more berths 
Add terminal capacity - more equipment (cranes) 
Flexible inter-port agreements (between ports) 
Flexible intra-port agreements (between parties within the port) 
Flexible labor agreements 
Reconfigure/improve gate operations 
Add equipment - channel clearing 
Add equipment - more vessels to coordinate or move vessels 
Improve land transportation availability 
Improve communications/information systems 
Modify waterway coordination systems 
Please note any other systems or processes not included in the above list 
Modify vessel design 
Modify waterways (reconfigure, dredge) 
Add utility capacity (electricity, water/waste water systems) 
Other (please comment in text box) - Please note any other actions that can reduce the 
impact of disruptions to ports 
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PAGE 3 Your Organization
Q3: Please note your headquarters location (if you are a shipper, carrier, third 
party or freight forwarder) and/or your terminallocations (if you are also a 
terminal operator or port authority): 
Headquarters
Location 
Primary Operations 
Locations 
North America 
Central America 
South America 
North Europe 
Eastern Europe 
South Europe 
North Africa 
Africa
China
Other Asia Pacific 
Other - If other, please provide additional detail if possible: 
Q4: Please note your role in the maritime transportation system: 
Terminal operator 
Terminal operator and carrier 
Port authority 
Port authority and terminal operator 
Carrier 
Carrier and freight forwarder 
Shipper
Shipper and terminal operator 
Freight forwarder 
Other third party 
Please provide additional explanation as needed: 
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PAGE 4 Waterways 
Q5: How frequently have you experienced or observed disruptions in 
WATERWAY OPERATION in the past 5 years? Please note the 
source of the disruption. 
Weekly Monthly Quarterly Annually Less frequently 
than annually 
N/A
Labor agreements/availability 
Equipment availability (e.g. tugs, other vessels used to coordinate and locally move 
vessels)
Channel clearing systems and equipment 
Waterway monitoring systems (e.g. level, flow, water condition, weather condition) 
Waterway access coordination 
Electric utilities 
Water/waste water systems 
Communication/Information Systems 
Other (e.g. lock availability; please add comments in text box) 
Q6
2. How long were the delays in WATERWAY OPERATIONS? (Please note the 
average and the longest delay for those disruptions 
experienced to the best of your memory). 
Average delays (in 
days) 
Longest delay (in 
days) 
Labor agreements/availability 
Equipment availability (e.g. tugs, other vessels used to coordinate and locally move 
vessels)
Channel clearing systems and equipment 
Waterway monitoring systems (e.g. level, flow, water condition,weather condition) 
Waterway access coordination 
Electric utilities 
Water/waste water systems 
Communication/Information Systems 
Other (e.g. lock availability; please add comments in text box) 
Q7
3. If you are a carrier only, please click below: 
Carrier only 
Other
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PAGE 5 Terminal Operations  
Q8: How frequently have you experienced or observed disruptions in 
TERMINAL OPERATIONS in the past 5 years? Please note the 
source of the disruption. 
Weekly Monthly Quarterly Annually Less frequently 
than annually 
N/A
Labor agreements/availability 
Equipment availability (e.g. cranes, material handling equipment) 
Berth availability 
Storage availability 
Yard/storage operations 
Screening/inspection operations 
Gate operations 
Electric utilities 
Water/waste water systems 
Communication/Information Systems 
Other (e.g. ship delays; please comment in text box below) 
Q9: How long were the delays in TERMINAL OPERATIONS? (Please note the 
average and the longest delay for those disruptions experienced to the best of 
your memory). 
Average delays (in 
days) 
Longest delay (in 
days) 
Labor agreements/availability 
Equipment availability (e.g. cranes, material handling equipment) 
Berth availability 
Storage availability 
Average delays (in days) Longest delay (in days) 
Yard/storage operations 
Screening/inspection operations 
Gate operations 
Electric utilities 
Water/waste water systems 
Communication/Information Systems 
Other (e.g. ship delays; please comment in text box) 
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PAGE 6 Intermodal Connections
Q10: How frequently have you experienced or observed disruptions in 
INTERMODAL CONNECTIONS in the past 5 years? Please note the source of 
the disruption. 
Weekly Monthly Quarterly Annually Less frequently 
than annually 
N/A
Labor agreements/availability 
Equipment availability (e.g. trucks, gate 
operations, inspection processes) 
Truck loading and unloading operations 
Rail loading and unloading operations 
Roadway capacity 
Rail capacity 
Gate operation/port entry operations 
Electric utilities 
Water/waste water systems 
Communication/Information Systems 
Other (comments in text box) 
Q11: How long were the delays in INTERMODAL CONNECTIONS? (Please 
note the average and the longest delay for those disruptions experienced to the 
best of your memory). 
Average delays (in 
days) 
Longest delay (in 
days) 
Labor agreements/availability 
Equipment availability (e.g. trucks, gate operations, inspection processes) 
Truck loading and unloading operations 
Rail loading and unloading operations 
Roadway capacity 
Rail capacity 
Gate operation/port entry operations 
Electric utilities 
Water/waste water systems 
Communication/Information Systems 
Other (comments in text box) 
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PAGE 7. Impact of Regulation 
Q12: To what extent do government agencies' (at all levels) policies and 
enforcement impact the delays in ports? 
No impact Slight 
impact
Moderate 
impact
Significant 
impact
Not
applicable/not 
familiar with this 
regulation
Jones Act 
96 Hour Advanced Notice of Arrival 
Hours of Service Rules 
Vessel Inspections 
Visa requirements for crew members 
10+2 Importer Security Filing requirements 
Cargo inspections (CBP, FDA, USDA, ATF, FW, etc.) 
Petro-chemical shipping requirements 
Q13
2. In your opinion, what regulations make ports - the terminals, intermodal 
connections, and waterways - more resilient? 
(Fill in comments in text box) 
Q14
3. In your opinion, what regulations make ports - the terminals, intermodal 
connections, and waterways - less resilient? 
(Fill in comments in text box) 
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PAGE 8 Thank you 
Thank you for your time and input on this study. 
Please indicate if you would like to receive a copy of the study results. 
Q15: Would you like to receive a copy of the study results? 
Yes, I would like to receive a copy of the study results. 
No, thanks.
PAGE 9 Request a copy of the study results  
Q16: Please note email address 
[…]
Q17: Please note name and company 
[…]
PAGE 10 Finish 
The survey is completed, thank you again for your assistance. 
Jim Rice 
Deputy Director - MIT Center for Transportation and Logistics 
Director - MIT Port Resilience Project 
617-258-8584
jrice@mit.edu 
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Appendix E: MIT CTL Global Supply Chain Risk 
Survey
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Appendix G: Theses at NTNU 
Report No. Author Title 
 Kavlie, Dag Optimization of Plane Elastic Grillages, 1967 
 Hansen, Hans R. Man-Machine Communication and Data-Storage Methods in Ship Structural 
Design, 1971 
 Gisvold, Kaare M. A Method for non-linear mixed -integer programming and its Application to 
Design Problems, 1971 
 Lund, Sverre Tanker Frame Optimalization by means of SUMT-Transformation and 
Behaviour Models, 1971 
 Vinje, Tor On Vibration of Spherical Shells Interacting with Fluid, 1972 
 Lorentz, Jan D. Tank Arrangement for Crude Oil Carriers in Accordance with the new Anti-
Pollution Regulations, 1975 
 Carlsen, Carl A. Computer-Aided Design of Tanker Structures, 1975 
 Larsen, Carl M. Static and Dynamic Analysis of Offshore Pipelines during Installation, 1976 
UR-79-01 Brigt Hatlestad, MK The finite element method used in a fatigue evaluation of fixed offshore 
platforms. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
UR-79-02 Erik Pettersen, MK Analysis and design of cellular structures. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
UR-79-03 Sverre Valsgård, MK Finite difference and finite element methods applied to nonlinear analysis of 
plated structures. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
UR-79-04 Nils T. Nordsve, MK Finite element collapse analysis of structural members considering 
imperfections and stresses due to fabrication. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
UR-79-05 Ivar J. Fylling, MK Analysis of towline forces in ocean towing systems. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
UR-80-06 Nils Sandsmark, MM Analysis of Stationary and Transient Heat Conduction by the Use of the Finite 
Element Method. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
UR-80-09 Sverre Haver, MK Analysis of uncertainties related to the stochastic modeling of ocean waves. 
(Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
UR-81-15 Odland, Jonas On the Strength of welded Ring stiffened cylindrical Shells primarily 
subjected to axial Compression 
UR-82-17 Engesvik, Knut Analysis of Uncertainties in the fatigue Capacity of Welded Joints 
UR-82-18 Rye, Henrik Ocean wave groups 
UR-83-30 Eide, Oddvar Inge On Cumulative Fatigue Damage in Steel Welded Joints 
UR-83-33 Mo, Olav Stochastic Time Domain Analysis of Slender Offshore Structures 
UR-83-34 Amdahl, Jørgen Energy absorption in Ship-platform impacts 
UR-84-37 Mørch, Morten Motions and mooring forces of semi submersibles as determined by full-scale 
measurements and theoretical analysis 
UR-84-38 Soares, C. Guedes Probabilistic models for load effects in ship structures 
UR-84-39 Aarsnes, Jan V. Current forces on ships 
UR-84-40 Czujko, Jerzy Collapse Analysis of Plates subjected to Biaxial Compression and Lateral 
Load
UR-85-46 Alf G. Engseth, MK Finite element collapse analysis of tubular steel offshore structures. (Dr.Ing. 
Thesis)
UR-86-47 Dengody Sheshappa, MP A Computer Design Model for Optimizing Fishing Vessel Designs Based on 
Techno-Economic Analysis. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
UR-86-48 Vidar Aanesland, MH A Theoretical and Numerical Study of Ship Wave Resistance. (Dr.Ing. 
Thesis)
UR-86-49 Heinz-Joachim Wessel, 
MK
Fracture Mechanics Analysis of Crack Growth in Plate Girders. (Dr.Ing. 
Thesis)
UR-86-50 Jon Taby, MK Ultimate and Post-ultimate Strength of Dented Tubular Members. (Dr.Ing. 
Thesis)
UR-86-51 Walter Lian, MH A Numerical Study of Two-Dimensional Separated Flow Past Bluff Bodies at 
Moderate KC-Numbers. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
UR-86-52 Bjørn Sortland, MH Force Measurements in Oscillating Flow on Ship Sections and Circular 
Cylinders in a U-Tube Water Tank. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
UR-86-53 Kurt Strand, MM A System Dynamic Approach to One-dimensional Fluid Flow. (Dr.Ing. 
Thesis)
UR-86-54 Arne Edvin Løken, MH Three Dimensional Second Order Hydrodynamic Effects on Ocean Structures 
in Waves. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
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UR-86-55 Sigurd Falch, MH A Numerical Study of Slamming of Two-Dimensional Bodies. (Dr.Ing. 
Thesis)
UR-87-56 Arne Braathen, MH Application of a Vortex Tracking Method to the Prediction of Roll Damping 
of a Two-Dimension Floating Body. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
UR-87-57 Bernt Leira, MK Gaussian Vector Processes for Reliability Analysis involving Wave-Induced 
Load Effects. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
UR-87-58 Magnus Småvik, MM Thermal Load and Process Characteristics in a Two-Stroke Diesel Engine 
with Thermal Barriers (in Norwegian). (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-88-59 Bernt Arild Bremdal, MP An Investigation of Marine Installation Processes – A Knowledge - Based 
Planning Approach. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-88-60 Xu Jun, MK Non-linear Dynamic Analysis of Space-framed Offshore Structures. (Dr.Ing. 
Thesis)
MTA-89-61 Gang Miao, MH Hydrodynamic Forces and Dynamic Responses of Circular Cylinders in Wave 
Zones. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-89-62 Martin Greenhow, MH Linear and Non-Linear Studies of Waves and Floating Bodies. Part I and Part 
II. (Dr.Techn. Thesis) 
MTA-89-63 Chang Li, MH Force Coefficients of Spheres and Cubes in Oscillatory Flow with and without 
Current. (Dr.Ing. Thesis 
MTA-89-64 Hu Ying, MP A Study of Marketing and Design in Development of Marine Transport 
Systems. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-89-65 Arild Jæger, MH Seakeeping, Dynamic Stability and Performance of a Wedge Shaped Planing 
Hull. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-89-66 Chan Siu Hung, MM The dynamic characteristics of tilting-pad bearings 
MTA-89-67 Kim Wikstrøm, MP Analysis av projekteringen for ett offshore projekt. (Licenciat-avhandling) 
MTA-89-68 Jiao Guoyang, MK Reliability Analysis of Crack Growth under Random Loading, considering 
Model Updating. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-89-69 Arnt Olufsen, MK Uncertainty and Reliability Analysis of Fixed Offshore Structures. (Dr.Ing. 
Thesis)
MTA-89-70 Wu Yu-Lin, MR System Reliability Analyses of Offshore Structures using improved Truss and 
Beam Models. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-90-71 Jan Roger Hoff, MH Three-dimensional Green function of a vessel with forward speed in waves. 
(Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-90-72 Rong Zhao, MH Slow-Drift Motions of a Moored Two-Dimensional Body in Irregular Waves. 
(Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-90-73 Atle Minsaas, MP Economical Risk Analysis. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-90-74 Knut-Aril Farnes, MK Long-term Statistics of Response in Non-linear Marine Structures. (Dr.Ing. 
Thesis)
MTA-90-75 Torbjørn Sotberg, MK Application of Reliability Methods for Safety Assessment of Submarine 
Pipelines. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-90-76 Zeuthen, Steffen, MP SEAMAID. A computational model of the design process in a constraint-
based logic programming environment. An example from the offshore 
domain. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-91-77 Haagensen, Sven, MM Fuel Dependant Cyclic Variability in a Spark Ignition Engine - An Optical 
Approach. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-91-78 Løland, Geir, MH Current forces on and flow through fish farms. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-91-79 Hoen, Christopher, MK System Identification of Structures Excited by Stochastic Load Processes. 
(Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-91-80 Haugen, Stein, MK Probabilistic Evaluation of Frequency of Collision between Ships and 
Offshore Platforms. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-91-81 Sødahl, Nils, MK Methods for Design and Analysis of Flexible Risers. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-91-82 Ormberg, Harald, MK Non-linear Response Analysis of Floating Fish Farm Systems. (Dr.Ing. 
Thesis)
MTA-91-83 Marley, Mark J., MK Time Variant Reliability under Fatigue Degradation. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-91-84 Krokstad, Jørgen R., MH Second-order Loads in Multidirectional Seas. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-91-85 Molteberg, Gunnar A., 
MM
The Application of System Identification Techniques to Performance 
Monitoring of Four Stroke Turbocharged Diesel Engines. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-92-86 Mørch, Hans Jørgen 
Bjelke, MH 
Aspects of Hydrofoil Design: with Emphasis on Hydrofoil Interaction in Calm 
Water. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
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MTA-92-87 Chan Siu Hung, MM Nonlinear Analysis of Rotordynamic Instabilities in Highspeed 
Turbomachinery. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-92-88 Bessason, Bjarni, MK Assessment of Earthquake Loading and Response of Seismically Isolated 
Bridges. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-92-89 Langli, Geir, MP Improving Operational Safety through exploitation of Design Knowledge - an 
investigation of offshore platform safety. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-92-90 Sævik, Svein, MK On Stresses and Fatigue in Flexible Pipes. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-92-91 Ask, Tor Ø., MM Ignition and Flame Growth in Lean Gas-Air Mixtures. An Experimental 
Study with a Schlieren System. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-86-92 Hessen, Gunnar, MK Fracture Mechanics Analysis of Stiffened Tubular Members. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-93-93 Steinebach, Christian, 
MM
Knowledge Based Systems for Diagnosis of Rotating Machinery. (Dr.Ing. 
Thesis)
MTA-93-94 Dalane, Jan Inge, MK System Reliability in Design and Maintenance of Fixed Offshore Structures. 
(Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-93-95 Steen, Sverre, MH Cobblestone Effect on SES. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-93-96 Karunakaran, Daniel, 
MK
Nonlinear Dynamic Response and Reliability Analysis of Drag-dominated 
Offshore Platforms. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-93-97 Hagen, Arnulf, MP The Framework of a Design Process Language. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-93-98 Nordrik, Rune, MM Investigation of Spark Ignition and Autoignition in Methane and Air Using 
Computational Fluid Dynamics and Chemical Reaction Kinetics. A 
Numerical Study of Ignition Processes in Internal Combustion Engines. 
(Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-94-99 Passano, Elizabeth, MK Efficient Analysis of Nonlinear Slender Marine Structures. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-94-100 Kvålsvold, Jan, MH Hydroelastic Modelling of Wetdeck Slamming on Multihull Vessels. (Dr.Ing. 
Thesis)
MTA-94-102 Bech, Sidsel M., MK Experimental and Numerical Determination of Stiffness and Strength of 
GRP/PVC Sandwich Structures. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-95-103 Paulsen, Hallvard, MM A Study of Transient Jet and Spray using a Schlieren Method and Digital 
Image Processing. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-95-104 Hovde, Geir Olav, MK Fatigue and Overload Reliability of Offshore Structural Systems, Considering 
the Effect of Inspection and Repair. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-95-105 Wang, Xiaozhi, MK Reliability Analysis of Production Ships with Emphasis on Load Combination 
and Ultimate Strength. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-95-106 Ulstein, Tore, MH Nonlinear Effects of a Flexible Stern Seal Bag on Cobblestone Oscillations of 
an SES. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-95-107 Solaas, Frøydis, MH Analytical and Numerical Studies of Sloshing in Tanks. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-95-108 Hellan, Øyvind, MK Nonlinear Pushover and Cyclic Analyses in Ultimate Limit State Design and 
Reassessment of Tubular Steel Offshore Structures. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-95-109 Hermundstad, Ole A., 
MK
Theoretical and Experimental Hydroelastic Analysis of High Speed Vessels. 
(Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-96-110 Bratland, Anne K., MH Wave-Current Interaction Effects on Large-Volume Bodies in Water of Finite 
Depth. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-96-111 Herfjord, Kjell, MH A Study of Two-dimensional Separated Flow by a Combination of the Finite 
Element Method and Navier-Stokes Equations. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-96-112 Æsøy, Vilmar, MM Hot Surface Assisted Compression Ignition in a Direct Injection Natural Gas 
Engine. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-96-113 Eknes, Monika L., MK Escalation Scenarios Initiated by Gas Explosions on Offshore Installations. 
(Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-96-114 Erikstad, Stein O., MP A Decision Support Model for Preliminary Ship Design. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-96-115 Pedersen, Egil, MH A Nautical Study of Towed Marine Seismic Streamer Cable Configurations. 
(Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-97-116 Moksnes, Paul O., MM Modelling Two-Phase Thermo-Fluid Systems Using Bond Graphs. (Dr.Ing. 
Thesis)
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MTA-97-117 Halse, Karl H., MK On Vortex Shedding and Prediction of Vortex-Induced Vibrations of Circular 
Cylinders. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-97-118 Igland, Ragnar T., MK Reliability Analysis of Pipelines during Laying, considering Ultimate 
Strength under Combined Loads. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-97-119 Pedersen, Hans-P., MP Levendefiskteknologi for fiskefartøy. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-98-120 Vikestad, Kyrre, MK Multi-Frequency Response of a Cylinder Subjected to Vortex Shedding and 
Support Motions. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-98-121 Azadi, Mohammad R. E., 
MK
Analysis of Static and Dynamic Pile-Soil-Jacket Behaviour. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-98-122 Ulltang, Terje, MP A Communication Model for Product Information. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-98-123 Torbergsen, Erik, MM Impeller/Diffuser Interaction Forces in Centrifugal Pumps. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-98-124 Hansen, Edmond, MH A Discrete Element Model to Study Marginal Ice Zone Dynamics and the 
Behaviour of Vessels Moored in Broken Ice. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-98-125 Videiro, Paulo M., MK Reliability Based Design of Marine Structures. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-99-126 Mainçon, Philippe, MK Fatigue Reliability of Long Welds Application to Titanium Risers. (Dr.Ing. 
Thesis)
MTA-99-127 Haugen, Elin M., MH Hydroelastic Analysis of Slamming on Stiffened Plates with Application to 
Catamaran Wetdecks. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-99-128 Langhelle, Nina K., MK Experimental Validation and Calibration of Nonlinear Finite Element Models 
for Use in Design of Aluminium Structures Exposed to Fire. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-99-129 Berstad, Are J., MK Calculation of Fatigue Damage in Ship Structures. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-99-130 Andersen, Trond M., 
MM
Short Term Maintenance Planning. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-99-131 Tveiten, Bård Wathne, 
MK
Fatigue Assessment of Welded Aluminium Ship Details. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-99-132 Søreide, Fredrik, MP Applications of underwater technology in deep water archaeology. Principles 
and practice. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-99-133 Tønnessen, Rune, MH A Finite Element Method Applied to Unsteady Viscous Flow Around 2D 
Blunt Bodies With Sharp Corners. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-99-134 Elvekrok, Dag R., MP Engineering Integration in Field Development Projects in the Norwegian Oil 
and Gas Industry. The Supplier Management of Norne. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-99-135 Fagerholt, Kjetil, MP Optimeringsbaserte Metoder for Ruteplanlegging innen skipsfart. (Dr.Ing. 
Thesis)
MTA-99-136 Bysveen, Marie, MM Visualization in Two Directions on a Dynamic Combustion Rig for Studies of 
Fuel Quality. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-2000-137 Storteig, Eskild, MM Dynamic characteristics and leakage performance of liquid annular seals in 
centrifugal pumps. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-2000-138 Sagli, Gro, MK Model uncertainty and simplified estimates of long term extremes of hull 
girder loads in ships. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-2000-139 Tronstad, Harald, MK Nonlinear analysis and design of cable net structures like fishing gear based 
on the finite element method. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-2000-140 Kroneberg, André, MP Innovation in shipping by using scenarios. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-2000-141 Haslum, Herbjørn Alf, 
MH
Simplified methods applied to nonlinear motion of spar platforms. (Dr.Ing. 
Thesis)
MTA-2001-142 Samdal, Ole Johan, MM Modelling of Degradation Mechanisms and Stressor Interaction on Static 
Mechanical Equipment Residual Lifetime. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-2001-143 Baarholm, Rolf Jarle, 
MH
Theoretical and experimental studies of wave impact underneath decks of 
offshore platforms. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-2001-144 Wang, Lihua, MK Probabilistic Analysis of Nonlinear Wave-induced Loads on Ships. (Dr.Ing. 
Thesis)
MTA-2001-145 Kristensen, Odd H. Holt, 
MK
Ultimate Capacity of Aluminium Plates under Multiple Loads, Considering 
HAZ Properties. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-2001-146 Greco, Marilena, MH A Two-Dimensional Study of Green-Water Loading. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-2001-147 Heggelund, Svein E., 
MK
Calculation of Global Design Loads and Load Effects in Large High Speed 
Catamarans. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-2001-148 Babalola, Olusegun T., 
MK
Fatigue Strength of Titanium Risers – Defect Sensitivity. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
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MTA-2001-149 Mohammed, Abuu K., 
MK
Nonlinear Shell Finite Elements for Ultimate Strength and Collapse Analysis 
of Ship Structures. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-2002-150 Holmedal, Lars E., MH Wave-current interactions in the vicinity of the sea bed. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-2002-151 Rognebakke, Olav F., 
MH
Sloshing in rectangular tanks and interaction with ship motions. (Dr.Ing. 
Thesis)
MTA-2002-152 Lader, Pål Furset, MH Geometry and Kinematics of Breaking Waves. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-2002-153 Yang, Qinzheng, MH Wash and wave resistance of ships in finite water depth. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-2002-154 Melhus, Øyvin, MM Utilization of VOC in Diesel Engines. Ignition and combustion of VOC 
released by crude oil tankers. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-2002-155 Ronæss, Marit, MH Wave Induced Motions of Two Ships Advancing on Parallel Course. (Dr.Ing. 
Thesis)
MTA-2002-156 Økland, Ole D., MK Numerical and experimental investigation of whipping in twin hull vessels 
exposed to severe wet deck slamming. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-2002-157 Ge, Chunhua, MK Global Hydroelastic Response of Catamarans due to Wet Deck Slamming. 
(Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
MTA-2002-158 Byklum, Eirik, MK Nonlinear Shell Finite Elements for Ultimate Strength and Collapse Analysis 
of Ship Structures. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
IMT-2003-1 Chen, Haibo, MK Probabilistic Evaluation of FPSO-Tanker Collision in Tandem Offloading 
Operation. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
IMT-2003-2 Skaugset, Kjetil Bjørn, 
MK
On the Suppression of Vortex Induced Vibrations of Circular Cylinders by 
Radial Water Jets. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
IMT-2003-3 Chezhian, Muthu Three-Dimensional Analysis of Slamming. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
IMT-2003-4 Buhaug, Øyvind Deposit Formation on Cylinder Liner Surfaces in Medium Speed Engines. 
(Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
IMT-2003-5 Tregde, Vidar Aspects of Ship Design: Optimization of Aft Hull with Inverse Geometry 
Design. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
IMT-2003-6 Wist, Hanne Therese Statistical Properties of Successive Ocean Wave Parameters. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
IMT-2004-7 Ransau, Samuel Numerical Methods for Flows with Evolving Interfaces. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
IMT-2004-8 Soma, Torkel Blue-Chip or Sub-Standard. A data interrogation approach of identity safety 
characteristics of shipping organization. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
IMT-2004-9 Ersdal, Svein An experimental study of hydrodynamic forces on cylinders and cables in 
near axial flow. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
IMT-2005-10 Brodtkorb, Per Andreas The Probability of Occurrence of Dangerous Wave Situations at Sea. (Dr.Ing. 
Thesis)
IMT-2005-11 Yttervik, Rune Ocean current variability in relation to offshore engineering. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
IMT-2005-12 Fredheim, Arne Current Forces on Net-Structures. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
IMT-2005-13 Heggernes, Kjetil Flow around marine structures. (Dr.Ing. Thesis 
IMT-2005-14 Fouques, Sebastien Lagrangian Modelling of Ocean Surface Waves and Synthetic Aperture Radar 
Wave Measurements. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
IMT-2006-15 Holm, Håvard Numerical calculation of viscous free surface flow around marine structures. 
(Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
IMT-2006-16 Bjørheim, Lars G. Failure Assessment of Long Through Thickness Fatigue Cracks in Ship Hulls. 
(Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
IMT-2006-17 Hansson, Lisbeth Safety Management for Prevention of Occupational Accidents. (Dr.Ing. 
Thesis)
IMT-2006-18 Zhu, Xinying Application of the CIP Method to Strongly Nonlinear Wave-Body Interaction 
Problems. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
IMT-2006-19 Reite, Karl Johan Modelling and Control of Trawl Systems. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
IMT-2006-20 Smogeli, Øyvind 
Notland
Control of Marine Propellers. From Normal to Extreme Conditions. (Dr.Ing. 
Thesis)
IMT-2007-21 Storhaug, Gaute Experimental Investigation of Wave Induced Vibrations and Their Effect on 
the Fatigue Loading of Ships. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
IMT-2007-22 Sun, Hui A Boundary Element Method Applied to Strongly Nonlinear Wave-Body 
Interaction Problems. (PhD Thesis, CeSOS) 
IMT-2007-23 Rustad, Anne Marthine Modelling and Control of Top Tensioned Risers. (PhD Thesis, CeSOS) 
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